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A bstract
This thesis presents a theoretical analysis of industrialization. Two kinds of models are 
developed. The first type incorporates the following features:
1 ) Oligopolistic behaviour and strategic interaction.
2) Endogenous technological capability and market structure.
3) A general equilibrium framework.
4) A dualistic structure (characteristic of many developing countries).
5) Asymmetries in initial conditions.
In part I, chapter 2 develops the benchmark model in autarky. Chapter 3 opens the econ­
omy. Under symmetry, trade is welfare improving. Asymmetric initial conditions imply that 
a backward nation may not benefit from trade with an advanced country, while the advanced 
nation will always benefit from trade with the backward nation. Subsidizing technological 
capability allows the backward economy to catch-up with the advanced economy’s wage. The 
subsidy is welfare improving if funded with a lump-sum tax.
In part II we extend the models from part I to variable intensity of competition. Chapter 4 
does this for autarky, chapter 5 for the open economy. We encompass intensities of competition 
ranging from individual to joint profit maximization. In the open economy, intensities of 
competition lower than individual profit maximization generate a separating surface for the 
wage rate. Below the surface, trade yields a higher wage rate than autarky (the reverse holds 
above the surface). The separating surface provides a positive basis for differential trade policy 
between industries.
The second type of model (chapter 6 ) is a Big-Push framework with multiple equilibria, and 
industrialization refers to the transition between these. A Cournot (upstream) industry fea­
tures endogenous technological capability and vertical linkages to a competitive (downstream) 
industry. The wage rate depends on whether the economy can fit through a ‘window of op­
portunity’ whilst on the transition path. One of the central results is that if the wage rate 
grows too steeply, the window will be missed and the economy may end up in a lower (post 
transition) level of development.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There is a long standing line of inquiry into how some newly industrializing economies achieved 
great progress in industrialization, with particular reference to Japan, South Korea and other 
East Asian economies (usually Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, but Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Thailand are sometimes included). This industrialization process is often referred to as 
the ‘East Asian Miracle’, after the World Bank study (1993). Within this field of research, 
there are several debates.
First, there is a debate on how to account for these economies’ performance, and to what 
extent productive factors (capital and labour) contributed to this. This debate is about how 
much of these economies’ performance can be accounted for by factor accumulation. The 
unaccounted for residual (to quote Abramovitz, 1956, p. 1 1 : “the measure of our ignorance”) 
is labelled Total Factor Productivity (TFP), and is usually ascribed to technological progress.
A second debate asks whether government intervention has had anything to do with the eco­
nomic performance of these economies. This strand of the literature tries to establish whether 
economic policies introduced by these governments were responsible for their economies’ out­
standing performance, and which of these policies were in fact determinant to their perfor­
mance. This is where our main focus of attention lies. Within this debate, there are two 
aspects which will be our main focus of attention: Firstly, on how latecomers can catch-up 
with the leading economies. Secondly, on the role of asymmetries in initial conditions and of 
the intensity of competition in this catching-up process. In this thesis we aim to uncover the 
theoretical underpinnings of this debate, and to evaluate the arguments analytically. From a 
positive perspective, we will address the question of whether government intervention can be 
justified. If such intervention can be justified at all, we then ask whether different industries 
call for differential treatment in terms of industrial, trade and competition policies, that is, we
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ask whether ‘industrial targeting’ can be justified and what precise form should such policy 
take? Prom a normative perspective, we will consider the welfare consequences of such policies.
Several authors have addressed these issues from a historical perspective. Bayly (2004) pro­
vides a summary account of this debate in 18th century Europe. During that period mainland 
Europe was faced with the problem of catching-up with England. On the British side, foreign 
secretary (and later on, prime minister) Lord Palmerston argued for, and fostered military 
attacks in the name of, trade liberalization1. Meanwhile, in continental Europe Friedrich List 
(1885) put forward an early version of the Infant Industry argument, arguing for economies 
to remain closed during the catching-up phase, and to liberalize trade only after domestic 
industry could compete against foreign ones on a level ground.
In relation to this debate, Lall (1992) states that: “Such interventions have to be selective, 
requiring that policy makers identify specific sectors...for promotion...to exploit their growth 
potential, linkages or externalities...The best combination may be the selective...protection of 
domestic markets, together with strong incentives for exports activity and domestic competi­
tion” (p. 172). However, even assuming that intervention is indeed justifiable (a very strong 
assumption in itself), with the exception of the study by Dixit and Grossman (1986), there 
is little in the literature to guide us as to the precise form of economic policy that should be 
implemented. Reference is often made to promotion of income-elastic goods, whose demand 
would expand as the world grows wealthier (Amsden, 1989), as well as Lall’s ‘growth potential, 
linkages or externalities’. Lall (1992) goes on to warn us that “the experience of developing 
countries is replete with instances of misguided intervention...Consequently, improved methods 
of intervening are worth striving for” (p. 183). What is required is a precise, testable theory 
of the form economic policy should take (if such intervention is indeed justifiable in the first 
instance).
The phenomenal growth of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore has 
sparked an ongoing flurry of research in economics and in the related discipline of development 
studies. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), state that:
“Virtually every country that experienced rapid growth of productivity and liv­
ing standards over the last 200 years has done so by industrializing. Countries that 
have successfully industrialized -tinned to the production of manufactures taking 
advantage of scale economies- are the ones that grew rich, be they eighteenth-
1Milanovic (2003) provides an analysis of the coercive aspects associated to the construction of empires and 
how this relates to trade liberalization.
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century England or twentieth-century Korea and Japan...What is it that allows 
some but not other countries to industrialize? And can government intervention 
accelerate the process?” (p. 1003)
In parts I and II of the thesis we develop a standard general equilibrium framework with 
oligopolistic interactions to address the issues highlighted. In part III some of these questions 
are brought up again in the context of a Big-Push framework, again with an emphasis on 
oligopolistic interactions.
Finally, there is a third debate on whether the East Asian growth episode was worthwhile 
at all. Within the first debate, there is a body of (albeit debatable) evidence which supports 
the view that after accounting for factor accumulation, there is very little left to explain of 
East Asian growth. Such a high rate of factor accumulation occurred through sacrifices in 
current consumption and leisure. This calls into question whether such sacrifices were indeed 
welfare improving from an intertemporal perspective (Saxel, 1995). Wade (1992) mentions that 
other indicators of human development in East Asia are way below the level expected for their 
income. In particular, life expectancy at birth in Sri Lanka is higher than South Korea’s (69 
years in 1986), whilst the latter’s per capita income is six times higher. Pollution has become 
a major problem in some areas and Seoul has one of the world’s highest concentrations of 
air borne sulfur dioxide. The low level of public health care in Korea has been highlighted in 
Amsden (1989) and Wade (1992). Dictatorial regimes have carried out widespread repression at 
great human cost. Such regimes are often hailed as ‘benevolent dictatorships’, and support for 
the idea that such regimes are almost necessary to achieve outstanding economic performance 
is pervasive in the literature, to the extent that some works have been classified as a revival 
of modernization theory (Amsden, 1989 and Wade, 1990 are cited as examples of the latter 
by Lie, 1991). There is also a literature which documents the conditions of workers in East 
Asia (see Choi, 1998; Lie, 1991; Jomo, 1994; Hart-Landsberg, 1992 and Ogle, 1990). The 
consensus within this literature is that when one looks more closely at the relative sacrifices 
made by workers versus entrepreneurs, it is the workers (to put it mildly) who have drawn the 
shortest straw. This view documents appalling work conditions, and claims that the welfare of 
workers has been the adjustment variable which allowed entrepreneurs to achieve exceptional 
generation of wealth. Indeed, these accounts resemble a striking resemblance to records of 
British work conditions during the first industrial revolution (Marx, 1903, v. I, ch. 10 and v. 
II, ch. 25 and Engels, 1958). We shall have more to say on this issue, especially in chapter 
6 , where we develop a model of the Big Push. In the context of this model, positive analysis
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shows that the wage rate does indeed expand during the industrialization process, but it is 
essential that it does so at a not-too-fast rate. Otherwise, it runs the risk of thwarting the 
industrial expansion process. Apart from this issue and the reasonable caveat that not all was 
the colour of roses in the ‘East Asian Miracle’, we shall not dwell on this debate.
The Sources o f G rowth D ebate
In the economics discipline, the main approach has been to perform growth accounting 
exercises for these economies, with (albeit to a lesser extent) some focus on theoretical research 
(for theory, see Lau and Wan, 1993; Lucas, 1993 and Wan, 2004). In the growth accounting 
literature, Young (1995) carried out a careful growth accounting exercise for Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea. His findings, summarized in table 1 , indicate that total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth in these economies was not particularly outstanding.
Hong Kong Singapore South Korea Taiwan
Economy* 2.3 0.2 1.7 2.1
Manufacturing# NA -1.0 3.0 1.7
Other Industry NA NA 1.9 1.4
Services NA NA 1.7 2.6
Private Sector NA NA NA 2.3
NA - Not available. * In the case of Korea and Taiwan, agriculture is excluded. # In the 
case of Singapore, the years are 1970-1990.
Source: Young (1995), table Xm.
Table 1. Average Total Factor Productivity Growth in South East Asia (percent per annum)
To provide a point of reference, in table 2 compares TFP growth rates across some developed 
and Latin American economies.
Country Period TFP Growth Country Period TFP Growth
Canada 1960-1989 0.5 Brazil 1950-1985 1.6
France 1960-1989 1.5 Chile 1940-1985 0.8
Germany 1960-1989 1.6 Mexico 1940-1985 1.2
Italy 1960-1989 2.0 Brazil (M) 1960-1980 1.0
Japan 1960-1989 2.0 Chile (M) 1960-1980 0.7
United Kingdom 1960-1989 1.3 Mexico (M) 1940-1970 1.3
United States 1960-1989 0.4 Venezuela (M) 1950-1970 2.6
M-Manufacturing alone; developed economies are from Dougherty (1991); Latin American 
economies are from Elias (1990).
Source: Young (1995), table XTV.
Table 2. Comparative Total Factor Productivity Growth in Some Developed and Latin 
American Economies (percent per annum)
As can be seen from comparing tables 1 and 2, South East Asian TFP growth rates hardly 
constitute a ‘miracle’. Young’s conclusion is that the spectacular growth rates achieved by 
these economies were generated by factor accumulation and effective transformation of these 
factors into output: Lots of perspiration, with a little inspiration. The focus of attention
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now becomes how these economies achieved such high rates of factor accumulation, and what 
mechanisms did they implement to transform these inputs into output efficiently. In a sense, 
these findings were bad news for growth, since it was hoped that if TFP had contributed 
substantially to South East Asian performance, there would indeed be hope of maintaining 
such high growth rates indefinitely. Moreover, rapid factor accumulation was achieved at the 
expense of consumption and leisure, thus from the perspective of intertemporal welfare, it is 
not clear whether the sacrifices made yield a positive payoff.
Nonetheless, this is by no means a settled issue. Other studies have found TFP growth rates 
as high as 4.1% per annum for South Korea (Christensen and Cummings, 1981). Young (1995) 
reconciles these findings with his own work by carefully delving into the data and methodology 
used by the other studies and arguing how his estimates are more reliable. In subsequent 
studies, Young’s findings have been criticized and the discussion has re-ignited. Sarel (1995) 
documents that TFP growth estimates for South East Asia axe highly sensitive to the time 
period chosen and to the relative contributions of labour and capital, and finds TFP growth 
estimates which are much higher than Young’s (1994, 1995). Nelson and Pack (1999) argue 
that growth accounting is highly sensitive to underlying assumptions on parameter values, and 
take the view that the methodology is, in general, unreliable. They instead focus on estimating 
growth rates from cross-country growth regressions, and then comparing these estimates with 
the observed growth rates for South East Asia. To this end, they use the following growth 
regression from Levine and Renelt (1992):
GDPGi =  -0.83 -  0.35-RODP60i -  0.38GPOPi +  3.17SECi 4-17.5/* for * =  1 ,..., 101
(i.i)
where GDPGi is the average growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in country i 
between 1960 and 1989, RGDP60i is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity terms in 
country i in 1960, GPOPi is average population growth in country i between 1960 and 1989, 
SECi is secondary school enrollment in country i in 1960 as a percentage of the appropriate 
age group, and 7* is the average investment/GDP ratio in country i between 1960 and 1989. 
This equation was estimated for a cross section of 101 countries, all coefficients are significant 
at the 5% level, and the value of R2 is 0.46. Using this regression, Nelson and Pack (1999) 
proceed to predict growth rates for countries which featured high rates of capital accumulation, 
based on their values of the explanatory variables in equation (1 .1 ), and compare these with 
the observed outcomes. Their results are shown in table 3, in decreasing order of the values of 
actual minus predicted growth of GDP per capita.
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Country Investment/GDP
1960-1989
Actual minus Predicted growth 
of GDP per capita
Taiwan 25.0 4.7
Korea 24.9 3.2
Hong Kong 27.3 3.1
Singapore 34.3 1.7
Ireland 22.2 1.1
Greece 24.2 0.8
Panam a 24.0 0.2
Portugal 23.7 -0.2
Algeria 35.0 -2.6
Gabon 40.0 -3.0
Jamaica 25.0 -3.7
Source: Nelson and Pack (1999), table 4.
Table 3. Investment Ratios and Predicted Minus Actual Growth Rates for Countries with 
High Rates of Investment (percent per annum)
This methodology indicates that the four South East Asian economies exhibited much higher 
growth rates than equation (1.1) would predict. Moreover, other high investment economies 
showed poor performance relative to their predicted values. Why the difference? Nelson and 
Pack conjecture that:
“a critical element was the...effort of firms...that allowed them to successfully 
initiate new technologies and absorb new equipment. While other countries with 
high investment-GDP ratios could purchase machinery that gave them the potential 
to improve their productivity, this could only be successful when it was combined 
with domestic effort to absorb the new technology” (1999, p. 431)
Krugman (1994) takes the view that high rates of factor accumulation automatically led 
to higher output, and that, similarly to Young (1995), there is no ‘miracle’ to explain. Rodrik 
(2005) argues against the use of cross-country growth regressions: The all encompassing nature 
of the problem means that endogeneity of explanatory variables (and the associated estimator 
bias) is almost inescapable. The problem is compounded when one notes that finding appro­
priate instruments (to be used in instrumental variables techniques which could potentially 
resolve the endogeneity bias) runs against similar, pervasive, endogeneity problems. Moreover, 
Rodrik (2005) is particularly skeptic on using policy indicators as explanatory variables, since 
government policy is highly unlikely to be random at all, let alone exogenous. A recent alter­
native is the use of panel data techniques to resolve the endogeneity problem (Islam, 1995), 
but there is still much debate regarding appropriate technique (Lee et al., 1997).
Summing up, whilst significant progress has been made, the magnitude of TFP or un­
explained growth in per capita income in South East Asia remains an unresolved question.
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Notwithstanding the objections, when analyzed from a macroeconomic perspective, the pic­
ture that emerges is that high rates of factor accumulation certainly did account for a lot of 
South East Asia’s growth. However, there remains a considerable fraction of this growth which 
cannot be accounted for2. This fraction is at best ‘above standard’, and at worst similar to 
OECD history (with the exception of Singapore, which features much lower TFP growth). 
That a number of countries which were very poor achieved such high rates of factor accumu­
lation, then managed to transform the latter into output in a relatively efficient manner, and 
still accomplished TFP growth rates similar or slightly better to those of the OECD is by all 
standards an outstanding feat. Therein lies the ‘miracle’. The emphasis then shifts to asking: 
What caused the high rates of factor accumulation? How did these economies prevent factor 
accumulation from going to waste? How did they maintain TFP from collapsing?
H istorical Perspectives
Views on the underlying causes of the East Asian Miracle vary widely. At one extreme we 
have the view that such outstanding performance is due to the extent of the free market in 
these economies, and that government intervention, if anything, hindered what could have been 
an even more outstanding result. In Robert Wade’s view (1990, p. 342) this is highly unlikely, 
given the paucity of such growth experiences (although the same argument could be reversed 
by focussing on the historical scarcity of laissez fare governments). At the other extreme we 
find the view that high-quality government interventions were a sine qua non condition for such 
spectacular growth. Ideology plays no minor role in the variance of perspectives, and perhaps 
this is something we could do without (at least from the perspective of scientific method).
There is a large literature focussing on historical accounts of the East Asian economies, 
their industries and the behaviour of their governments. The World Bank (1993) carried 
out an analysis for eight East Asian economies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) for the latter half of the twentieth century, 
and concludes by recommending macroeconomic stability, a focus on early education, support 
of agriculture, building a sound financial system, openness to foreign ideas and technology 
and letting prices reflect economic scarcities. The study warns that: “promoting specific
2 When considering the magnitude of this ‘unexplained’ proportion, it is hard to resist the temptation to 
dismiss it as measurement error. Indeed, the difficulties of accurately measuring capital and labour inputs are 
paramount. Unexplained growth in the order of 1-2% per year hardly seems sufficient to justify such a strong 
diversion of attention. Moreover, Young (1995) argues that higher estimates can be explained by reference 
to methodological flaws in particular T FP studies. The skepticism is compounded when one considers the 
magnitude of the underground economy. Indeed, with OECD economies estimating up to a sixth of GDP as 
underground, and backward economies having much higher estimates, it is remarkable that the unexplained 
fraction has been reduced to so little. Adding to  the problem, official statistics in developing economies are also 
likely to be less reliable.
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industries...will generally fail” (p. 367), and then states: “a successful export push, whether 
it results from an open economy and strong economic fundamentals, or from a combination of
strong fundamentals and prudently chosen interventions, offers high economic gains” (ibid.).
\
Although the study does not find support for industrial targeting in general, it does find 
support for some types of protective trade policies. In particular, policies which promote 
industries based on their export performance were found to be relatively successful. The study 
is not without its share of criticism, especially on the issue of the ineffectiveness of industrial 
targeting (see Rodrik, 1994 and Wade, 1994).
Amsden (1989) studies the South Korean experience in the latter half of the 20th century. In 
this analysis South Korea is characterized as a late industrializing economy. The notion of a late 
industrializer refers to economies which are latecomers to the industrialization process. As such 
they face the disadvantages associated with being a late entrant, as well as the advantages of 
having a series of inventions available for copying (i.e., learning). Amsden also characterizes the 
catching-up process of mainland Europe in the 18th century (relative to England) as one of late 
industrialization. Likewise, countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Turkey, India, Japan and Taiwan 
are also included in this group (Amsden, 1989, ch. 1 ). Amsden emphasizes the importance of 
effective learning in the context of late industrialization. She notes that learning constitutes 
the critical mechanism by which these economies can expand their technological frontier, and 
thereby successfully enter into technologically advanced industries. Formal theoretical models 
of learning in competitive equilibrium in the context of economic growth and international trade 
have been developed by Stokey (1988, 1991a and 1991b) and Young (1991 and 1993). In such 
models dynamic gains from learning lend support to the infant industry argument (although 
static gains from trade do not). Wade (1990) analyses the case of Taiwan, with references to 
Korea and Japan, focussing on how the government can design policies which improve upon 
the market mechanism. Both Amsden and Wade take the view that the presence of, and the 
economic policies of, a developmental state were fundamental to the East Asian Miracle.
Before proceeding, it is convenient to define some key concepts which will be used through­
out this study. The first is that of technological capability. This term refers to the knowl­
edge of workers within the firm, which determines the levels of productivity and product quality 
(Fransman and King, 1984; Lall, 1992 and Sutton, 2004). In this study we will use the term 
in the narrow sense of ‘product quality’. Moreover, the stage-game structure of the models we 
will be using allows for a more general interpretation of ‘product quality’. In this framework, 
product quality could be re-labelled innovation, R&D or learning. In general, the outcome of 
sunk investment in stage games admits a similar treatment to the one we will be conferring to
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technological capability (product quality). The flexibility of the stage-game approach allow us, 
then, to treat all of the above as a sunk investment in a particular stage of the firm’s decision 
process.
The second notion is that of initial conditions. Usually, this is taken to reflect the 
status quo in a country at a given point in time, including sociopolitical, as well as economic, 
structure. Here we will use this notion in the restricted sense of initial conditions pertaining 
to technological capability. Nonetheless, initial conditions of technological capability may be 
interpreted as encompassing all initial conditions which are relevant to the industrial production 
process.
South K orea
There are some key notions which Amsden identifies as having marked the difference be­
tween South Korea and less successful late industrializes. Firstly, she points out the crucial role 
of large oligopolistic firms, which eventually became internationally competitive and embarked 
in fierce rivalry: “Korea’s economy may be highly concentrated, but its leading firms...engage 
in intense competition with one another in overseas as well as domestic markets” (Amsden, 
1989, p. 129). The extent of concentration in the Korean economy is staggering. In 1974, the 
combined sales of the top ten chaebol (the Korean diversified business group) was 15.1% of 
GNP. By 1984, this figure was 67.4%.
Secondly, Amsden claims that the strong emphasis on learning and on shopfloor manage­
ment within Korean firms proved crucial in attaining technological capability. More specifically, 
the widespread use of Quality Control Circles, whereby workers set-up teams to improve qual­
ity and provide feedback on ways to better the production process, is hailed as one of keys to 
successful shopfloor management (ibid, p.325).
Thirdly, government use of disciplinary mechanisms is claimed to have enhanced industrial 
performance. Disciplinary mechanisms are credible incentive schemes whereby the government 
provides continuing support to enterprises with satisfactory performance, particularly with re­
spect to export targets, productivity and technological goals as opposed to financial indicators. 
However, there is considerable debate on this point. Kang (1995) questions the autonomy of 
the Korean State and its ability to discipline the chaebol. He highlights underlying cronyism 
and how this affected the decisions to bail out business groups.
Fourth, favorable initial conditions allowed firms to bridge the gap between their initial 
technological capabilities and those of the international market. In particular, the educational 
level of the workforce was high relative to other countries with similar development levels.
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Low levels of initial inequality (whether in terms of income or land distribution) have also 
been mentioned by Lucas (1993) and Rodrik (1994) as having contributed to higher subsequent 
growth. Lucas (1993) compares the Philippines with South Korea in the mid-twentieth century, 
citing rough similarities but crucial differences in the initial distribution of income and in human 
capital, and suggests that this may help to explain their divergent paths. One might also add 
the impact of Spanish heritage on the Philippines’ institutional framework as opposed to the 
Japanese colonial influence in Korea.
Fifth, the manipulation of relative prices to increase the relative profitability of industries 
which did not have a comparative advantage in the short run allowed South Korea to suc­
cessfully develop its technological capability to a point where industries which were initially 
unprofitable, became so after a learning phase. Amsden coined the phrase “getting prices 
wrong” to highlight how the government instated a wide range of subsidies and protection 
mechanisms to tilt incentives towards entry into industries which would not have been prof­
itable otherwise. This is arguably the most contentious point in the East Asian Miracle. The 
World Bank (1993) found that, if anything, relative prices in East Asia have been subjected to a 
lower degree of distortion than elsewhere in the developing world. Although Amsden’s evidence 
on this point is not entirely satisfactory (see the critique in Wade, 1992, p.292), evidence has 
begun to emerge which points to a maturation process in many Korean industries. A study by 
Lee (1997) finds that effective rates of protection have gradually decreased for many industries, 
hinting at an effective process of maturation. She calculates an index of comparative cost for 
each industry as follows:
C  ( f \ -  1  +  E R P i ( $  (-I o \
C<W -  l  + BRPavg(t) (L2)
Ci(t) represents the comparative cost index of industry i in year t. ERP{{t) is the effective 
rate of protection for industry i in year t  (see Bhagwati et al., 1998, ch. 15). It is calculated by 
comparing domestic versus international prices. If domestic prices are higher than international 
prices, this leads to a positive effective rate of protection. ERPavg(t) is the average effective 
rate of protection for all traded goods industries in year t. C{(t) then measures how a particular 
industry’s degree of protection weighs up against the average rate of protection in the tradable 
sector. k  'Ciit) higher than 1 denotes a comparative disadvantage. A Q(£) lower than 1 denotes 
a comparative advantage. Table 4 documents the evolution of an index of comparative cost for 
several industries in South Korea. An industry which evolves from a high level of comparative 
cost towards a low level is considered to have matured under protection, in the sense that the
difference between its domestic prices and international prices has reduced over time, relative
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to other tradeable sectors.
Industry_______________________1970 1975 1 978 1 980 1 983 1 985 1988 1990
1 Crops 1.195 1.390 1.524 1.879 1.721 2.046 2.574 2.837
2 Other Agriculture 0.645 0.696 1.089 1.620 3.127 3.336 (-) (-)
3 Forestry 0.842 0.765 1.165 1.356 0.908 1.414 1.288 1.220
4 Fishery 0.842 1.031 1.036 0.480 0.594 0.554 0.700 0.856
5 Mining 0.846 0.893 0.996 0.742 1.085 1.126 1.141 1.264
6 Food 1.009 0.847 0.656 0.544 0.403 0.413 0.491 0.509
7 Beverages 0.725 0.755 0.667 0.826 0.793 0.734 0.679 0.730
8 Tobacco 0.788 0.644 0.379 0.605 0.683 0.623 0.466 0.442
9 Textile 0.823 0.802 0.726 0.829 0.789 0.795 0.830 0.835
10 Apparel 0.905 0.703 0.716 0.706 0.865 0.831 0.700 0.788
11 Leather 1.315 1.283 1.107 0.752 0.754 0.511 0.520 0.432
12 Wood 1.824 1.099 0.816 0.733 0.709 0.748 0.810 0.787
13 Paper 0.872 0.871 0.764 0.869 0.893 0.833 0.978 0.920
14 Printing & Publishing 0.635 0.652 1.062 0.729 0.723 0.790 0.864 0.828
15 Industrial Chemicals 0.875 0.696 0.896 0.920 1.158 1.059 0.844 0.886
16 Non Industrial Chemicals 1.603 1.473 1.090 0.876 0.796 0.901 1.160 1.003
17 Petroleum and Coal 0.541 53.229 1.463 (-) (-) 9.075 1.190 0.548
18 Rubber 1.156 0.889 0.682 0.773 0.717 0.690 1.024 0.828
19 Pottery 0.998 0.809 0.714 1.013 0.947 0.950 1.110 0.819
20 Glass 0.931 0.847 0.673 1.081 0.908 0.842 0.904 0.803
21 Nonmetallic Mineral 1.032 0.911 0.868 1.030 0.980 1.120 0.888 1.082
22 Iron and Steel 1.624 1.453 1.028 0.845 0.807 0.803 0.842 0.875
23 Nonferrous Metal 0.924 0.713 0.999 0.829 0.776 0.619 1.229 1.439
24 Fabricated Metal 1.155 1.126 0.892 1.126 1.024 1.182 1.092 0.968
25 General Machinery 1.076 0.820 0.803 1.140 1.028 0.980 1.046 1.187
26 Electrical Machinery 1.195 1.036 0.824 0.933 0.861 0.869 0.937 0.944
27 Transportation Equipment 1.698 1.145 1.218 1.439 1.203 1.406 1.315 1.118
28 Precision Instruments 1.618 1.106 1.158 1.109 1.034 1.041 0.995 1.033
29 Miscellaneous Products 0.822 0.773 0.918 1.203 1.164 1.054 1.020 1.001
Primary Sector 1.055 1.216 1.393 1.334 1.462 1.575 1.947 2.200
Manufacturing Sector 0.952 0.890 0.853 0.913 0.903 0.900 0.910 0.888
(-) Cj(t) cannot be calculated for some observations of other agriculture and petroleum and coal because they show negative value added in world 
market prices.
Source: Lee (1997), table 2.
Table 4. Index of Comparative Cost per Industry in South Korea
In table 4, thirteen industries had a comparative cost index above 1 in 1970, of which crops 
was a senile industry. Of the remaining twelve infant industries, the following matured by 
crossing (from above) the threshold level of 1: Food (in 1975), leather (in 1980), wood (in 
1978), rubber (in 1975), iron and steel (in 1980) and electrical machinery (in 1978). Lee then 
asks whether any of the remaining industries exhibit a downward trend in their comparative 
cost indices by fitting a time trend and a constant to the above data. She finds that two 
additional industries have a significantly negative time trend: Precision instruments (5% level 
of significance) and non-industrial chemicals (10% level of significance). Thus eight out of 
twelve infant industries show a process of maturation. Of the remaining industries, nonmetallic 
minerals, fabricated metal and general machinery show little signs of being what Lee labels 
‘geriatric infants’ (p. 1274), with their comparative cost levels not being too distant from 1. 
Transportation equipment exhibits an (albeit not significant) downward trend.
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The data on comparative cost indices is then related to growth per industry, shown in the
following table:
Industry______________________ 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90
1 Crops 4.3 -2.0 4.7 -0.8
2 Other Agriculture 4.1 2.5 12.2 1.6
3 Forestry -0.3 0.4 0.7 -6.8
4 Fishery 9.6 1.2 5.1 3.7
5 Mining 7.5 2.2 2.8 -1.9
6 Food 3.0 8.0 4.3 4.5
7 Beverages 13.7 9.3 4.0 13.9
8 Tobacco 12.5 8.5 4.9 4.7
9 Textile 23.0 6.6 6.7 4.7
10 Apparel 25.0 16.7 4.7 4.7
11 Leather 34.8 8.2 9.4 6.6
12 Wood 11.4 6.0 3.9 7.5
13 Paper 14.5 13.4 11.7 16.7
14 Printing & Publishing 10.6 14.4 15.0 5.7
15 Industrial Chemicals 26.8 17.6 8.4 13.1
16 Non Industrial Chemicals 20.8 12.9 13.9 15.3
17 Petroleum and Coal 8.1 11.9 3.8 8.6
18 Rubber 23.8 16.7 10.3 7.2
19 Pottery 8.6 25.5 8.1 1.9
20 Glass 18.1 13.1 14.5 16.3
21 Nonmetallic Mineral 14.2 13.0 8.1 9.7
22 Iron and Steel 33.5 24.6 10.3 9.1
23 Nonferrous Metal 26.8 21.8 14.9 12.9
24 Fabricated Metal 21.4 15.5 18.5 15.2
25 General Machinery 29.7 7.5 21.6 24.7
26 Electrical Machinery 39.7 24.1 15.3 20.5
27 Transportation Equipment 21.5 18.3 20.9 19.3
28 Precision Instruments 37.0 19.3 12.5 19.0
29 Miscellaneous Products 25.8 17.2 10.8 10.3
Note: Growth rates of output are at 1985 constant prices, percent per annum.
Source: Lee (1997), table 3.
Table 5. Growth of output per industry in South Korea (percent per annum)
For manufacturing industries excluding petroleum and coal, Lee finds that the comparative 
cost index is positively (and significantly) related to industry growth: Industries which had 
comparative disadvantage (as measured by a high comparative cost index) are the ones that 
grew faster. This is interpreted as evidence of successful targeted industrial or trade policy. 
She also presents growth data for different groupings of industries, as shown in the following 
table:
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Industry*
Heavy & 
Chemical 
Industry
Favoured** Favoured
Infants***
Manufacturing Primary All Traded 
Goods
s=5 years
1970-75 10.8 18.8 28.6 29.1 14.1 4.7 10.2
1975-80 9.2 17.0 19.7 20.2 13.0 -0.5 8.9
1980-85 5.9 11.9 14.0 15.1 9.3 5.3 8.5
1985-90 6.4 14.5 16.4 17.1 11.7 0.7 9.8
s=10 years
1970-80 10.0 18.0 24.1 24.6 13.6 2.1 9.5
1975-85 7.5 14.4 16.8 17.6 11.2 2.3 8.7
1980-90 6.1 13.2 15.2 16.1 10.5 3.0 9.1
s=15 years
1970-85 8.6 15.9 20.6 21.3 12.1 3.1 9.2
1975-90 7.1 14.5 16.7 17.5 11.3 1.8 9.1
s=20 years
1970-90 8.0 15.6 19.5 20.3 12.0 2.5 9.3
Note: Growth rates of output are at 1985 constant prices, percent per annum.
*: Heavy and chemical industries are chemicals, petroleum and coal, rubber, nonmetallic mineral, iron and steel, nonferrous metal, fabricated metal, general 
machinery, electrical machinery, transportation equipment and precision instruments (industries 15-18 and 21-28 from tables 4 or 5), while light industry 
encompasses all other industries (industries 1-14,19-20 and 29 from tables 4 or 5).
**: Favoured industries are chemicals, iron and steel, nonferrous metal, general machinery, electrical machinery, transportation equipment and precision 
instruments (industries 15-16, 22,23, 25 and 26-28 from tables 4 or 5).
***: Favoured infant industries are all the Favoured Industries excluding industrial chemicals and nonferrous metals (industries 16, 22,25 and 26-28 from tables 
4 or 5).
Source: Lee (1997), table 5.
Table 6 . Growth of output for selected groups of industries in South Korea (percent per
annum)
In Table 6  it is clear that the group of favoured industries (chemicals, iron and steel, nonfer­
rous metal, general machinery, electrical machinery, transportation equipment and precision 
instruments) grew at a faster rate. Among the favoured industries, the ones classified as in­
fants (which exclude industrial chemicals and nonferrous metals) grew slightly faster than the 
two mature ones. Lee does not explain in great detail the procedure followed for defining 
such groupings, leading to suspicions of selection bias in forming the groupings. However, the 
interpretation does seem plausible.
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Amsden (1989) argues that in South Korea a developmental (and dictatorial) State im­
plemented a wide variety of interventionist policies which directed firms’ incentives towards 
achieving higher technological capability and this led the process of growth. In particular, 
together with other instruments, the Korean Antitrust Law was actively used as a means of 
regulating the degree of rivalry within industries. Other instruments included making firms 
compete for subsidies and other means of support on the basis of performance (particularly 
export) objectives.
In addition, all commercial banks were government owned and controlled (and this allowed 
the State to control interest rates and to set up a menu of lending schemes for each industry).
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Price controls were regularly used to offset market power in many industries and capital controls 
were enforced to avoid capital flight and also to maintain local ownership of industries (i.e., 
capital flows took the form of overseas aid and foreign lending, with foreign ownership or 
capital outflows being of relatively small significance). The government also implemented an 
export-oriented import-substitution regime. In essence, a targeted mercantilist trade policy. 
This consisted of an initial period of import substitution, inward oriented development followed 
by a subsequent opening of the economy on the exports side, and to a lesser extent on the 
import side, with the degree of protection differing widely by industry (see table 4, above). 
Regarding the export push, it is important to highlight the favorable conditions that South 
Korea enjoyed in gaining access to the USA market.
Amsden (1989) proposes that by enhancing domestic competition among firms, setting 
export and productivity goals, together with the (credible) threat of not supporting firms 
with a poor performance, whilst protecting them from foreign competition, the government 
tilted firm incentives towards increasing performance (as opposed to rent seeking). She asserts 
that the mix of (targeted) export-oriented import-substitution and disciplinary mechanisms in 
South Korea was critical for the nation’s success.
H istorical Perspectives: Critique
In summary, the key questions this literature addresses are: Why did some late industrializ­
e s  (in particular South Korea, Japan and Taiwan) achieve spectacular success in raising their 
income levels and their level of technological capability? In other words, What are the funda­
mental causes of the ‘East Asian Miracle’? The means of enquiry are (sometimes quantitative) 
historical descriptions of the industrialization processes. The answers often come in the form 
of what Wade has labelled an ‘inductive approach to policy and policy-making’ (1990, p. 348), 
whereby the optimal policies are induced from the historical interpretations. In particular, by 
focussing on the types of policy measures which operated in each period in each economy, the 
authors aim to identify which of these were crucial to economic performance. This policy choice 
exercise is often based on expert opinion (usually interviews with policy makers, managers and 
entrepreneurs). Such a process is likely to be fraught with bias, be it of an ideological nature 
or due to incomplete/imperfect information or cognition, whether on behalf of the researcher 
or the expert who provides the opinion. Moreover, in the absence of statistical testing, there is 
no way of telling whether the influence of a particular policy is indeed (statistically) significant 
in determining outcomes.
Another problem with this approach is that even in the cases in which we are able to iden­
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tify precisely the critical factors (be they policies or other specificities of the economies under 
study), we are still left in the dark as to (or, at best, with a very vague notion of) the mecha­
nisms through which these policies affect economic performance, and hence the circumstances 
under which these policies could be used to advantage. The problem is compounded when we 
consider the variety of policies which were implemented across East Asia, with Thailand and 
Hong Kong’s laissez faire versus Japan and Korea’s state dirigisme; Taiwan’s mid-sized public 
enterprises and small private firms versus Korea’s and Japan’s large private conglomerates; the 
impact of Japan’s colonial heritage in Korea and Taiwan versus the British heritage in Hong 
Kong and so forth. The response to this variety has been either to assert that such diversity of 
interventions supports the hypothesis that they did not make much difference (see for example 
World Bank, 1993). The alternative response is that most of these interventions were, to a 
larger or lesser extent, conducive to growth, and that there is a wide range of policy mixes 
which will work (Wade, 2003, introduction). The problem lies in telling these explanations 
apart. For this we need a detailed theory of how and why the interventions did (or did not) 
work.
As we mentioned above in the context of growth regressions, further problems arise when 
analyzing the direction of causality (i.e., endogeneity of explanatory variables). Hypothetically, 
economic growth could be caused by responsible fiscal policy and other factors such as good 
educational systems and infrastructure. However, the reverse is just as likely to be true: It is 
easier to sustain prudent fiscal policy, good infrastructure, etc. in the context of a prosperous 
economy. Even in the case of investment, the commonly held notion that it is investment 
which causes growth is being challenged3: There is substantial evidence that it is growth 
which Granger-causes4 savings, and not the other way round (World Bank, 1993, appendix 5.1 
and Carroll and Weil, 1994).
T he N eed for Theory
Nelson and Pack (1999) come to the conclusion that the theories we have so far are lacking 
in their microfoundations:
“Economic analysis in general, but development economics in particular, needs 
a better theory of firm behaviour...it needs a realistic theory, that is consistent
3 Although note that such a presumption is not predicted by the quintessential neoclassical growth model: 
Solow (1956). In Solow’s model, accumulation of per-worker capital stock occurs as an endogenous result along 
the transition path as the economy converges towards its steady state.
4 Granger causeility tests whether a variable is explained by lagged (past) values of another, or viceversa 
(Granger, 1969).
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with what we have learned empirically, about the processes of firm, industry and 
national learning, that have been behind The Asian Miracle” (p. 435)
In light of the evidence on the East Asian Miracle, it seems there is a reasonably strong 
(albeit unproven) case for selective interventions. However, without a clear, positive theory 
of selective interventions, one is left with little foundation on which to pursue such crucial 
decisions. What are the precise mechanisms by which these policies worked? Did they work 
at all or is there some other underlying process?
After a few decades (in Wade’s terminology) of ‘inductive policy analysis’, it is time to 
apply the lessons we can draw from this literature to build a theory which accounts for some 
of the most salient features of the process. It is in this spirit that we find a need for formal, 
testable theories of industrialization. Rodrik (2004, p. 5) puts the problem thus:
“How do we provide guidance to countries besides uttering platitudes (“integrate 
into the world economy,” “maintain sound money and sustainable fiscal balances,” 
etc.)? How do we avoid policy nihilism and an anything-goes kind of approach 
(“all countries must find their own solutions to their problems”)? How do we move 
forward with a positive agenda for policy reform instead? For those of us working 
on issues of economic growth, this constitutes the central challenge of our time.”
As a starting point for the construction of such theories, in parts I and II we build a 
framework which takes into consideration some essential features:
1 ) Oligopolistic behaviour and the associated strategic interaction.
2) An endogenous treatment of technological capability and market structure.
3) A general equilibrium framework.
4) A dualistic structure (characteristic of many developing countries).
Features 1 and 2 emerge from the development studies literature. This emphasizes the 
importance of large enterprises which successfully embarked upon technologically advanced 
projects, particularly in the case of South Korea and Japan (Amsden, 1989). Features 3 and 
4 are essential to analyze the impact of structural changes as the economy industrializes. In 
the models we develop later on, we will see that market structure and technological capability 
interact in an essential manner to affect the wage rate and (dual) structure of the economy. 
Once we develop models incorporating these features, we will be in a position to modify or 
extend them by introducing:
5) Asymmetries in initial conditions.
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6) Variable intensity of competition.
This will bring forth a coherent analytical framework which will allow us to carry out a 
positive analysis of the role of economic policy (in particular industrial, trade and compe­
tition policies), based on solid micro foundations, and using a standard general equilibrium 
framework.
We develop two kinds of models. The first type (parts I and II of the thesis), are general 
equilibrium models characterized by a symmetric equilibrium. The second type of model is 
presented in part HI. This is essentially a Big-Push type model with multiple equilibria, and 
the question of industrialization is analyzed in the context of a switch between a low wage 
equilibrium and a high wage equilibrium. In the process we discover a new characterization 
for the stages of economic growth.
In part I, chapter 2 develops the basic model within a closed economy framework. In chap­
ter 3 this is extended to a two country setting, in which industries in both economies feature 
strategic interaction and the terms of trade are determined endogenously. We find the usual 
result that, under symmetry, free trade is welfare improving. The open economy model al­
lows us to address the impact of asymmetries in initial conditions and the question of whether 
catching-up is feasible and welfare-improving. Allowing for asymmetric initial conditions brings 
forth the following result: A technologically advanced nation benefits from free trade with all 
nations of lower or slightly higher technological capability. However, a nation with a signif­
icantly lower technological capability will not benefit from a free trade agreement with the 
advanced country, and is better off in autarky. This sheds light on the negotiation process 
of bilateral free-trade agreements between advanced and backward economies. Regarding the 
issue of catching-up, we find that a subsidy to enhance technological capability is an effective 
instrument which allows the backward economy to match the advanced economy’s wage rate. 
Moreover, if the subsidy is funded via a lump-sum tax, it will be welfare enhancing.
In part n  we extend the models developed in part I to allow for a diverse range of intensities 
of competition. Chapter 4 does this for the closed economy, chapter 5 for the open economy. 
This will add further oligopolistic content to the models, for we will be able to encompass 
intensities of competition ranging from individual profit maximization at the firm level to 
perfect collusion (joint profit maximization) by changing a single parameter. Once we open up 
the economy, changing the intensity of competition will bring forth one of the central results 
of the study: For intensities of competition lower than individual profit maximization, there 
exists a separating surface for the wage rate below which the open economy features a higher 
wage rate than autarky, whilst above the surface it is the closed economy which features a
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higher wage rate. The separating surface occurs in the space of parameters which characterize 
different types of industries, and thereby provides a positive basis for differential trade policy 
regarding these industries.
Part III (chapter 6) extends a Big-Push framework borrowed from Venables (1996) to allow 
for endogenous choice of technological capability in a Cournot oligopolistic (upstream) industry 
with vertical linkages to a perfectly competitive (downstream) industry. This extension brings 
forth a novel interpretation of the transition from a low-wage (underdeveloped) equilibrium 
towards a high-wage (developed) equilibrium. The transition is now characterized by a series 
of ‘take-off’ points (industrial and technological take-offs), which lead the economy to differing 
levels of development. The resulting level of development (wage rate) depends crucially on 
whether the economy can fit through a ‘window of opportunity’ while it is on the transition 
towards the high-wage equilibrium. If it manages to fit through the window, it will end up 
with a higher wage rate than would have otherwise been the case (under certain parameter 
restrictions). The conditions characterizing the ‘window of opportunity’ are formally specified 
and one of the central results is that if the wage rate grows too quickly, the window will be 
missed and the economy will end up in lower (yet still high-wage) equilibrium.
We intentionally concentrate exclusively on developing the theoretical aspects of the models 
in chapters 2-6, and defer the linkage of these findings to historical experience to the conclusions 
(chapter 7). This has the advantage of allowing us to proceed in a swift and focussed form.
The literature which most closely relates to this study is, for parts I and II, the theory of 
international trade under imperfect competition. For part II, the literature of interest studies 
the linkages between the intensity of competition and economic performance. For part III, the 
relevant literature is that related to Big Push models. We now (briefly) relate our theoretical 
models to previous work in these specific areas.
The T heory o f  International Trade U nder Im perfect C om petition
The first generation of models in this field introduced monopolistic competition (Krugman, 
1979, 1980) and strategic interaction (Brander, 1981; Brander and Spencer, 1985; Venables, 
1985) into a trade-theoretic structure. These models provided a novel framework which shed 
light on certain features of international trade previously unaccounted for by the Hecksher- 
Ohlin model (Bhagwati et al., 1998, chs. 5-6). In particular, the models introduced product 
differentiation and strategic interaction and this provided an explanation for intra-industry 
trade. Initially, Krugman did not allow for strategic interaction, whilst Brander, Spencer and 
Venables did not allow for product differentiation (although Brander, 1981, briefly touches
26
upon the issue of product variety, p. 9). Among other features of the models, accounting for 
intra-industry trade constituted an important breakthrough which warranted that the models 
became part of the mainstream paradigm in economics roughly within a decade (Krugman, 
1998, p. 146). Bernhofen (2001) has generalized these models by subsuming product differ­
entiation and strategic interaction into a single framework, using a quadratic utility function 
with a taste for variety and Cournot oligopoly. This line of work has been continued by Clarke 
and Collie (2003), who consider the case of Bertrand competition. The literature on trade 
under imperfect competition is notorious for its variety of models and policy implications. 
Small changes in assumptions often lead to policy reversals, ranging from the optimality of 
free trade to intervention via trade policy (tariffs or quotas) or industrial policy (taxes or sub­
sidies). Dixit (1984) comments on the common absence of factor price determination in this 
literature, and how this proves to be an crucial shortcoming, since inter-industry trade will 
be determined by such factor prices. Dixit and Grossman (1986) study the case of economies 
composed of multiple oligopolistic industries, incorporating general equilibrium effects oper­
ating via input markets. They provide a formal basis for industrial targeting, i.e., which of 
the multiple oligopolistic industries should be subsidized/taxed. Their conclusion is that the 
industries which can most effectively shift rents towards the domestic market are the ones 
which should be subsidized. However, due to the informational requirements of such a policy, 
Dixit and Grossman remain skeptical of their findings and conclude:
“our main finding is a negative one, but it has considerable importance for 
practical policy-making. When several oligopolistic industries are linked together 
by factor endowment constraints, the optimal rent-extraction policies are generally 
less beneficial than a partial-equilibrium analysis would suggest, and very demand­
ing of information. The prospects for correct implementation of such policies in 
practice are not at all good.”
The problem lies, thus, not in the optimality of such industrial targeting (which their 
analysis proves), but in the implementation of the strategy: How can the worthwhile industries 
be identified?
Technological Capability in International Trade 
The literature on strategic interaction in international trade has been complemented by 
considering the effects of innovation (i.e., technological capability). Spencer and Brander (1983) 
analyze the case of R&D rivalry across nations and conclude that subsidies to R&D can be
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welfare enhancing from the perspective of an individual nation. Their model also supports 
the infant industry argument. However, their argument is based neither on capital market 
imperfections (in which credit is not available or is available at an interest rate above the 
long run free market shadow value), nor on positive externalities from innovation. The infant 
industry argument in Spencer and Brander (1983) relates to the expansion of the national 
industry at the expense of the foreign one. Thus a subsidy to local industry can help it achieve 
a leadership position.
More recently, Grossman and Helpman (1991) present over a decade’s work on dynamic 
models of international trade under monopolistic competition with innovation, including their 
famous quality ladder growth model. Murphy and Shleifer (1997) present a model where dif­
ferences in human capital affect product quality. The model assumes a perfectly competitive 
setting and a taste for quality (but not for variety). An advanced economy has no incentive 
to trade with a backward economy, since consumers in the advanced economy (high in human 
capital) have high income levels and prefer the quality good. In the backward economy, con­
sumers have low income levels and cannot afford the quality good. Thus the backward economy 
has nothing to offer to the advanced economy, while the rich economy finds it unprofitable to 
produce low quality goods to sell to the backward economy.
Motta (1992b) is one of the closest papers to our study. Similarly to us, he introduces a 
model of oligopoly with technological capability into an international trade framework. He 
uses a model by Sutton (1991, ch. 3) based on perfectly substitutable goods. In our case, we 
use a model with imperfect substitutability from Sutton (1998, ch. 2). Motta’s framework 
is partial equilibrium, and he allows for differences in qualities between countries. In that 
framework trade losses may arise in the short run (i.e., for fixed product quality) for backward 
nations, when they engage in free trade with advanced nations. This is due to exit of the 
low quality firms. In contrast, in the long run (when product quality can be adjusted), both 
nations benefit from trade. This result is similar to what we find in chapter 3, where symmetric 
economies with Cournot industries benefit from free trade. Like Motta, our model endogenizes 
technological capability in international trade. Unlike Motta, we endogenize market structure, 
wage rates, the sectorial distribution of employment and the terms of trade.
New trade theory has a strong interventionist flavour. Brander, Dixit and Spencer, along­
side most authors in this field, warn that such interventionist conclusions should taken cau­
tiously, for two reasons. Firstly, most models assigns a value of unity to the opportunity costs 
of industrial policies (subsidies are usually valued in terms of forgone consumption). However, 
it may be more accurate to consider alternative government expenditures. If the funds for
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subsidies are being taken away from investments, such as health care or human capital, their 
opportunity cost may be considerably higher than unity. Secondly, a theoretical basis for in­
tervention could be used by special interest groups to justify rent-seeking. Justifiably, this is 
precisely the type of outcome which has engendered deep mistrust in the economics profession 
towards interventionist arguments.
The In tensity  of C om petition
The intensity of rivalry between domestic firms takes a central role in this study. Several 
authors (Amsden and Singh, 1994; Crafts, 1997, p. 49; Wade, 1990, p. 143) have stressed 
the importance of this aspect for economic performance. This is probably one of the least 
developed topics in the industrialization debate (be it on East Asian or elsewhere). A clear 
terminology has not yet emerged, so we will start by making a few clarifications. Some authors 
(Aghion et al., 1999), use the term ‘competition’ to denote product substitutability (or the elas­
ticity of substitution between goods): Increased product substitutability would be associated 
with decreased mark-ups and hence more intense competition. Others use the term ‘compe­
tition’ to denote the number of firms: A larger number of firms is taken to imply stronger 
competition (Carlin et al., 2004). The notion we will use for the in tensity  of com petition 
refers to a structural characteristic of the type of strategic interaction between firms, and is an 
entirely different concept to product substitutability or to the number of competitors. It was 
introduced by Sutton (1991, p. 9), and refers to the changing nature of competition as the 
industry changes from a perfectly competitive setting, to Bertrand competition, to Cournot 
competition, to joint profit maximization (perfect collusion). The perfectly competitive setting 
and Bertrand competition would be considered the toughest type of competition, followed by 
Cournot and then by joint profit maximization (the weakest form of competition, equivalent 
to a perfectly collusive agreement). The term ‘rivalry’ can also be used to denote the intensity 
of competition. The intensity of competition bears considerable similarity to the notion of 
conjectural variations. However, unlike conjectural variations, it does not rely on notions of 
(inappropriately dynamic) reaction functions, and is directly measurable (we will see in chapter 
4, that it is the extent of cross-ownership within an industry). The intensity of competition 
can be affected by the anti-trust climate in the economy: Whereas a permissive anti-trust 
authority may lead to a low intensity of competition, a stringent authority may be associated 
with a high intensity of competition.
Amsden and Singh (1994) analyze the role of rivalry (in the sense of intensity of com­
petition) in Japanese and South Korean development. Porter (1990) asserts that Japanese
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international success derives from the fierce rivalry (intensity of competition) prevalent in the 
local market. Analyzing the Japanese case, Amsden and Singh find that MITI (the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry) intervened in several occasions to curb the intensity of 
competition between firms, especially during recessions (presumably to avoid exit of otherwise 
profitable firms). This intervention consisted of encouraging cartels and mergers in industries 
characterized by economies of scale. On the other hand, there were many instances in which 
MITI promoted vigorous oligopolistic rivalry. Exposure to international competition was used 
as a complementary policy to competition policy: “The emphasis on exports and on maintain­
ing oligopolistic rivalry -  instead of concentrating resources and subsidies on a single ‘national 
champion’, which many governments in their industrial policies are prone to do -  are the key 
factors which distinguish Japanese policies from those of other dirigiste countries” (Amsden 
and Singh, 1994, p. 946). In the Korean case, Amsden and Singh note that there is ample ev­
idence of strong rivalry between big business groups. Aside from anti-trust policy, the Korean 
government designed a reward scheme in which big business groups would vie for subsidies 
and other means of support on the basis of technological and export performance. Amsden 
(1989) describes how the South Korean government went about regulating market structure. 
Essentially, she argues that the government used industrial licensing and credit allocation to 
favour specific firms over others. Prom the following quotation, it is hard not to conclude that 
the criteria were overtly cronyist (in spite of Amsden’s assertions about reciprocity based on 
performance):
“In the cement industry, the chaebol belonging to a party elder, the Ssangyong 
group, was allowed to acquire nearly half of cement-making capacity by the 1980’s, 
and was then blessed with licenses for capacity expansions despite the existence 
of a more experienced cement company (the Tongyang corporation) dating to the 
Japanese colonial period. In the steel industry the small minimills of Japanese 
colonial heritage were discriminated against in credit allocation in favour of a newly 
created state-owned integrated enterprise, the Pohang Iron and Steel Company 
(POSCO). In shipbuilding, seven small experienced shipbuilders were dwarfed and 
in some cases bankrupted by the government’s assistance to the Hyundai group. In 
the machinery building sector, all three leading chaebol-the Hyundai, Samsung, and 
Daewoo groups-were favored over a slew of smaller long-standing firms” (Amsden,
1989, p. 73)
In spite of such close ties the strategy seems to have worked, in the following sense. By
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relying on the chaebol, Korea has managed to compete successfully with world leaders and has 
managed to develop its technological capability. Of course, the normative question of whether 
such favouritism was welfare improving remains unaddressed.
Competition policy in Japan and South Korea ranged from cartel and merger support to the 
promotion of fierce rivalry, depending on the industry and on economic conditions prevailing at 
the time. Amsden and Singh (1994) argue for a non-monotonic relationship between the inten­
sity of competition and economic performance: “If total openness to international competition 
and maximum domestic competition are not necessarily optimal, what is the appropriate level 
of openness or degree of domestic competition for an economy?” (p. 943). In their conclusions 
they state that “during much of the high growth period in Japan, despite all the government 
restrictions on competition, industrial concentration actually fell” (p. 950). In the models we 
develop in parts I and II, we will provide a formal treatment of concentration (which will be an 
endogenous variable), product substitutability and the intensity of competition (both of which 
will be exogenous parameters). By incorporating the three concepts in an explicit model, the 
differences and relationships between these notions of ‘competition’ will become clear.
From a theoretical perspective, there are some models which also highlight a similar notion 
to the intensity of competition. In particular, Eaton and Grossman (1986) build a generalized 
model which encompasses diverse types of competition by using the conjectural variations 
approach. Whilst recognizing the shortcomings of conjectural variations, they nonetheless 
proceed to develop an analysis of industrial and trade policies. After considering a wide variety 
of settings ranging from Cournot to Bertrand conjectures, strategic (first-mover) governments, 
and free entry and exit, they find that free trade with no government intervention is optimal 
only under Stackelberg conjectures when domestic consumption is zero. Dixit (1984) discusses 
anti-trust policy in the context of a trade model with oligopolistic competition and notes that 
the disciplining effects of exposure to foreign competition is sometimes used as an argument for 
the relaxation of anti-trust policy. Dixit shows how it may be desirable to encourage mergers 
or export cartels of domestic firms in order to strengthen the local industry.
Bernhofen (2001) subsumes product differentiation and strategic interaction into a single 
framework, using a quadratic utility function with a taste for variety and Cournot oligopoly. 
In his model ‘competition’ amounts to product substitutability. Aghion et al. (2005) use 
the elasticity of substitution as a measure of the intensity of competition in an endogenous 
growth model and find an ‘inverted-U’ relationship between innovation and competition (both 
theoretically and empirically). In chapters 4 and 5, we shall find a similar relationship be­
tween technological capability and the intensity of competition (but only in the case when the
31
marginal cost of technological capability is high). Carlin et al. (2004) carry out an empirical 
analysis using surveys for Eastern European transition economies and also find an ‘inverted- 
U’ relationship, this time between firm performance (as measured by sales growth) and the 
number of competitors present in the firm’s market.
B ig-Push Perspectives
Alternative interpretations of the East Asian Miracle are based on the notion that such 
growth episodes were a transition from a low-income to a high-income equilibrium. The ex­
planations discussed so far highlight the role of a series of institutional causes which impelled 
high factor accumulation and effectively translated this into high growth rates in the East 
Asian economies. Rodrik (1995a and 1996) proposes an alternative interpretation of the East 
Asian Miracle based on the notion of coordination failures. He proposes that these economies 
had the required resources (initial conditions) to operate at a high level of income, but where 
unable to do so because they were subject to a coordination failure in that these resources 
were being used in an inefficient manner. Thus, what the East Asian governments did was 
to coordinate with economic agents a switch from a low-income equilibrium to a high-income 
equilibrium, and that it was this transition which sparked growth. In particular, Rodrik argues 
that the export boom in South Korea and Taiwan was a consequence of the rise in growth and 
investment: Growth required investment together with imports of machinery. In order to cover 
the foreign exchange needs of such imports, exports expanded. Presumably (although Rodrik 
does not clarify this), the mechanism by which exports expand in response to investment is 
the need of finding larger markets in order to fulfill scale economies of new projects, which the 
small domestic market could not exploit. So exports are essentially responding to a supply-side 
expansion. In an comment on Rodrik’s paper, Victor Norman (see the discussion at the end 
of Rodrik, 1995a) notes that the rise in imports of machinery occurred roughly half a decade 
after the beginning of the export boom. Norman then states that the hypothesis that it was 
investment (and the associated machinery imports) which led to exports is hard to sustain, for 
the latter predated the former. In the models we develop in parts I and II, openness to foreign 
markets has the effect of disciplining domestic firms, which, when faced with international 
technological capability, have to choose whether to match their overseas rivals’ technological 
capability or exit the market. In being exposed to foreign competition, firms have no choice 
but to increase their technological capability, if they are to achieve positive market share. This 
entails the notion of an increase in fixed investment as a consequence of the exposure to for­
eign competition. What we have obtained is essentially a formalization of the argument which
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states that exports act as a technology enhancing mechanism: Exports cause investment in 
technological capability via exposure to foreign competition and to a larger market.
In the same family of Big-Push models we find the paper by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1989), which develops similar arguments for a closed economy. The argument is essentially 
a formalization of the dual-economy analysis by Lewis (1954): There is a ‘traditional’ sector 
with constant returns to scale and a ‘modem’ sector which features increasing returns to scale. 
Initially, the economy produces only in the traditional sector, and due to a coordination failure, 
it is not profitable to enter the modern sector. If this coordination failure can be overcome 
(by some central coordination mechanism), workers shift to the modem sector, their wages 
increase and demand for modern goods rises in parallel. Thus a Big-Push of industrialization 
is obtained. Once the transition is complete, the economy remains in a high-wage industrialized 
equilibrium. Other Big-Push models include those by Matsuyama (1991, 1992a and 1992b) 
and Rodriguez-Clare (1996). The key difference between the existing (Big-Push) literature 
and the model we develop is the introduction of endogenously (and strategically) determined 
technological capability.
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Part I
Introducing O ligopolistic 
Interactions and Technological 
Capability into a General 
Equilibrium Framework
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C hapter 2
General Equilibrium w ith  
O ligopolistic Interactions: Autarky
1 Introduction
In order to provide an analytical evaluation of the substantive issues in the debate, we develop 
a model that combines oligopolistic interactions at the industry level with a general equilibrium 
framework. This chapter constitutes the first step towards developing a general equilibrium 
model with oligopolistic interactions and international trade. Here we develop the benchmark 
closed economy model.
Throughout the thesis we will use extensively the notion of ‘technological capability’. We 
will use the term in the narrow sense of ‘product quality’. At a deeper level this term en­
compasses a more fundamental meaning, i.e., the ‘knowledge’ of workers in the firm, which 
determines the levels of productivity and product quality (Sutton, 2004). This more profound 
meaning lies outside the scope of the thesis. Also throughout the thesis we will refer to sunk 
and fixed costs. It is convenient to clarify that in this research all fixed costs are sunk, and the 
terms will be used interchangeably.
We present a long run analysis of a general equilibrium, two-sector economy. The analysis 
is long-run in the sense that market structure and technological capability are determined 
endogenously and all goods are ultimately consumed (that is, any intertemporal allocation 
issues have been settled). There is an industrial (modem) sector and a traditional sector, and 
the only factor of production is labour.
The industrial sector (labelled industry X )  is characterized by increasing returns to scale 
(IRTS), which are associated with endogenous sunk costs. In turn, sunk costs determine 
technological capability. We use a three stage game to model the behavior of firms in the
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industrial sector. In the first stage firms decide whether to enter the market. In the second 
stage, firms invest in technological capabilities, taking the current market structure as given. 
In the third stage, firms compete in quantities, a la Cournot, taking as given the current market 
structure and each firm’s technological capabilities.
The other industry is a traditional sector (industry Y), characterized by a 1:1 technology 
(1 unit of labour input produces 1 unit of output), implying constant returns to scale (CRTS). 
The presence of this sector ensures that the labour market clears. Since the model is general 
equilibrium, wages are determined endogenously.
There is a representative consumer who consumes goods produced by industries X  and Y, 
subject to a budget constraint. Consumers supply a fixed amount of labour to industries X  
and Y, for which they perceive the equilibrium wage rate.
Workers axe employed by firms in industry X  to develop technological capability. The 
demand for labour from industry X  is determined by investment in technological capability and 
by the number of entrants. For simplicity, we assume there are no variable costs in industry X.  
Industry Y serves as an outside option to all workers who cannot find employment in industry 
X .
The following diagram depicts the structure of the model, as explained above.
Numeraire: YIndustry X
IRTSCournot: n
Industry Y
CRTS 
1:1 Technology
3 Stages:
1. Entry: Jt-F(u)=0
2. Innovation F(u)
3. Cournot n /
F(u)
R&D
x(u)
Consumers:
max V s.t P.X+Y=w
Figure 1: The Structure of the Autarky Model
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2 we develop the model. Section 3 characterizes 
a symmetric general equilibrium. In Section 4 we analyze how the equilibrium solutions change 
as we vary the parameters. Section 5 offers some remarks on general features of the model. 
Section 6 concludes.
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2 A  G eneral Equilibrium  Closed Econom y M odel
We describe the consumers’ problem first, then the production side of the model and finally 
the labour market. On the production side, the model features two industries (labelled X and 
Y respectively), without upstream or downstream linkages1. For simplicity, the only factor of 
production in the model is labour. The output of industries X  and Y  is wholly consumed by 
workers (there are no savings).
2.1 Consum ers
There is a population of L homogeneous consumers, indexed by h = 1, . . . ,  L. Each consumer 
has a perfectly inelastic labour supply, which has been set to one. Consumers choose over two 
types of good by maximizing a utility function (denoted by V), subject to a budget constraint. 
One type of good is labelled Y, and represents the (homogenous) good produced by industry 
Y  (the traditional sector). The other type of product, labelled X , is constituted by a range
of vertically differentiated goods produced by industry X .  In industry X , each firm produces
one good only, labelled x k.2 xk denotes per-capita consumption of good k. There is a finite 
number of firms (denoted by iV+1)3, and this will define the number of X-type goods, such that 
k = 1, ..., iV +  1 . Each good in the X  industry is associated with a quality level (uk), which will 
represent the producer’s technological capability. Thus the representative consumer’s problem 
can be stated as
N+l ,  2 \  N+l N
s ?  r ' £ ( ‘ * ' l ) ' 2 " S S 5 ; + y  M
N+l N + l
subject to ^ 2  PkXk + qY = w + ^ T ,  ShkRk (2 .2 )
fc = i  f c = i
where pk is the price of X-type good k, q is the price of the Y-type good, a € (0,1) is a 
parameter which measures the substitutability between the X-type goods (alternatively, the 
degree of horizontal product differentiation), w is the wage rate, skk is the ownership share of 
(representative) consumer h in firm k (such that Ylh=i shk — 1)> and 11* denotes the net profits 
of firm k. Free entry implies that net profits are zero, thus firm profits drop out from the budget 
constraint. The (quadratic) utility function in equation (2.1) is the underlying utility for the
l In chapter 6 we develop a model with vertical linkages.
2 Subscripts k and I will denote firms, while the more commonly used subscripts i and j  will be reserved to 
denote countries.
3 We denote the number of firms by N +  1 rather than N  since this will make the algebra somewhat more 
organized in later chapters.
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standard linear demand model, with some modifications (see Sutton, 1998, ch. 2). In passing, 
it is worth noting that to perform welfare analysis we will substitute the equilibrium solutions 
into V, and we shall label this the welfare indicator, tW ’. From the consumer’s problem, we 
obtain the inverse demand function for good k
p* =  l - 2 ^ - ^ X ; -  (2.3)ul Uk m
The (per-capita) demand function for good Y  is obtained as a residual from the budget con­
straint (equation 2.2):
1 /  N + 1 N + 1 \
(2.4)
j /  N + l  N + l '
Y  =  -  I W +  ^ 2  S hk life -  P*x k
9 V fc=l k=l /
Good Y  will be defined as the numeraire, hence its price (q) will be set to 1. We seek an 
equilibrium in which the economy is characterized by symmetric firms, each earning zero net 
profits. Thus, (per-capita) demand for Y  simplifies to
Y  =  w — (N  +  l )px  (2.5)
The demand functions specified above are used in obtaining equilibrium solutions for industries 
X  and Y. We now describe industry X.
2.2 In d u s try  X
Industry X  features increasing returns to scale, associated with the presence of (endogenous) 
sunk costs. In this industry, firms play a three stage game, similar to the game featured in 
Sutton (1998, ch. 2). In the first stage firms decide whether to enter or not. In the second 
stage, firms invest in building technological capability (by choosing their level of sunk costs). 
In the final stage, firms compete in quantities, k  la Cournot. The equilibrium concept used 
here is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (Selten, 1975).
Using backward induction to find a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, we now move on 
to the description and solution of the final stage in the firms’ decision problem.
2.2.1 Stage 3: C ourno t C om petition
In this stage, firms choose their optimal quantity, taking as given rivals’ quantities, technolog­
ical capabilities and market structure. Gross profits of firm k  (7r^) are equal to revenue (pkXk) 
minus the cost of producing x k. For simplicity, when solving the final stage we follow Sutton
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(1998) in assuming that variable production costs are zero4. Hence we write,
Kk=PkXk for k =  1 , N  + 1 (2.6)
The first order condition for firm k is given by
Pk +  TT-Xh =  0 for k =  1 , N  + 1 (2.7)dxk
There are N  + l  such equations in Xk (one for each firm). In Appendix 1, we solve this 
system of equations, and find a symmetric Nash equilibrium. We obtain the solution for 
in terms of the number of firms, N  +  1, and the vector of firms’ technological capabilities, 
(u i, ...,ujv+i)5. To simplify exposition, we introduce the following vector notation for firms’ 
technological capabilities: U  =  (ui, We obtain the following solved-out payoff for
firm k (which will be used to solve the second stage of the game):
*k(U) =  2(2 - a )1 “  2 +  oN  S  )  (2'8'
If firms choose a symmetric quality level (denoted by u), the payoff simplifies to
W = 2(2 +  <7 N )2 (2 , 9 ^
which is the expression derived by Sutton (1998, p. 512, equation 2.2.17'). Note that 7Tfc(U)
refers to per-capita gross profit obtained by the firm (the gross profit the firm earns from each
consumer). Since population size is given by L, total gross profits are L  7Tfc(U).
2.2.2 S tage 2: C om petition  in Technological C apability
In the second stage subgame, firms choose how much to invest in order to achieve a certain 
technological capability, taking as given their rivals’ strategies. Their investment is a sunk 
cost, which is embodied in a fixed outlays function, F(.), to be defined below. The firm’s net 
profit is
II k = L  7Tfc(U) -  F(uk, w) for k =  1 ,..., N + l  (2.10)
4 The model extends readily to the case of positive variable production costs. However, to reduce the number
of parameters, it was decided to set such costs to zero.
6 Recall that u*. also represents product fc’s quality level. For our purposes the terms ‘product quality’ and a
firm’s ‘technological capability’ will be synonimous.
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where L  denotes population size, 7Tfc(U) denotes the solved-out gross per-capita profit function 
(equation 2.8) and F(uk,w) denotes a fixed outlays function, of the following form: F(uk, w) = 
w f(u k), where w is the wage rate, and f(uk) =  £ is a convex mapping from technological
capability (uk) to labour units required to achieve such capability. The mapping f(uk) is the 
firm’s labour requirement in industry X\ It measures units of labour required to achieve 
a certain technological capability Uk- We assume /3 > 2 (to ensure that the second order 
conditions hold, see Appendix 2), e > 0 and Uk > uQ ^  1. is the elasticity of f(uk)  with 
respect to Uk- £ is an exogenous set-up cost. u0 represents the initial (inherited) value of 
technological capability, which is an exogenous parameter. In the open economy case (see 
chapters 3 and 5), uQ is used as a means of modelling differences in initial conditions across 
countries.
Firms maximize the objective in equation (2.10) with respect to Uk- This leads to the 
following first order conditions
4 * -  — ( - V  +  l (2 .1 1 )GU'k U'h \  U0 )
Differentiating the solved out payoff (2.8) with respect to Uk, we can rewrite the first order 
conditions as follows:
2 +  <7 (N  — 1)i\  /  N+1 \  )S- 2■,n ~~rrr ( 1 — ■ a-  - y  ^  =  weP-Z-g- k = 1 N  + l  (2.12)
(2 — o’) 2 (2 +  trN) 2 + a N ^ u kJ  y  y ’
If firms choose a symmetric quality level (denoted by u) , the first order conditions simplify to
L  2 +  o(lV ~ 1 ) =  (2.13)
(2 — o) (2 +  crN) t£
The first order conditions (together with other equilibrium conditions, to be introduced below) 
will allow us to solve for the equilibrium level of technological capability (see section 3 for more 
details). This completes the description of the second stage subgame. Second order conditions 
for this stage are discussed in Appendix 2.
2.2.3 Stage 1: T he E ntry Decision
In the first stage, firms decide whether to enter or not. We assume there is a sufficiently large 
pool of potential entrants. Firms enter as long as gross profits are not exhausted by fixed
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outlays. This leads to the following free-entry condition
L T T k ^ w e ^ y  k = l , . . . , N + l  (2.14)
In equihbrium, ignoring integer effects, entry occurs until condition (2.14) holds with equality.
If firms choose a symmetric quality level (denoted by u), using (2.9), the free entry conditions 
simplify to
L ,
=  we~ T  (2-15)
2(2 +  <7^)2  tg
This concludes the description of the Stage 1 subgame, and hence completes the description of 
the game in industry X.
2.3 The Labour M arket and Industry Y
We first discuss the labour market, and then industry Y. Each consumer has a perfectly 
inelastic labour supply, which has been set to 1. The consumer decides how much of his 
labour endowment to allocate between industries X  and Y  (labour is perfectly mobile between 
industries). Total labour supply is therefore fixed at the size of the population, L. Labour 
demand stems from sectors X  and Y. The labour requirement of each firm in sector X  is 
f(uk) =  e • Employment in industry X  is given by
N + l
Lx =  ^  f ( u k)
k= 1
In a symmetric equilibrium this simplifies to
I* = (i\r + l ) e ( ^ )  (2.16)
Any labour not used in industry X  is absorbed by industry Y.  We denote employment in 
industry Y  by Ly. Thus we can write the labour market clearing condition as
L = Lx + Ly where Lx,Ly € [0, L] (2-17)
Industry Y  has a simple 1:1 (constant returns to scale) technology: One unit of labour produces 
one unit of good Y. The wage rate will adjust to ensure that labour supply matches demand.
We now turn to industry Y. Recall per-capita demand for good Y  from equation (2.4), and 
its symmetric counterpart (2.5). In a symmetric equilibrium we have that x^ = x  and pk = p-
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Using this, aggregate demand for good Y  can be written as T D =  L Y  =  Lw — (N  4-1 )Lpx. 
We next use the fact that Lpx = Lit = we > which obtains by the free entry condition in 
equation (2.15). Thus we can write aggregate demand for good Y  as
T D = w L - ( N  + 1M £ (2.18)
Given the 1:1 technology assumed for sector Y, aggregate supply of good Y  is identical to the 
amount of labour employed in the sector, and can be solved from equation (2.17), to yield
r ^ L v = L - ( N  + l ) e ( ± ) ‘ (2.19)
If Ly > 0 then w = 1, to ensure that T 5 =  T D. To see this, note that industry Y  uses a 
(freely available) 1:1 technology, hence the marginal product of labour is given by the price of 
good Y  (namely, q), which has been set equal to 1 (since good Y  is the numeraire). However, 
if demand for labour from sector X  is high enough to make Ly =  0 (in which case Lx = L), 
then industry Y  is non-existent, and industry X  uses all the labour available in the economy. 
In this case we have that w > 1 (otherwise workers would switch to production of Y  and earn 
w = 1). Thus we obtain that in general equilibrium w ^  1. When Ly =  0, the equilibrium 
wage is solved from the labour market clearing condition (equation 2.17).
It is important to note that in this model value added is identical to the wage rate. This 
can be broken down into the value added generated in each sector, and these are discussed 
in Appendix 3. This completes the description of the labour market and industry Y. In the 
following section, we characterize a symmetric general equilibrium.
3 C harac teriza tion  o f a  Sym m etric G eneral Equilibrium
We have five parameters (0, a, e, L  and u0) and three key variables which determine the rest 
of the system (u, N  and w). The general equilibrium solutions to these variables will be 
functions of the parameters only: u (0, a, e, L, u0), N  (0, a, e, L, uQ) and w (0, <r, e, L, u0). We 
will simplify notation by dropping the arguments, so we write u(.) for u (0, <j, e, L, u0), N(.) for 
N  (0, (7, e, L, u0) and w(.) for w (0, cr, e, L, u0). The solutions will depend on whether Ly > 0 or 
Ly =  0. The functions u(.), N(.) and w(.) characterize the general equilibrium of the economy, 
and can be derived explicitly in a symmetric equilibrium. A Symmetric General Equilibrium 
is characterized by:
a) Market clearing for goods of type X  and Y.
42
b) Market clearing for labour.
c) A Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in Industry X , which in turn is characterized
by:
i) Firms choosing (Nash) symmetric equilibrium quantities in stage 3 of the game, 
taking as given technological capabilities and market structure.
ii) Firms choosing (Nash) symmetric equilibrium technological capabilities in stage 2 
of the game, taking market structure as given.
iii) Free entry in stage 1 of the gameB.
We now set out the equilibrium conditions and then use these to seek a symmetric equilib­
rium.
Equilibrium  Conditions:
First we have the ‘no-profitable deviation’ (first order) conditions for choice of technological 
capability from (2.12):
2 +  a (N  -  1) (  a ut \  _  u f~ 2
( 2 -v )* (2  + o N ) [  2 +  e<3 yg ( ' >
Second we have the zero profit (free entry) condition, from (2.14):
Uk\
Uq
IyjTk =  we ( —  J (2-21)
Third we have the labour market clearing condition, from (2.17)
L = Ly + Lx (2.22)
Finally, we require market clearing for type Y  and type X  goods, which will hold by con­
struction. In a symmetric equilibrium, the ‘no-profitable deviation’ condition for choice of
technological capability (2.20) simplifies to
r 2 + a ( N - l )  y - *  ,00„
V , ) ( 2  + (2'23)
Substituting symmetric gross profits (2.9), the free entry condition (2.21) becomes
2(2 + o N Y =We~ 4  (2'M)
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and using (2.16), the labour market clearing condition (2 .2 2 ) can be written as
L - L ,  + ( N +  l ) s ( ^ ) (2.25)
Conditions (2.23-2.25) allow us to solve for u(.), N(.) and w(.), as follows. Prom (2.23) we can 
solve for u to obtain:
’ Lug 2 + <t( N - 1 )u =
i
0 - 2
we(3 ( 2  — a ) ( 2  +  a N ) 2 
To solve for N  we substitute (2.26) into (2.24) and obtain
N  + 1 = V -  2)(2 - ^ ) + 1
2(7
(2.26)
(2.27)
We now substitute N  + l  from (2.27) into u (equation 2.26) to obtain technological capability 
in terms of exogenous parameters (/?, a, e, L, u0) and the wage rate (w):
u = tif L
i
/9 -2
(2.28)
Next substitute N  + l  (from equation 2.27) and u (equation 2.28) into the labour market 
clearing condition (2.25) to obtain the equilibrium wage rate. Care needs to be taken in noting 
that if labour demand from industry X  is insufficient to clear the labour market, industry Y  
will absorb any surplus labour. This implies that the wage rate will be equal to the marginal 
product of labour in industry Y, which is equal to the price of good Y, q =  1 . Thus we 
have that if Ly =  0, w > 1 (otherwise workers would produce using the freely available 1:1 
technology), and if Ly > 0, w =  1 (in which case they are effectively using such technology). 
The equilibrium wage rate is given by
w =  max < (2.29)
The solution for the wage rate is substituted into equation (2.28) to obtain the general equilib­
rium level of technological capability. This depends on whether Ly is strictly positive or not. 
If Ly =  0 (w > 1), we have:
F L  1
U — Un e (£-2)(2—or) , , 
2a ^  1
(2.30)
If, on the contrary, Ly > 0 (such that w = 1), then technological capability is obtained simply
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by setting w = 1 in (2.28):
« = { “» ! 1— -— t Y 2 (2-s i )\  * 2 .  [ ) , ( ! _ ! ) + „ ] * /
The general equilibrium number of firms is simply given by equation (2.27) and no further 
substitutions are necessary. This completes the characterization of a symmetric general equi­
librium in the closed economy. The symmetric general equilibrium outcomes for the closed 
economy are summarized in the following table:
a) If Lv =  0 (w > 1 )
(/3~2jS2~°r)+11
w - f ) + ^
L 1gl/?-2)(2-a) | 1
N + i = iiz^hzfl + i
u = u,
b) If > 0 (w =  1)
w =  1
u ( uZ l  1 1
™ 1 2 ' W h ) + » ] 7
N  + 1 =  ^ ~ 2K2~g) +  i
Table 1 : Symmetric General Equilibrium for the Closed Economy.
An interesting feature of the results on market structure is that concentration depends only 
on ft and a. Thus market size (L), initial conditions (u0) and set-up costs (s) do not affect 
concentration. This is a common feature of vertical product differentiation models, and is 
related to the ‘non-convergence property’ discussed in Sutton (1991, 1998) and Cabral (2002), 
that is, that concentration does not fall to zero as market size increases indefinitely.
Two Fundamental Effects: Market Structure and Technological Capability
In this model, there are two fundamental mechanisms which determine the demand for 
labour and thereby the wage rate. Firstly, we have the technological capability effect, which 
refers to how changes in technological capability affect the demand for labour at the level of the 
firm. If technological capability rises, this will increase f (u)  and thus labour demand at the firm 
level. On the other hand we have the market structure effect, which refers to how industry-level 
labour demand is affected by market structure. As the number of firms rises, the demand for 
labour at the industry level will expand -there are more firms with labour requirement f(u).
45
The key notion is that the two effects go in opposite directions: As technological capability rises, 
fixed costs increase, and the market can accommodate fewer firms. Likewise, if technological 
capability falls, so do fixed costs and a larger number of entrants can survive. One of the 
central results then is the answer to the question: Which will generate higher labour demand 
(and higher wage rate), few firms each with high technological capability, or many firms each 
with low technological capability?
A n Explanatory N ote  on  W elfare Analysis
Since net profits are zero and we use a representative consumer, utility is a measure of welfare 
(denoted by W). This is obtained by substituting (symmetric) equilibrium solutions into the 
utility function (equation 2 .1 ), as follows
W  = (N  + 1) x — (1  +  2aN) —z +  Y  (2.32)
For welfare analysis it is important to note that consumers’ income is determined by the 
wage rate. As we change any given parameter to analyze the comparative statics around a 
symmetric general equilibrium, we will be interested in the associated welfare change. Welfare 
is determined by income, and hence by the wage rate. So, in order to obtain the welfare 
consequences of any given change in parameter values all we need to observe are the changes 
in the wage rate.
We are now in a position to analyze how the economy reacts to changes in parameter values. 
This is the task for the next section.
4 Analysis of the Symmetric Equilibrium
We consider how each of the parameters (/?, cr, e, L, u0) affects outcomes for a symmetric equi­
librium. But first, let us summarize the variables to be examined. What follows is a list of the 
variables which were considered to be the most interesting, for which results are reported.
a) Wage rate (equal to per-capita value added 6): w(.) (see table 1 ).
b) Technological capability: u(.) (see table 1).
c) Number of firms: N  (.) +  1 (see table 1).
d) Welfare: W  (.) (equation 2.32).
6 For more details on the measurement of value added in this model, see Appendix 3.
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e) Em ploym ent in in d u stry  Y: Ly = L — Lx (from equation 2.17).
f) Em ploym ent in in d u stry  X: Lx (.) (equation 2.16).
We analyze how these variables change as parameters are varied. It is worth noting that 
the analysis we have carried out is an equilibrium analysis. As such, all the behavior we discuss 
refers to changes in the equilibrium values of the system as we change one of the exogenous 
parameters, while holding the other parameters constant (but not the equilibrium values of 
the variables, these vary according to the equilibrium solutions obtained in section 3).
While the model contains more variables than those presented in this section, these were 
deemed the most enlightening subset. For the interested reader, the analysis of all remaining 
variables is presented in Appendix 4.
N otation
We will use the notion of ‘parameter thresholds’ extensively in what follows, so a notational 
clarification is due. For each of the variables listed above we will analyze slope and concavity 
with respect to the parameters. However, due to the non-linearity of the system, we often find 
changes in the slope/concavity of a variable within the interval of change for the parameter at 
hand. To identify such changes, we have defined ‘threshold’ values of parameters at which the 
change occurs.
In the case of a change of slope, the threshold will usually be determined by an extreme 
point of the variable, and as such will be associated to a vanishing first derivative. For example, 
if we wish to define a threshold level of a defined by an extreme in w (which will be labelled 
<rw), we would use the condition ^ \ a=aW =  0  to solve for crw7.
For a change of concavity, we would use the presence of an inflection point to solve for 
the threshold value of the parameter. For example, if we wish to pinpoint a change in the 
concavity of u with respect to cr, we would define a threshold level of a  (call it au), such that 
=  0 , and solve for <ru from this condition.da a=a» ’
In order to simplify notation, the notation for thresholds is consistent only within each 
proposition, not across propositions. If this notational simplification had not been put in 
place, each parameter threshold would have also required an extra index for the appropriate 
proposition. Since it will be clear from the context which parameter threshold we are referring 
to, we have opted for the simpler notation.
7 §7 Io—ctvu should be read as ‘the partial derivative of w with respect to a evaluated at cr'1
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Finally, we use the notion of ‘piecewise’ concavity/convexity of a variable. This notion is 
useful in the case when a variable exhibits kinks in its trajectory. It refers to functions which 
are concave/convex within sections that he between certain thresholds (the kinks), but not 
across sections. Thus we can have that a function is piecewise concave (when individually 
considered, all of its sections are concave), but not globally concave (due to the kinks, some 
sections considered jointly may not be concave, even though each section is concave when 
considered individually).
4.1 Analysis o f  C hanges in /3
To obtain some intuition of how f3 affects the economy, we proceed to a detailed account of the 
different forces at work in the model. For this first parameter, we proceed at a leisurely pace 
to become familiar with the process at hand. (3 is a convenient parameter to start with, since 
its analysis is relatively simple, and it allows us to introduce the main mechanisms.
Recall that /? is the elasticity of the firm’s labour requirement in industry X , /  (u) =  
£ (ul )  > respect to technological capability, u. Labour requirement is constituted by 
the physical labour input needed to achieve a certain level of technological capability. (3 is 
closely related to the marginal cost of technological capability, which is given by (3^ .
The marginal cost is monotonically increasing in /5, since ^  > 1.
The following discussion is based on Figure 4.1, shown below. Continuous lines track the 
equilibrium outcomes of the variables, while dashed lines show the behaviour which would have 
prevailed had there not been a lower bound of 1 on the wage rate (we shall refer to these as 
‘shadow’ values). The top left graph shows technological capability in terms of /?, the top right 
graph depicts the wage rate in terms of /?, the bottom left graph shows the number of firms as 
a function of f3 and the bottom right graph depicts employment in industries X  and Y  as well 
as the total number of workers (the economy’s labour endowment).
48
w1
g
E
_c
IW
0
an
N + l
Figure 4.1: The effect of (3
As /3 increases, the marginal cost of technological capability rises. The effects of this are 
twofold. Firstly, investment in technological capability is reduced (this is the ‘ technological 
capability effect'). Secondly, lower investment in technological capability reduces the sunk 
costs required to enter the industry, leading to an increase in the equilibrium number of firms 
(the ‘market structure effect'). These effects constitute the driving forces for some of the main 
results of the study. The technological capability effect reduces the demand for labour at the 
level of the firm ( /  (u) falls). The market structure effect increases the demand for labour 
at the level of industry X  (there are now more firms demanding workers). The net effect 
on labour demand will determine the consequences for the wage rate. If the net effect is to 
increase labour demand (the market structure effect dominates the technological capability 
effect), then the wage rate will rise. We find that the net effect of increasing (3 is to reduce 
labour demand, thereby reducing the wage rate (the ‘technological capability’ effect dominates 
the ‘market structure’ effect).
Parallel to the process just described is a process of structural change in the economy. As 
demand for labour in industry X  falls due to the increasing marginal cost of technological 
capability, any surplus labour must be absorbed by industry Y . As soon as the wage rate 
reaches a level equal to 1, industry Y  becomes active. Surplus workers turn to their outside 
option of using the 1:1 ‘traditional’ technology, to earn their marginal product (w  =  q =  1,
49
since good Y is the numeraire). Thus as the marginal cost of technological capability rises, 
more workers are made redundant in industry X  and employment in this industry contracts. 
As more workers move to industry Y, it expands its share in employment.
The process just described admits several interpretations. Industry Y  could be called the 
‘traditional’, ‘pre-modern’ or ‘informal’ sector. The key property is that this industry features 
constant returns to scale (as opposed to industry X  which has increasing returns to scale), and 
offers little scope for expansion of the wage rate. Workers in industry Y could be interpreted 
as ‘covert unemployment’, ‘informal workers’ or ‘self employed workers’8.
The dual structure of the economy helps us consider the effects that different policies have on 
economic development. In particular, we can envisage two kinds of development configuration:
1) H igh-tech: The economy has few firms each with a high level of technological capability.
2) P roliferation: The economy has many firms, each with a low level of technological 
capability.
We ask the question: Which of these configurations generates a higher level of income (and 
therefore welfare)? We will see that the answer depends on parameter values, and this provides 
a testable prediction of the model. In Figure 4.1 we can see that the ‘high-tech’ configuration 
is associated with a higher wage rate, relative to the ‘proliferation’ configuration. However, 
this is not always the case, as we will see below.
To recap: as (3 rises, u falls at a decreasing rate and N  + 1 rises linearly. Since the rise 
in N  4 -1 is insufficient to offset the fall in u, labour demand in industry X  contracts and w 
falls, both at decreasing rates. Once the wage rate reaches a level of 1 , industry Y becomes 
active and expands its share in employment (at a decreasing rate), all the while industry X  is 
contracting. It is worth noting that at the level of (3 for which the wage rate reaches the lower 
bound of 1 (namely, fiw=1), technological capability begins to fall at a faster rate, thereby 
generating a kink in the graph of u (and also in that of w). This occurs because the increase 
in marginal cost can no longer be offset by reducing wages: The wage rate had been acting 
as a buffer to accommodate (albeit partly) the increase in the marginal cost of technological 
capability. Once w =  1 , the buffer is no longer available, and the effects of the increase in the 
marginal cost are borne by technological capability.
The results discussed above and others are stated in a more precise manner in the following 
proposition (which is continued in Appendix 4)9.
8 The model could have been simplified by dropping industry Y  from the framework and having a wage rate 
which would adjust to clear the labour market (and would not have a lower bound of 1). However having the 
dual structure offers interesting insights relating to the process of economic development.
9 In setting out this proposition and the subsequent ones, care needs to be taken in noting that some of the
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P roposition  (3: Effects of (3
Recall that f3 £ (2, oo).
a) W age ra te : Define a threshold level of /3, ^ w~1, such that w = I. The wage rate, w, 
is strictly decreasing and strictly (piecewise) convex in (3 for [3 < (3W=1: ^  < 0, > 0. For 
(3 ^  /T ^ 1, we have w =  1.
b) Technological capability: u is strictly decreasing and strictly (piecewise) convex in 
/?: < 0 , > 0. When (3 ^  /51l,=l, u  falls at a higher rate, thereby generating a kink in the
function.
c) N um ber o f firms: N + 1 is strictly increasing and linear in /?: ^  > 0, — = 0.
d) W elfare: W  is strictly decreasing and strictly convex in 13: ^  < 0, > 0. The 
behavior of welfare (W) tracks that of the wage rate, w (with different values). When {3 ^  (3W=1, 
W  falls at a smaller rate, generating a kink in W. The reason why W  becomes flatter is that 
once the wage rate becomes 1 , the fall in welfare is mitigated by the fact that as increases 
above (3W=1 the wage cannot not fall any further.
e) Em ploym ent in  industry  Y: Ly =  0 for (3 < /3W=1, and it is strictly increasing and 
strictly concave for (3 ^  (3W=1: > 0, < 0.
f) Em ploym ent in in d u stry  X : Recall that Lx = L — Ly, so its behavior is the opposite 
of Ly. Thus for (3 < /3W=:1, Lx = L. For (3 ^  {3W=1 Lx is strictly decreasing and strictly convex: 
9Lz. < o  > 0dp ^  u> Tp* > Ui
Proof: By inspection of the corresponding variables, their derivatives and associated 
thresholds^.
Following a similar approach to the analysis of /?,we now proceed to analyze the effects of 
varying a.
4.2 A nalysis of C hanges in <r
The substitutability of goods in industry X  (horizontal product differentiation) is measured 
by a. The closer <7 is to 1, the closer substitutes the goods are. In the limit, as a —> 1 , 
type X  goods become perfect substitutes. Likewise, as a —> 0, the goods become perfectly 
unsubstitutable.
variables will exhibit kinks. Accordingly, any derivatives will not be defined at the kinks.
To deal with this we have used the notion of piecewise concavity (convexity), introduced above. Thus state­
ments about the (piecewise) concavity of a function refer to the parts of the function which he (strictly) between 
the kinks.
51
We present a similar figure to that used in the previous section. In Figure 4.2, a  is plotted 
on the horizontal axes. Continuous lines represent the symmetric equilibrium outcomes, and 
dashed lines show the projection of the corresponding outcome, had the wage rate not had 
a lower bound equal to  1 (the ‘shadow value’). The top left graph in Figure 4.2 depicts 
technological capability. The top right graph shows the wage rate. The bottom left graph 
illustrates the number of firms and the bottom  right graph depicts employment in industries 
X  and Y .
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Figure 4.2: The effect of cr
Technological capability is increasing in cr. To study the concavity of technological capability, 
consider two thresholds: crj^ 1 and . crj^ 1 is the lowest value of a  at which the wage rate 
reaches its lower bound of 1 . cr^rj  ^ is the highest value of a  at which the wage rate is at its lower 
bound of 1. For cr <  cr]^1 and for cr >  cr^pj (such that w  >  1), we have that technological 
capability is concave in cr. For crjpp cr ^ a high (su°h that w  — 1)> technological capability is 
convex in cr. When a Towl ^  cr ^  ^high (u> =  1 ) we find that technological capability is rising at 
an increasing rate as cr grows, beginning with a flatter slope than was the case when a  <  cr^1, 
(i.e., when w  >  1). This is due to the wage being fixed at 1 : As shown by the ‘shadow’ wage 
rate, when a  increases past c r ^ 1, had it not been for the lower bound of 1  the wage rate would 
have continued falling, would have reached a minimum and would have begun growing. The 
effect of this for technological capability is that when the wage would have continued falling
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(but was fixed at 1 ), the net marginal benefit of technological capability is rising at a relatively 
slower rate than its shadow counterpart. Thus technological capability rises at a slower pace 
than its corresponding shadow value. Once the wage rate reaches a minimum and begins rising, 
the process is reverted: The shadow wage rate rises faster than the actual wage (w = 1 ), hence 
the actual net marginal benefit grows faster than its shadow value, leading to the steeper slope 
of actual technological capability, relative to its shadow value. Once cr grows past cr™r^ , the 
wage rate becomes strictly greater than 1 , and technological capability recovers its underlying 
(concave and rising) shape.
Meanwhile, the number of firms is decreasing at a decreasing rate in a. The intuition behind 
the pattern followed by technological capability and by the number of firms is as follows. 
As cr grows, goods become closer substitutes and the net marginal benefit of escalation10 
grows, since any given firm can capture a larger share of the market by unilaterally raising 
its technological capability. Thus, in equilibrium, each firm finds it optimal to increase its 
investment in technological capability. In turn, this raises the investment required to survive 
in the industry, thereby reducing the number of entrants.
We now focus on the determination of the wage rate. So long as employment in industry 
X  equals labour supply in the whole economy, the wage rate is strictly greater than 1 . As 
soon as labour demand from industry X  falls short of the economy’s labour endowment any 
surplus labour is employed by industry Y, and this makes the wage rate constant at a value 
of 1 (which is the constant marginal product of labour in industry y ). The number of firms 
combines with technological capability to determine labour demand by industry X , and hence 
the wage rate. At first we find that the decreasing number of firms is not offset by the increasing 
technological capability, resulting in a net reduction in the demand for labour by industry X, 
and a decreasing wage rate. For higher values of cr, the decrease in the number of firms is more 
than offset by the increase in technological capability, resulting in a higher labour demand by 
industry X  and an increasing wage rate. The wage rate is thus ‘U’-shaped, and may reach its 
lower bound of 1 for intermediate values of a  ( c r ^  cr ^  crj^j1).
The intuition for the ‘U’-shape of the wage rate is as follows. On the one hand we have 
that when a is relatively low, the number of firms is large, with each firm having relatively 
low technological capability. The effect on labour demand of the falling number of firms is 
greater than the effect of rising technological capability. Whence the wage rate falls with a (the 
‘market structure’ effect dominates the ‘technological capability’ effect). On the other hand, for
10 The term ‘escalation’ refers to  the process whereby a firm increases its technological capability by increasing 
its investment, in order to outperform its rivals. See Sutton (1998, page 26).
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relatively high values of g the situation is reversed. We now have a small number of firms, each 
with a relatively high level of technological capability. It is now the increase in technological 
capability, rather than the fall in the number of firms, that drives the demand for labour from 
industry X , and hence the wage rate becomes increasing (now it is the ‘technological capability’ 
effect that dominates the ‘market structure’ effect).
Employment exhibits the following pattern. For g < cr^ 1 and for a > cr^r^, labour 
demand from industry X  is sufficient to employ all of the labour force, therefore industry Y  
remains inactive (and the wage rate is strictly higher than 1). For crf^1 ^  cr ^  (^high labour 
demand from industry X  is smaller than the economy’s labour force, and thus some workers 
turn to industry Y  for employment (and the wage rate is equal to 1 ). Within this range, 
employment in industry X  is decreasing, reaches a minimum and then is increasing. This 
behaviour reflects the pattern followed by the shadow wage rate. Similarly, employment in 
industry X  equals the economy’s labour endowment minus employment in industry Y, and 
consequently exhibits complementary behaviour to Ly: It is increasing, reaches a maximum 
and becomes decreasing.
It is worth noting (see table 1) that lower values of (3 or e, or higher values of L  or u0 will lead 
to higher wage rate and technological capability (and in the case of [3, higher concentration). 
Thus we can also picture a scenario in which the wage rate is overall higher and does not 
reach its lower bound of 1 . It therefore does not have any kinks, exhibiting a pattern like 
that followed by the shadow wage. Similarly, in this scenario technological capability would be 
globally concave (following the pattern of the shadow technological capability), also without 
any kinks in its trajectory. This would imply that industry X  remains the sole employer for 
any value of cr € (0 , 1 ).
The results discussed above and others are stated more precisely in the following proposition 
(which is completed in Appendix 4).
Proposition a: Effects o f cr
Recall that g G (0,1).
a) W age rate:
If w > 1 for all a G (0,1) then w is ‘U’ shaped: As we increase g , w is strictly decreasing 
< 0)> reaches a global minimum ( ^  =  0) and becomes strictly increasing ( |^  > 0). It 
follows that w is strictly convex in cr: > 0 .
Alternatively, if w =  1 for some g G (0,1), then define two thresholds: cr] ^ 1 and g™^, such 
that for all g G [crj^1, g%=1\, w  =  1 obtains. Provided 0 < cr^ 1 < <r™=i < 1, for <7 < w
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is strictly decreasing and strictly convex in a < 0, > 0). For a > <J™^1 w is strictly
increasing and strictly convex in cr > 0 , > 0 ).
b) Technological capability: u is strictly increasing in cr: > 0. For w > 1 , we have
that u is strictly concave in cr: < 0. When w — 1 , u is strictly convex in cr: > 0 . u is
kinked at the points where w becomes 1 .
c) N um ber of firms: N  + 1  is strictly decreasing and strictly convex in cr: ^da  ^ < 
^ > 0 .
d) W elfare: W  exhibits similar behavior to the wage rate (with different numerical values). 
However, when w =  1, W  becomes flatter, generating a kink in W . This change of slope occurs 
for the same reason as outlined in part (d) of Proposition ft.
e) Em ploym ent in in d u stry  Y: Ly = 0 for w > 1 . If iu =  1 then Ly > 0. In this case, 
Ly is strictly concave: < 0 and ‘fl’ shaped: As we increase <r, Ly is strictly increasing
( li^  ^  0 )> reaches a global maximum ( ^ L = 0 ) and becomes strictly decreasing < 0 ).
f) Em ploym ent in in d u stry  X : Lx is equal to L — Ly. Thus its behavior is the opposite 
of Ly. Ly will supplement Lx to use all of the available labour supply (given by L).
Proof: By inspection of the corresponding variables, their derivatives and associated 
thresholds!.
4.3 Analysis o f Changes in e
e can be interpreted as an exogenous set-up cost. The following figure presents the usual 
variables as a function of e. In Figure 4.3, we plot e on the horizontal axes. Continuous lines 
represent the actual trajectory of the variables, while dashed thin lines show the ‘shadow’ value 
of the corresponding variable, had the wage rate not had a lower bound equal to 1 . As before, 
the top left graph shows technological capability, the top right graph shows the wage rate, the 
bottom left graph shows the number of firms and the bottom right graph shows employment 
in industries X  and Y.
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Figure 4.3: The effect of e
Technological capability is decreasing in e, at a decreasing rate. When the wage reaches its 
lower bound of 1 , technological capability exhibits a kink and after that it becomes steeper 
and falls again at a decreasing rate. Intuitively, as set-up costs rise, the marginal cost of tech­
nological capability also rises, thereby reducing technological capability. Each of the existing 
firms (the number of which does not change) chooses a lower level of technological capability, 
and consequently less work-hours are required. Thus the demand for labour falls in industry 
X , and so does the wage rate. At ew=1 the demand for labour in industry X  becomes smaller 
than the (fixed) labour supply, and some surplus labour appears. This will be absorbed by 
industry Y ,  where labour has a marginal product equal to  1 . Therefore, the economy’s wage 
rate reaches its lower bound of 1 .
The results discussed above are stated more precisely in the following proposition (continued 
in Appendix 4).
P roposition  e: Effects of e
Recall that e G (0, oo).
a) W age rate: Define a threshold ew=l as the lowest value of e such that w  =  1. For 
e <  £w=1, w  is strictly decreasing and strictly convex in e: ^  <  0, >  0. For £ ^  £w=1, we
have w =  1 .
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b) Technological capability: u is strictly decreasing and strictly (piecewise) convex in 
e: < 0 , > 0. When w becomes equal to 1 at e — ew~1, u falls at a higher rate, thereby
generating a kink.
c) N um ber o f firms: N  + 1 is invariant with respect to e.
d) Welfare: W  is strictly decreasing and strictly (piecewise) convex in e: ^  < 0, 
> 0. W  exhibits a kink at e = ew=1. This change of slope occurs for the same reason as
outlined in part (d) of Proposition /3.
e) Em ploym ent in industry Y : Ly — 0 for e <  ew=1, otherwise it is strictly increasing 
and strictly concave: -q£- > 0 , < 0 .
f)  Em ploym ent in industry X : Lx =  L — Ly, so its behavior supplements that of Ly. 
Proof: By inspection of the corresponding variables, their derivatives and associated
thresholdsB.
4.4 A nalysis o f Changes in u0
The effect of initial or inherited technological capability (u0) is similar to the reciprocal of the 
set-up cost (l/e). Both parameters affect marginal cost by shifting the fixed outlays function. 
u0 captures the notion of historical disparity in initial conditions. This issue will become 
central in subsequent chapters, when we introduce international trade. We consider a narrow 
definition and refer to uQ as initial or inherited technological capability, but (similarly to u), it 
admits a more general interpretation. Figure 4.4 presents the corresponding graphs. We plot 
u0 on the horizontal axes. Continuous lines represent the actual trajectory of the variables, 
while dashed thin fines show the ‘shadow’ value of the corresponding variable, had the wage 
rate not had a lower bound equal to 1 . As before, the top left graph shows technological 
capability, the top right graph shows the wage rate, the bottom left graph shows the number 
of firms and the bottom right graph shows employment in industries X  and Y.
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Figure 4.4: The effect of uQ
For w  =  1  (uQ ^  v%=1) technological capabihty (u) increases at an increasing rate with uQ. 
For w  >  1 (uQ >  < =1), technological capability is still increasing in u0, but at a constant rate. 
The number of firms is invariant with respect to u0. Thus, to deduce the pattern followed by 
the wage rate, we need only consider the ‘technological capability’ effect (the ‘market structure 
effect’ is zero). For sufficiently low values of initial technological capability, the wage is equal to 
1 , and as uQ grows past u^=1, the wage begins to rise at an increasing rate. Correspondingly, 
as technological capability increases, employment in industry X  rises, eventually occupying all 
of the labour force. Meanwhile, employment in industry Y  falls, and ultimately industry Y  
becomes inactive.
The mechanisms at work are the familiar ones. When the wage rate is fixed at 1 , techno­
logical capabihty can increase convexly, since the expansion of employment in industry X  that 
this entails is not hindered by rising wages. This can be sustained so long as there is a positive 
share of the labour force employed in industry Y . As soon as there are no more workers left in 
industry Y  on which to draw upon for the expansion of technological capability, wages begin 
to  rise, and it is the wage rate that now rises convexly, while technological capability rises 
linearly.
The results discussed above and others are stated more precisely in the following proposition 
(completed in Appendix 4).
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Proposition  ua: Effects of u0
Recall that u0 € [1, oo).
a) W age ra te : Define a threshold u™= 1  as the highest value of u0 such that w =  1. For
u0 > u™=1, w is strictly increasing and strictly convex in u0: > 0, > 0. For uQ ^  Ug=1,
we have w =  1 .
b) Technological capability: For u ^  u™=1, u  is strictly increasing and strictly convex 
in uQ: ^  > 0, > 0. For u > u™=1, u  is strictly increasing and linear in uQ: ^  > 0, 
^  — 0
c) N um ber o f firms: N-+ 1 is invariant with respect to uQ.
d) W elfare: W  is strictly increasing and strictly (piecewise) convex in u0: > 0,
> 0. W  exhibits a kink at u =  u™=1. This change of slope occurs for the same reason as
outlined in part (d) of Proposition f3.
e) Em ploym ent in  industry  Y: Ly = 0 for u0 > u ^ - 1, and it is strictly decreasing and
strictly concave for u0 ^  u™=l\ < 0 , < 0 .
f) Em ploym ent in  industry  X : Lx =  L  — Ly, so its behavior mirrors that of Ly. Thus 
for u0 > Ug=1, Lx = L  and for u0 ^  u^=1, Lx is strictly increasing and strictly convex in u0:
du0 > u » ^  u -
Proof: By inspection of the corresponding variables, their derivatives and the associated 
threshold®.
4.5 A nalysis of C hanges in L
L  represents the size of the labour force as well as population, and it could also be interpreted 
as market size. In this section we assume that L  changes continuously, ignoring integer effects. 
In analyzing the effects of population change, there are three cases to consider:
(a) (3 < 3 (the marginal cost of increasing technological capabihty is low, i.e., (3 is ‘low’).
(b) P > 3 (the marginal cost of increasing technological capabihty is high, i.e., f3 is ‘high’).
(c)/J =  3.
Figure 4.5a presents the usual graphs for case (a). The top left graph depicts technological 
capabihty, the top right graph shows the wage rate, the bottom left graph plots the number of 
firms, and the bottom right graph exhibits employment in industries X  and Y. As before, the 
shadow value of a variable, had the wage rate not had a lower bound of 1 , is shown as a thin 
dashed line.
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Figure 4.5a: The effect of L ((3 <  3)
Provided the wage rate is greater than 1 (such that L >  where the threshold
is defined as the highest value of L  at which w =  1), increasing the size of the labour force 
increases technological capability at a decreasing rate. W hen L  ^  Lp= 3 , the increase in 
technological capability occurs at an increasing rate and lies beneath its shadow value. This 
is due to  the fact that the wage rate is not rising, which allows technological capabihty to 
increase at a faster rate than would be the case had the wage rate been growing.
The number of firms is constant with respect to population size. Thus the ‘market structure’ 
effect is zero and it is the ‘technological capability’ effect that determines the wage rate. 
Provided L >  L p ^ ,  the wage rate increases at a decreasing rate as population grows. For 
such values of L  all of the labour force is employed by industry X ,  while industry Y  is quiescent. 
For smaller population size (L  ^  ^ < 3 ), the demand for labour from industry X  is insufficient 
to employ all of the work force. Thus, some workers will be absorbed by industry T , where 
labour has a marginal product equal to 1 , and so the wage rate becomes 1 .
Regarding the labour market, the increase in technological capabihty associated with in­
creasing population leads to higher employment in industry X ,  while the ‘market structure’ 
effect is null. For L <  , employment in industry X  is increasing in population at an
increasing rate. W hen L  ^  - £ $ < 3  we have Lx =  L : Industry X  employs ah of the labour force 
(population), and industry Y  is no longer active.
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Employment in industry Y  is obtained as a residual: Any workers not employed by industry 
X  are absorbed by industry Y. Thus for L  ^  3 , employment in industry Y  is zero. For
L < 3 , employment in industry Y  is ‘D’-shaped, increasing in L  at first, readies a maximum,
and then is decreasing in L  at an increasing rate. To see why this is so, note that since industry 
Y  uses a simple 1:1  technology, its labour employment is equal to aggregate supply of good Y  
(see equation 2.19). In equilibrium this matches aggregate demand (equation 2.18). In turn, 
aggregate demand is per-capita demand for good Y  (equation 2.5) multiplied by population 
size. Per-capita demand is the residual income unspent on goods of type X, and expenditure 
on type X  goods is equal to profit, which is equal to fixed investment in technological capabihty 
(recall that such payments take the form of wages). Thus, per-capita demand for good Y  is 
eventually dependent on technological capabihty: Higher technological capabihty increases the 
demand for goods of type X ,  which reduces the (residual) demand for goods of type Y. As we 
can see from Figure 4.5a, technological capabihty is increasing in population size. This means 
that per-capita demand for good Y  is decreasing in population.
The change in aggregate demand for good Y  is the outcome of two opposing forces, to 
which we now turn. On the one hand, we have that per-capita demand is falhng with popula­
tion size: As the labour force expands, technological capability expands, while the number of 
firms is fixed. This increases the expenditure on goods of type X , and reduces the (residual) 
expenditure on good Y  (we shah label this the ‘industry X  crowding-out’ effect).
On the other hand, population itself is growing, and thus although per-capita demand of 
good Y  may be falling, the population increase could account for an increase in the aggregate 
demand of good Y  (we shall label this the ‘population growth’ effect).
From Figure 4.5a, we can see that at first the ‘population growth’ effect dominates the 
‘industry X  crowding-out’ effect, leading to increasing employment in industry Y. However, 
for higher levels of technological capability (and population), the ‘industry X  crowding-out’ 
effect dominates, thereby leading to a decrease of employment in industry Y. Eventually, all 
of the labour force is employed by industry X , and industry Y  ceases to be active.
We now turn to case (b), /? > 3 (/? is high). The corresponding graphs are presented in 
Figure 4.5b.
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Figure 4.5b: The effect of L ((3 >  3)
In case (b) the marginal cost of technological capability is higher than in case (a). The wage rate 
exhibits similar behaviour to case (a), although it is overall lower, since this case is associated 
with a higher (3.
Technological capability is increasing at a decreasing rate. For L  <  T«>3 , technological 
capability lies below its shadow value: Since the wage rate is fixed at 1 , technological capability 
is more costly relative to its shadow value. By contrast, when (3 <  3 -case (a), j3 is low-, the 
corresponding population range (L <  £^< 3 ) has technological capability increasing convexly. 
This difference arises because (3 >  3 (high (3) implies a higher marginal cost of technological 
capability, thus, for a given population increase, technological capability rises at a slower rate.
The number of firms is constant and overall higher than in case (a). Regarding employ­
ment, we can see that employment in industry Y  is ‘fY-shaped. Employment in industry X  is 
always increasing in population. At first it increases less than proportionately with L, then it 
increases more than proportionally with L, eventually catching up with the 45° fine. At this 
point, industry Y  becomes inactive and the wage rate becomes strictly greater than 1 . The 
mechanisms behind this process are similar to those described in case (a).
For comparative purposes, Figure 4.5c superimposes Figures 4.5a and 4.5b. Continuous 
lines represent case (a), /? <  3 (low /?), while dotted lines represent case (b), (3 >  3 (high j3).
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Figure 4.5c: The effect of L  for (3 >  3 and (3 < 3
It is clear from Figure 4.5c that when technological capability and the wage rate are above 
their lower bounds, they are higher in case (a) -w hen (3 is low (13 <  3). Correspondingly, the 
number of firms is higher when (3 is high (/? >  3). Employment in industry X  reaches the 45° 
line sooner when j3 is low ((3 <  3).
It is interesting to highlight the point where the shadow wage rates cross, ur| > 3  =  w j<3. At 
this point, employment levels in industries X  and Y  also cross their corresponding counterpart 
when f3 is high/low.
Case (c), /3 =  3, features levels of technological capability, number of firms, wage rate and 
employment which (not surprisingly) he between those of case (a) and case (b), and follow a 
similar pattern. The only difference is that when w  =  1  technological capabihty is linear in L. 
Since it does not add any new major insights, we have not presented a separate figure for case
(c).
The results discussed above and others are summarized in the fohowing proposition (com­
pleted in Appendix 4).
Proposition L: Effects o f L
Recall that L £  (0 ,oo).
a) Wage rate: Define a threshold Lw=1 as the highest value of L  such that w  =  1. For
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L > Lw=zl, w is strictly increasing and strictly concave in L: > 0, < 0. For L  ^  Lw=1,
we have w =  1 .
b) Technological capability: For L ^  Lw=:1, u is strictly increasing and strictly concave 
in L: §£ > 0, < 0- For L < Lw=1, we consider three cases:
(a) For P < 3 u is strictly increasing and strictly convex in L: > 0, > 0.
(b) For /3 > 3 u is strictly increasing and strictly concave in L: §£ >  0, ^  < 0.
(c) For P =  3 u is strictly increasing and linear in L: > 0, =  0.
u is kinked at L  =  Lw==1.
c) N um ber of firms: N  + 1 is constant with respect to L, =  0.
d) W elfare: W is strictly increasing and strictly (piecewise) concave in L: ^  > 0, 
< 0 . W exhibits behavior similar to the wage rate, w (with different numerical values).
W  exhibits a kink at L =  Lw=1, and is flatter in the region where w = 1. This change of slope 
occurs for the same reason as outlined in part (d) of Proposition p.
e) Em ploym ent in in d u s try  Y: For L > Lw=1, Ly =  0. For L  <  L w=1, Ly is ‘fT-shaped. 
It is strictly increasing at first > 0), reaches a maximum ( ^ f  =  0) and becomes strictly 
decreasing afterwards ( ^ -  < 0). Ly is strictly concave: < 0 for L  ^  Lw=1.
f) Em ploym ent in in d u s try  X: Lx = L — Ly, so its behavior supplements that of Ly. 
Thus for L > Lw=1, Lx =  L. For L  ^  Lw=1 Lx is strictly increasing and strictly convex:
Proof: By inspection of the corresponding variables, their derivatives and associated 
thresholdsB.
This completes the analysis of how the economy changes as we vary each of the parameters. 
We are now ready to summarize some of the most important results of the model.
5 R em arks Concerning G eneral Features o f th e  M odel
One of the most important issues that this framework allows us to address is the following: 
Under which circumstances (i.e., parameter values) will having few firms each with a high level 
of technological capabihty (a ‘high-tech’ economy) generate a higher wage rate (and hence 
higher welfare) than having many firms each with a low level of technological capabihty (a 
‘proliferation’ economy)? If a policy maker could control parameter values in order to change 
the structure of the economy towards a ‘high-tech’ configuration or towards a ‘proliferation’ 
configuration, which should be chosen?
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These are fundamental questions since there is a trade-off for labour demand when choosing 
whether to opt for few firms with high technological capabihty or for many firms each with 
low technological capabihty. In the first case, labour demand is reduced by having fewer firms, 
but it is increased by the high level of technological capabihty that each firm achieves. In the 
latter case, labour demand is enhanced by the presence of many firms, but it is reduced by the 
low technological capabihty that each firm exhibits. It is not clear a-priori which leads to the 
higher level of income and welfare.
The general feature that we have in mind relates to the structure of the demand for (scarce) 
resources in the economy. As the demand for resources rises, so will their price. Accordingly, the 
owners of the resources will enjoy a rise in income and welfare. So the problem of development 
reduces to one of finding the conditions under which the demand for resources is highest. In an 
ohgopoly setting with endogenous technological capability and market structure, an increase 
in the demand for resources by each firm in the form of fixed costs (increases in technological 
capability) will lead to reduced entry, and this will curtail the overall increase in the demand 
for resources. This model, and the extensions that follow in subsequent chapters, provide a 
framework which allows us to pinpoint exactly the conditions under which each effect dominates 
the other (the market structure effect versus the technological capability effect). For the closed 
economy case, these are summarized in the following proposition.
P roposition  1: D evelopm ent C onfigurations in A u tarky
A ‘high-tech’ configuration is associated with a higher wage rate (and welfare) than a 
‘proliferation’ configuration, unless <7 is low.
Proof: By inspection of the equilibrium solution functions for technological capability, the 
number of firms and the wage rate, shown in table I I .
This proposition follows directly from the analysis in section 4: For all parameters, except 
it is always the case that parameter values which generate high technological capabihty and 
high concentration will be associated with a higher wage rate than parameter values which 
generate low technological capabihty and low concentration.
The exception is when a  is low. In this case goods are poor substitutes and we observe an 
economy with many firms each with a low level of technological capabihty. This prohferation 
of technological trajectories is associated with a higher wage rate and welfare.
The next set of questions which this framework allows us to address relates to the rela­
tionship between the parameters of the model and economic pohcy. We can envisage a pohcy 
maker who designs pohcies to change some of these parameters. On the one hand, innovation
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or industrial policies can be related to changes in j3 (reducing the marginal costs of technolog­
ical capability, e.g., support to intellectual property, subsidies to R&D), e (subsidies to set-up 
costs, e.g., subsidized loans for purchasing capital equipment) and uQ (policies to improve the 
firm’s initial level of technological capability, e.g., public training institutes). On the other 
hand, demographic and migration policy can address population size (L). The extent of hori­
zontal product differentiation (product substitutability), given by <r, seems harder to change, 
although Motta and Polo (1998) have endogenized its choice in framework related to ours.
Extension: A Replication Argument
The model presented is constituted by a single oligopolistic industry. This feature is an 
extreme simplification of a real economy. Nonetheless, the mechanisms at work readily extend 
to the multiple industry case. Consider an economy composed by a traditional sector like the 
one we have described, and multiple industries similar to sector X  (indexed by r  =  1 ,..., R). 
Let the products of these industries be non-substitutable with the products of other industries 
(although each firm’s product is substitutable with those of other firms within the same indus­
try). Assume further that there are no supply-side linkages between industries (i.e., there are 
no intermediate goods). The absence of demand and supply linkages between industries implies 
that they are only linked via the labour market. Each of these industries will be characterized 
by a set of parameters (/?r , oy, en Uon L)11, which vary according to the characteristics of each 
industry. Then we can consider the net effects on the demand for labour of having differ­
ent mixes or proportions of industries with high or low technological capability (respectively, 
concentration). The reasoning is straightforward and extends Proposition 1 to the multiple 
industry case: Having a high proportion of high-tech industries will result in a higher wage 
rate than a high proportion of proliferation industries, with the exception of those industries in 
which ar is low. In the latter case, proliferation will constitute an effective way of expanding 
the demand for labour (and the wage rate).
6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we characterized a general equilibrium model which allows us to assess the 
impact of the marginal cost of technological capability (related to /3), the substitutability 
between type X  products (cr), set-up costs (e), population size (L ) and initial technological 
capability (u0), on variables such as the wage rate (w), technological capability (u), market
11 Population size (L) is assumed to be an economy-wide variable, and so does not vary between industries.
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structure (N  +  1 ), welfare (W), and the structure of the economy (i.e., how employment is 
distributed between the modern and the traditional industries: Lx and Ly, respectively). The 
findings are summarized in Propositions fi-L and Proposition 1.
One of the contributions of this chapter is to introduce strategic choice of technological 
capability (innovation) into a general equilibrium setting. This provides the opportunity of 
looking at the interaction between the microfoundations of oligopolistic interaction models, as 
is the case with the innovation/technological capabihty literature (Brander and Spencer, 1983; 
Dixit, 1988b and Sutton, 1998); and economy-wide variables, such as the wage rate and the 
structure of the economy, which have been the usual object of attention in the development 
economics and international trade literature (Ethier, 1982 and Venables, 1985 and 1996).
The model we have developed will allows us, in the next chapter, to carry out an open- 
economy analysis with oligopolistic interactions. One of the advantages of this framework is 
that we can analyze the strategic interaction behind technological capabihty or innovation 
using stage games. This will allow us to place strategic interaction in the spothght, whilst 
keeping the model tractable.
The mechanism whereby higher technological capabihty can affect the standard of hving in 
this framework is not via some form of externality (be they across sectors -as in Romer, 1990- 
or over time -as in Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Rather, the view that emerges is that escalation 
by any firm (in the sense of this firm investing in higher technological capabihty) may affect 
hving standards via strategic interaction (ohgopohstic competition). This result emerges from 
the vertical differentiation of the goods being considered: As a firm raises its technological 
capabihty, its competitors must match this move or else exit the market. In doing so, firms 
collectively raise the level of fixed costs associated with surviving in the industry^ which are 
associated with higher concentration. The net effect on the demand for labour will depend 
on which of two effects dominates. Firstly we have the ‘technological capabihty effect’, which 
raises the demand for labour and hence the wage rate (as weh as welfare). Secondly, we have 
the ‘market structure effect’, which reduces the demand for labour and hence the wage rate.
In particular, Proposition 1 allows us to address the industrial pohcy issue of whether 
development based on small and medium enterprises (SME’s) or large enterprises should be 
preferred. We have found that proliferation (smah and medium enterprises) will result in 
a higher wage rate only if industry X  features a low degree of product substitutability (cr). 
For ah other parameter values large enterprises with high technological capabihty wih lead to 
higher demand for labour. Of course, the idea of having large enterprises is justified subject 
to the condition that they actually do achieve high technological capabihty. Otherwise we
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would be in the worst possible scenario, where we have the disadvantages of a concentrated 
market structure together with low technological capability, and the associated low demand 
for labour, low wage rate and low welfare. However, ceteris paribus, having a concentrated 
market structure with low technological capability is not a Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium, 
so this outcome could only arise as a result of exogenously imposed constraints on the system, 
such as entry restrictions or other types of regulations.
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Appendix 1: Solving the Final Stage Subgame for Industry X (Cotirnot Competi­
tion)
In this Appendix, we solve the final stage subgame (Cournot competition), in order to obtain 
a ‘solved-out payoff’ function. Recall the first order conditions for this stage of the game 
(equation 2.7):
Pk + =  0 for k =  1,..., n +  1dxk
Let us begin by substituting the inverse demand function (2.3) and its derivative (f |£ ) into 
the first order condition to obtain
=  0  (Al.l)
Adding and subtracting and re-organizing equation (A l.l), we arrive at
X* _  _±--------1. 1=1 {A12)
ujt 2 ( 2  — a)
The next step is to sum expression (Al.2) over k, and solve for to obtain
N+} _ r^N+1
= 2(2 + crN) (AL3)
Expression (Al.3) is substituted back into equation (Al.2), to yield the following solution for 
Xk
» - 5^  (‘- r ib s  5 ) (*.«
By imposing symmetry between firms (such that u/ =  uk), we obtain the following simplifica­
tion
u2
x  =  tttt; (Al.4')2(2 +  (tN) k '
To solve for the price (pk), take the inverse demand function (equation 2.3), add and subtract
2 (7 %, to obtainuk
o W+l X k  2(7 Xl
Now substitute Xk from (A1.4) and the expression in (A1.3) into pk (A1.5). This yields the 
solution for pk‘-
Pk 2 - < r ( 1 2 + < W v S u t )  (AL6)
By imposing symmetry between firms (such that ui = Uk), we obtain the following simplified 
solution
* = 2 ^ N  <AL6')
The solved-out payoff is given by the product of equations (Al.4) and (Al.6 ). This yields
1 /  N + i  \  2
*t = 2(^ (" ‘- 2^ I > J  (AL7)
which is equation (2 .8 ) in the text.
A ppendix 2: Second order conditions for th e  Second Stage Subgam e
The second order conditions are obtained by differentiating the first order conditions (2.11) 
with respect to u^. We obtain the following
v? ~ 2
^  w£W  ~  i ) - V  (A2<1)OUk Uo
where
d27ti
du\ ( 2  -< r ) 2
2 + cr(iV — 1)
2 + a N (A2.2)
Substituting equations (A2.2), (2.28) and (2.27) into the second order condition (A2.1), this 
simplifies to ^  2. In section 2.2.2 we assume /? > 2 to ensure we attain a maximum.
A ppendix 3: V alue A dded
Since the only production factor in the economy is labour, there are no intermediate goods 
and profits are zero in all sectors, total value added is identical to the wage rate. This can 
be divided into value added generated by industry X  and by industry Y. As usual, there 
are three ways to measure value added: Using production, income and expenditure. All three 
approaches lead to the same result for per-capita value added. We shall discuss each in turn.
On the production side of sector X ,  value added is simply the total economy-wide revenue 
from good X , which is given by L(N  +  l)px, since there are no intermediate goods. Upon
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dividing by L  we obtain per-capita value added (measured on the production side):
VAPX =  V A X = (N  + 1 )px (A3.1)
On the income side, value added in sector X  is given exclusively by workers’ income 
(VAIX =  wLx), since labour is the only factor of production. In turn employment in sec­
tor X  (Lx) is equal to (N  +  1 )f(u) (where f(u)  was defined in section 2.2.2). The zero profit 
condition in stage 1 (equation 2.14) can be written as Lit =  w f(u), so f(u )  = Ln/w. Recall 
from equation (2 .6 ) that 7r =  px, substituting this into V A IX, we obtain the same result as 
above: V A IX = V A X = (N  + l)px.
On the expenditure side, value added in sector X  is constituted by consumption expenditure 
of good X ,  since there is no investment or international trade in this economy. Consumption 
expenditure of good X  is equal to L(N  +  1 )px, and dividing by population (L) we obtain the 
same result previously found in per-capita terms: V A EX =  V A X — (N  +  1 )px.
On the production side of sector Y, VAPy =  q(L — Lx). Noting that q =  1 , we have that 
value added in sector Y  is simply the supply of Y  goods, which (given the assumption of 1:1  
technology) is the same as employment in sector Y  (Ly). In per capita terms:
VAPy =  V A y = (L — Lx) / L = Ly/ L  (A3.2)
On the income side, value added in Y  is equal to the wage bill in the sector, VAIy =  wLy. 
However, recall from section 2.3 that whenever Ly > 0, the wage rate will be 1. Hence we 
obtain the same result as with the production side: V A Iy =  V A y =  Ly/L.
On the expenditure side, value added is composed by consumption of good Y, which is
defined from equation (2.5) as L[w — (N  +  1 )px). We now use the zero profit condition L'k —
Lpx =  w f(u)  to write value added as Lw—(N + l)w  f(u). By noting again that if Y  is produced 
at all, we must have w =  1 , this can be written as L — (N  +  1 )f(u). Now (N  -I-1 )f(u)  is none 
other than Lx, and so we arrive at the same (per-capita) value added as in the production and 
income side: V A E y =  VAy = Ly/L.
Total (per-capita) value added is the addition of value added for both sectors: V A  —
V A x+ V A y .
71
A ppendix  4: A nalysis of O th e r Variables of In te rest
For brevity, we decided to discuss only a subset of the economy’s variables in the main body 
of the chapter. Those variables were deemed the most enlightening in terms of describing the 
workings of the economy. However, other variables may also be of interest. We provide here a 
complete analysis of the remaining variables, continuing with the same format as in Section 4. 
The remaining variables are:
g) P rice  of good X: p =  2+gn  (equ8^ 011 A l.6 ', in Appendix 1 ).
2
h) Per-firm  o u tp u t of good X  (per-capita): x  =  2(2+gAr) (equation A1.4', in Appendix
! ) ■
i) In d u s try  o u tp u t of good X  (per-capita): X  =  (N  + l)rc. 
j)  Econom y o u tp u t of good X: x  =  L X.
k) D em and for Good Y  (per-capita): Y  = w — (N  + 1 )px  (equation 2.5).
L — (N  +  l)e (equation 2.18).1) A ggregate D em and for G ood Y : T D =  w
m) A ggregate Supply o f G ood Y: T 5  = Ly = L — (N  +  l)e (equation 2.19).
n) Value added in in d u stry  X  (per-capita): V A X = (N  -1- 1 )px (equation ??).
o) Value added in  in d u stry  Y  (per-capita): VAy =  Ly/ L  (equation A3.2). Note that 
in equilibrium, this is the same as physical per-capita production of good Y. To see this note 
that good Y  is the numeraire (its price has been normalized to q =  1) and sector Y  is assumed 
to use a 1:1 technology. Thus V A y =  Y.
We proceed to complete the corresponding propositions.
P roposition (3: Effects o f  (3 (continued)
g) Price o f good X: p is strictly decreasing and strictly convex in /?: < 0, > 0.
h) Per-firm  output o f good X  (per-capita): x  is strictly decreasing and strictly convex 
in (3\ ^  < 0, > 0. When ^  (3W=1, x  becomes steeper, generating a kink at ft =  fiwz=1.
i) Industry output o f good X  (per-capita): X  is strictly decreasing and strictly convex 
in /3: ^  < 0, > 0. X  inherits the kink found in x, at (3 = (3W==1.
j)  Econom y output o f  good X : x  exhibits behavior identical to X ,  except that it is 
multiplied by L.
k) Dem and for good Y  (per-capita): Y  has similar properties to Ly. It is equal to 0 
for (3 < (3W=1, and it is strictly increasing and strictly concave for /? ^  (3W=1: > 0, < 0.
Note that, in equilibrium, the upper bound of Y  is 1 (in equilibrium, the highest possible
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individual demand for Y  occurs when all individuals devote all of their time to the production 
of Y, which at most will generate a single unit of good Y,  per capita).
1) A ggregate D em and for G ood Y : X D, has the same properties as Y, but it is 
multiplied by L  (in equilibrium, X D = Ly).
m) A ggregate Supply of G ood Y : X s  =  Ly, always matches X D in equilibrium, and 
thereby exhibits identical behavior.
n) Value added in in d u stry  X  (per-cap ita): V A X, exhibits behavior similar to w. The 
only difference is that when w =  1, V A x does not (like w) become flat at a value of 1. Instead 
it begins to fall at a steeper rate. To see this, note that the wage reduction which occurs as fi 
rises acts like a ‘buffer’ in reducing the shrinkage of sector X .  Once the wage rate reaches its 
minimum value of 1, the ‘buffer’ is exhausted and sector X  shrinks at a faster rate.
0) Value added in in d u stry  Y  (per-capita): VAy, has the same value as per-capita 
demand for good Y  and displays identical behavior.
Proof: By inspection of the corresponding variables, their derivatives and associated 
thresholds^.
Proposition  cr: Effects o f a (continued)
fV-.
g) P rice of good X: p, is strictly increasing and strictly convex in cr: > 0 and > 0.
h) Per-flrm  o u tp u t of good X  (per-capita): x  is strictly increasing in a\ > 0. For 
w > 1 , we have that x  is strictly concave in a: < 0. When w =  1, x  is strictly convex in
a: > 0 . £ is kinked at the points where w becomes 1 .
1) In d u stry  o u tp u t o f good X  (per-capita): X  is ‘U’-shaped in cr: It is strictly 
decreasing at first ( ^  < 0 ), reaches a m in im um  {jX  =  0 ), and becomes strictly increasing 
( ^  >0). X  is strictly convex in a ( | ^  > 0).
j)  Econom y o u tp u t o f good X: x  exhibits behavior identical to X ,  except that it is 
multiplied by L.
k) D em and for good Y  (per-capita): Y  has properties identical to Ly, and we refer 
the reader to Proposition cr, part (e).
1) A ggregate D em and for Good Y: T D, has the same properties as Y, but it is 
multiplied by L (in equilibrium, T D =  Ly).
m) A ggregate Supply o f G ood V: Xs  =  Ly, always matches T D in equilibrium, and 
thereby exhibits identical behavior.
n) Value added  in  in d u stry  X  (per-capita): VA x, exhibits behavior similar to w . 
The only difference is that when w =  1, V A x does not (like w) become flat at a value of 1.
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Instead it becomes steeper. To see this, note that the wage variation which occurs as a changes 
acts like a ‘buffer’ in attenuating the adjustment of sector X.  Once the wage rate reaches its 
minimum value of 1, the ‘buffer’ is exhausted and sector X  adjusts at a faster rate.
0) V alue added  in in d u stry  Y  (per-capita): VAy, has the same value as per-capita 
demand for good Y  and displays identical behavior.
Proof: By inspection of the corresponding variables, their derivatives and associated 
thresholdsB.
P roposition  s: Effects of e (continued)
g) P rice  of good X: p is invariant with respect to e: ^  = 0.
h) Per-firm  o u tp u t o f good X  (per-capita): x  is strictly decreasing and (piecewise)
strictly convex in e: | |  < 0 , > 0 . x  exhibits a kink at e — ew==1.
1) In d u s try  o u tp u t of good X  (per-capita): X  exhibits behaviour similar to x, but is
multiplied by N  +  1 (which is constant with respect to e).
j)  Econom y o u tp u t o f good X: %, exhibits behavior identical to X,  except that it is 
multiplied by L.
k) D em and for good Y  (per-capita): Y  has properties identical to Ly, and we refer 
the reader to Proposition e, part (e).
1) A ggregate D em and for Good Y: T D, has the same properties as Y, but it is 
multiplied by L (in equilibrium, T D =  Ly).
m) A ggregate Supply  of G ood Y : T 5  =  Ly , always matches T D in equilibrium, and 
thereby exhibits identical behavior.
n) Value added  in in d u stry  X  (per-capita): V A x is strictly decreasing and strictly 
(piecewise) convex in e: < 0 , - > 0 , displaying a kink at e =  ew=1.
o) Value added  in in d u stry  Y  (per-capita): V A y} has the same value as per-capita 
demand for good Y  and displays identical behavior.
Proof: By inspection of the corresponding variables, their derivatives and associated 
thresholdsB.
Proposition  uQ: Effects of uQ (continued)
g) P rice  o f good X: p is invariant with respect to u0: ^  =  0.
h) Per-firm  o u tp u t o f good X  (per-capita): x  is strictly increasing and strictly convex 
u ° ' "Bit, > Bv? > anc* exkft>its a at u o — < =1.
74
i) In d u s try  o u tp u t of good X  (per-capita): X  exhibits behaviour similar to x, but is 
multiplied by N  + 1 (which is constant with respect to u0).
j)  Econom y o u tp u t of good X:  x, exhibits behavior identical to X ,  except that it is 
multiplied by L.
k) D em and for good Y  (per-capita): Y  has properties identical to Ly, and we refer 
the reader to Proposition uQ, part (e).
1) A ggregate D em and for Good Y: YD, has the same properties as Y, but it is 
multiplied by L  (in equilibrium, XD = Ly).
m) A ggregate Supply of G ood Y: X s  = LV) always matches X D in equilibrium, and 
thereby exhibits identical behavior.
n) V alue added  in industry  X  (per-capita): VAx is strictly increasing and strictly 
convex in uQ: > 0 , > 0 , displaying a kink at u0 =  ujf=1.
0) V alue added in in d u stry  Y  (per-capita): VAy, has the same value as per-capita 
demand for good Y  and displays identical behavior.
Proof: By inspection of the corresponding variables, their derivatives and associated 
thresholds!.
P roposition  L: Effects o f L  (continued)
g) P rice  of good X: p is invariant with respect to L.
h) Per-firm  o u tp u t of good X  (per-capita): For L  > Lw=1, x  is strictly increasing 
and strictly concave in L: > 0, < 0. For L ^  Lw~l , we consider three cases:
(a) For P < 4 x  is strictly increasing and strictly convex in L: > 0, > 0.
(b) For P > 4 x  is strictly increasing and strictly concave in L: f f  > 0, < 0.
(c) For P — 4 r  is strictly increasing and linear in L: > 0, =  0.
x  is kinked at L = Lw=1.
1) In d u stry  o u tp u t of good X  (per-capita): X  is equal to x  multiplied by N + 1. Thus 
X  is simply a scaled up version of x  (with the scaling constant equal to N  +  1).
j)  Econom y o u tp u t of good X: x  strictly increasing and strictly (piecewise) convex 
in L: > 0, > 0. X exhibits a kink at L  =  Lw=1.
k) D em and for good Y  (per-capita): For L > Lw=1 Y  =  0. For L  ^  Lw=1 Y  is strictly 
decreasing in L: ^  < 0. For L  ^  Lw=1, we have three cases:
(a) For P > 4 Y  is strictly convex in L: > 0.
(b) For P < 4 Y  is strictly concave in L: < 0.
(c) For P = 4 Y  is linear in L: =  0.
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Y  is kinked at L = Lw=1.
1) A ggregate D em and for G ood Y: TD, has the same properties as Y, but it is 
multiplied by L (in equilibrium, T D =  Ly, so its properties are identical to those of Ly , see 
part (e) of Proposition L ).
m) A ggregate .Supply o f G ood Y: Ts  = Ly, always matches T D in equilibrium, and 
exhibits identical behavior.
n) Value added in industry X  (per-capita): V A x is strictly increasing in L: 9^ p  > 0.
For L > Lw=1, V A x is strictly concave in L: < 0. For L ^  Lw=1, we have three cases:
(a) For p < 4 V A x is strictly convex in L: 9q^^ x > 0.
(b) For p > 4 V A x is strictly concave in L: < 0.
(c) For P =  4 V A x is linear in L: 9q^^ x — 0.
V A X is kinked at L  =  Lw=1.
o) Value added in industry Y  (per-capita): VAy, has the same value as per-capita 
demand for good Y  and displays identical behavior.
Proof: By inspection of the corresponding variables, their derivatives and associated 
thresholds!.
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Chapter 3
General Equilibrium w ith  
Oligopolistic Interactions: Open 
Economy
1 Introduction
This chapter develops a general equilibrium model of two economies each with two sectors. 
Each economy is in essence identical to that presented in chapter 2. We assume free trade 
in the goods market, that is, the economies are joined on the consumption side. Consumers 
maximize a (quadratic) utility function over two types of goods, labelled type Y  and type X,  
subject to a budget constraint. Good Y  is homogeneous, while type X  goods are vertically 
differentiated. Consumers have a constant labour supply, equal to their labour endowment, 
which has been normalized to 1. Labour is assumed immobile between the economies, and 
each economy features a population of L* (i = d, f  ) consumers/workers. Labour is used by 
industry X  and any surplus labour above this is absorbed by industry Y. Employment in 
industry X  is denoted by Lx{ (i =  d, / ) ,  and employment in industry Y  is denoted by Lyi 
{i = d , f  ).
Industry X  is characterized by a three stage game. In stage 1 firms decide whether to 
enter or not, and a zero profit condition emerges. In stage 2, firms compete in technological 
capabilities (denoted by Ui) by investing in sunk costs -labelled F(ui)~, taking market struc­
ture as given. Stage 3 portrays competition in quantities (x{), taking market structure and 
technological capabilities as given. The presence of fixed costs is associated with increasing 
returns to scale (IRTS).
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In principle, industry X  could use labour to generate technological capability (via fixed 
costs) and to produce type X  goods (via variable costs). We will simplify matters by assuming 
that variable costs are zero (the analysis can be extended to non-zero variable costs). Industry 
X  uses labour exclusively to generate technological capability. We can think of this as an 
appended sector to industry X  (for example, an R&D lab), to highlight the notion that these 
workers are hired exclusively to further the firm’s technological capability. The assumption 
that all fixed costs are sunk becomes reasonable when we consider that these take the form 
of wages paid to workers: If the firm exits, it cannot get any of the payments back from its 
workers.
Industry Y  features a freely available 1:1 technology. The output of industry Y  (denoted 
by Yi) is equal to employment in that industry (Y{ =  Lyi). This implies a very simple form of 
constant returns to scale (CRTS). Good Y  is treated as the numeraire, so its price is normalized 
to 1, and the marginal product of labour in industry Y  is 1. We will see that this effectively 
constitutes the outside option of workers employed in industry X , and it implies that the 
economy’s wage rate is bounded from below at 1.
Labour is the sole input. Consumers’ income is constituted by their wage receipts, by profits 
accruing from shares owned in firms, and by the value of an endowment of type Y  goods. We 
will see that equilibrium profits are zero, so they drop out from the budget constraint.
We characterize a symmetric general equilibrium, featuring identical values for all variables 
and parameters in both economies. This chapter provides an analysis of how the equilibrium 
changes as we manipulate parameter values. The analysis provides the first and second order 
comparative statics properties of the model. Most parameters of the model can be interpreted 
as policy variables. Thus the comparative statics exercise provides insight into economic policy. 
In particular we can analyze different variants of industrial, demographic and trade policies. 
The characterization of an economy by the values of its parameters admits the following inter­
pretation: We can treat the parameters of the economy as a representation of its institutional or 
structural characteristics, which lie outside the explanatory scope of the model. We can then 
analyze the consequences of changing these characteristics by reference to our comparative 
statics results.
In this chapter we refer to two types of equilibrium. Firstly we have a symmetric equilibrium 
within each economy (but not necessarily across economies). In this case all firms within a given 
country choose identical quantities and technological capability. This type of equilibrium allows 
countries to have different equilibrium outcomes if their parameter values differ. The other 
type of equilibrium features symmetry across economies. In this equilibrium both countries
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feature identical parameter values, and resulting equilibrium outcomes are identical in both 
economies. In particular, both countries have identical wage rates, welfare levels, numbers of 
firms and all firms have the same technological capability, sell the same quantity, at an identical 
price.
We consider the consequences of introducing asymmetries in initial conditions and whether, 
given some difference in initial conditions, industrial policy aimed at catching-up is feasible 
and welfare improving. Inter-industry trade may occur when initial conditions differ between 
the two economies, while intra-industry trade arises in all instances. To facilitate exposition, 
the structure of the model is summarized in a ‘flow-chart’ type diagram in Figure 1.
Domestic Economy Foreign Economy
Numeraire: Y( Numeraire: Yf
Consumers:
max V s . t  P.X+Y=w+EjCi
Industry X 
IRTS 
v3 S tages^
Industry X 
ERTS 
s3  S tages^
&DJ :&DJ
Industry Y
CRTS 
1:1 Technology
Industry Y
CRTS 
1:1 Technology
Figure 1: The structure of the open economy model
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2 we develop the model. In Section 3 we 
characterize a symmetric general equilibrium. Section 4 analyses the comparative statics prop­
erties of this equilibrium, assuming that all parameters are identical in both economies. This 
section focusses on what happens when both economies face identical changes in their struc­
tural/institutional characteristics (parameter values). In Section 5 we carry out an analysis of 
asymmetric initial conditions and industrial policy for catching-up. This section presents some 
of the most important results of the thesis. Section 6 concludes.
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2 The Open Econom y G eneral Equilibrium  M odel
We present a world economy constituted by two countries, both of which are treated as large 
economies1. Both economies have identical structures, although we allow for asymmetry in all 
parameters except a. Firstly we describe the consumers’ problem, then the production side of 
the model and finally the labour market.
Each of the constituent economies is similar to the closed economy model developed in 
chapter 2, but now we allow free trade in consumer goods. We label foreign economy variables 
with subscript and domestic economy variables with subscript id \  To avoid duplication of 
equations, it will be convenient to use subscripts i, j  = d, f  with i ^  j  to label expressions 
which are identical for both economies.
The economies are fully integrated on the consumption side: There is free trade in type Y  
and type X  goods. Transport costs are assumed to be insignificant. On the production side, 
each economy features two industries (labelled X  and Y, as in chapter 2). The only factor of 
production in the model is labour. Labour is immobile across and perfectly mobile within each 
of the economies. The output of industries X  and Y  is wholly consumed by workers (saving is 
not possible), and there are no intermediate inputs.
2.1 Consum ers
In each economy there is a population of Li homogeneous consumers, indexed by hi =  1,..., Li 
for i = d, f .  Consumers have identical tastes in both economies, and since the model features 
free trade in consumption goods and zero transport costs, consumers can purchase goods 
produced in either country without incurring additional costs. Each consumer has a perfectly 
inelastic labour supply, which has been normalized to one. Consumers allocate their labour 
endowment between industries X  and Y. Since there is no labour mobility across countries, 
consumers earn the (labour market clearing) wage rate prevalent in their country. Consumers 
maximize the same utility function as in the previous chapter by choosing over two types of 
good: Y  (a homogenous good) and X  (a vertically differentiated product).
In industry X , each firm produces one good only, labelled Xkd for domestic firms and Xkf for 
foreign firms, while x^ refers to firms from either country, x ^  denotes per-capita consumption
1The term ‘large economy’ is used in the traditional trade theoretic sense: changes in the individual economies 
affect the world (general) equilibrium. The alternative case would be that of a small economy, where changes 
in an individual economy do not affect the world (general) equilibrium. In the latter case, terms of trade are 
usually assumed to be exogenous. Not so in the large economy case, where the terms of trade are determined 
endogenously.
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of good k, produced by the kP1 firm in country i. We axe using the same index (k) for domestic 
and foreign firms advisedly, since both will be summed together below. In each economy, there 
is a finite number of firms, denoted by n* +  1 for country i. The worldwide number of firms 
is denoted by N  +  1 =  rid +  n / +  2. As in chapter 2, we denote the number of firms by 
rid +  1> *V +  1 and N  4 -1, rather than the usual notation of rid, n f  and N. This is adopted 
purely for aesthetic convenience, since it will make the equations somewhat more organized. 
We introduce the following vector notation: x^ =  (x\d, x%d, •••> x nd+i d), x /  =  (%if, x<if, 
..., xUf+i f )  and x  =  (xd, x /). Since we assume single product firms, the number of firms 
in each country will determine the number of X-type goods produced in that country. Each
good in the X  industry has a ‘quality level’ associated with it, denoted Ukd in the domestic
economy and f  in the foreign economy, whilst uj- denotes technological capability of firms in 
either country. The quality level represents the producer’s technological capability. In vector 
notation, we have: V d =  (“ld, “ 2d, “nj+ 1  d), U / =  (a ,/, “ 2/ ,  ..., u„/+ i /)  and U =  (Ud,
U /). The representative consumer’s problem can be stated as
N + l  ,  2 \  N + l  N
^  (3.1)
x , r  fc=i  ^ u* '  k= \Ukm Ul
N + 1 ni+1
subject to ^ 2  Pkx k +  qiYi = VH + QiYi +  ^ 2  Shki^ki for i = d, f  (3.2)
fc=l k=1
where cr G (0,1) measures the substitutability between the X-type goods (and is identical for 
both economies), pk is the price of the kth X-type good (in either coimtry), qi is the price of 
the Y-type good in economy i, W{ is the wage rate in economy i, Y{ is the consumption of 
type Y  goods in country i, Y< represents country z’s (per capita) endowment of type Y goods, 
Shki is the ownership share of consumer h in firm k in country i (with the usual restriction 
that YlhLishki =  1)j and 11^ denotes the (net) profits of firm k in country i. Notice that 
firm ownership is restricted to a consumer’s economy (i.e., foreign ownership is ruled out). 
The endowment of type Y goods, Yj, is a minor variation on the model presented in chapter 
2, and it is only included to allow for the possibility that a rich economy may demand more 
type Y goods than the poor economy produces (in which case the poor economy depletes its 
endowment of type Y goods).
Consumer income comes from wages (wi), the value of their endowment of type Y goods 
(qiYi) and dividends generated by the consumer’s shares in industry X  firms ( ^ K J 1 shkAi)-  
In equilibrium we will see that net profits are zero (by free entry), thus the dividend term in 
the budget constraint will drop out.
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To perform welfare analysis we substitute the equilibrium solutions into Vi, and we label 
this welfare indicator lWi for economy i = d, f .
From the consumer’s problem, we obtain the inverse demand facing domestic producers 
(Pkd) and foreign producers (pkf)
P U =  (iz^ r+lz f:) f°r h j  = d, f  and i ^ j  (3.3)
Uu  l=1 uh J
Per-capita demand functions for good Y  are obtained as a residual from the budget constraint 
(equation 3.2):
1 /  _  T li+ l n + l  \
Yi =  — I Wi +  qiYi +  ^ 2  shkiTLki ~  Pkx k I for i = d, f  (3.4)
qi \  fc=i k=i )
Good Y  is the numeraire, hence its price is set to 1 in both economies (qi = 1). In a symmetric 
equilibrium within each country (which is not necessarily symmetric across countries) we have 
that Xki =  Xi for i =  d, f .  In this case, after setting net profits to zero, (per-capita) demand 
for Y  in each country simplifies to
Y{ =  Wi +  Yi -  (ni +  1) piXi -  (rij +  1) pjXj for i , j  — d , f  and i ^  j  (3.5)
In a symmetric equilibrium in which both economies have identical outcomes, such that Xi = x, 
demand for Y  simplifies further to
Yi = Wi + Y i — (N  +  1 )px  for i = d, f  (3.6)
Which can be rearranged to yield net demand for Y :
Yi — Yi = Wi — (N  +  1 )px  for i — d , f
Consumers in economy i will be net consumers (net demanders) of Y  when their demand is 
above their endowment. Otherwise, they are net suppliers of Y  (and the economy becomes a 
net exporter of Y ) . The demand functions specified above are used to obtain the equilibrium 
solutions for industries X  and Y. We proceed to describe industry X.
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2.2 Industry X
Industry X  has increasing returns to scale, due to the presence of (endogenous) sunk costs. 
As in the previous chapter, firms play a three stage game. In the first stage the entry decision 
is made. In the second stage, sunk investments in technological capability are undertaken. In 
the third stage, firms face Cournot competition. The equilibrium concept is Subgame Perfect 
Nash Equilibrium.
Firms in this industry face competition not only from their local rivals, but also from their 
overseas rivals (since there is free trade in consumer goods), and hire workers exclusively from 
the local workforce (recall that labour is internationally immobile).
In this chapter and in chapter 5, we will consider two notions of symmetry. Firstly we 
consider symmetry within each economy, without restricting parameters or solutions to be 
identical across economies. This will allow us to set out the conditions for a general equilibrium.
Secondly, we consider symmetry both within and across the economies. In this case we 
impose the restriction that each parameter takes the same value in both economies. We shall 
refer to the latter case as a symmetric (general) equilibrium.
In keeping with backward induction, we proceed to the description of the final stage in the 
firms’ decision problem.
2.2.1 Stage 3: Cournot C om petition
In this stage, firms choose the optimal quantity to produce, taking as given their rivals’ strate­
gies, technological capability and market structure. Gross profits of firm k in country i are 
equal to revenue (pki^ki) since the cost of producing Xki has been set to zero, that is,
TTfci =  PkiXki for i = d, f  (3.7)
Firms maximize their objective (equation 3.7) by choosing x^-  The first order conditions for 
the kth firm in country i are given by
Pki +  =  ° for i = d, f  (3.8)dXki
For the domestic economy there are n^ +  1 such equations in x (one for each firm). For the 
foreign economy there are n /  + 1  equations. In Appendix 1, we solve this system of equations, 
and find a symmetric Nash equilibrium. We obtain the solutions for x<* and x / in terms 
of the number of domestic and foreign firms (n^ +  1 and n f  +  1) and the vectors of firms’
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technological capabilities, Ud and U /. Using the solutions for Xd and x /, after calculations 
shown in Appendix 1 , we obtain a solved-out payoff function, which will be used to  solve the 
second stage of the game. The solved-out payoff is:
for z, j  = d, f  and z ^  j
Note that- 7Tfci(U) is per-capita gross profit earned by the firm, that is, 71^  (U) is the gross profit 
the firm earns from each consumer. Since population is Ld in the domestic economy and Lf  
in the foreign economy, and the firm faces a unified world market for consumer goods, total 
gross profit of the kth firm in country i is given by (La +  Lf)7Tki(V).
With within-coxmtry symmetry (i.e., firms choose a symmetric quality level within each 
country, denoted by u a  and U f ) ,  n k i  simplifies to:
2
for i, j  = d, f  and i ^  j  
(3.10)
With across-country symmetry (setting Ud =  Uf =  u) and noting that N  + 1 = 7 i d + n /  +  2, 
the above expression simplifies further to
v 2
7r_ 2 ( 2  +  o-N )2
which is the expression we obtained in chapter 2 (equation 2.9). However we must be careful 
to emphasize that the underlying structure of the economy is substantially different, since we 
now have two separate countries.
2.2.2 Stage 2: C om petition  in Technological C apability
In the second stage firms choose their investment in technological capability, taking as given 
their (local and foreign) rivals’ strategies as well as market structure. Sunk investment deter­
mines technological capability via a fixed outlays function, F(.). The firm’s net profit is given 
by
nki =  (I'd +  Lf)  7Tfci(U) -  F (ufei, W i )  for i - d ,  f  (3.11)
where Li denotes population size in economy i ) ^ ( U )  denotes the solved-out gross per-capita 
profit function for country i (equation 3.9) and F(uki, Wi) denotes the fixed outlays function:
uf
7Ti = -2(2 — a )2 1 2 -f cr (71* 4- rij +  1) Uj(7%i +  1) (nj +  1) —Ui
(3.9)
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F(uki,Wi) = Wi f(uki), where Wi is the wage rate prevailing in country i, and f(uki) =  
£i ( ^ )  1 is a convex mapping from technological capability in country i (Uki) to labour units 
required to achieve such capability. The mapping f(uki) is the firm’s labour requirement in 
industry X  for country i: It measures units of labour required to achieve a certain technological 
capability Uki. Pi > 2 is required for the second order conditions to hold. We also assume 
£i > 0 , and > uoi ^  1 - Pi ls the elasticity of f(uki) with respect to £i is an exogenous 
set-up cost, represents an initial (inherited) value of technological capability, which is an 
exogenous parameter. In section 5, is used as a means of modelling differences in initial 
conditions across countries. It is important to note that we allow each country to have different 
values for the following parameters: Pi, Li, £i, (i =  d, /) .  We have constrained the value
of cr to be identical in both economies. This appears to be a reasonable assumption for it 
seems difficult to justify that identical goods should have different degrees of substitutability 
in different countries.
Firm k maximizes (3.11) with respect to u^ ,  taking as given rivals’ technological capabilities 
and market structure. The first order conditions are:
(Ld +  Lf )  =  w%e%P* for i = d, f  and k =  +  1 (3.12)
duki uki \UoiJ
This constitutes a system of N-\-l equations in Ify and U /. Taking the derivative of the solved 
out profit function (equation 3.9) with respect to u ^  and simplifying, we can write (3.12) as 
follows
(Ld +  Lf)  [2 +  a (m +  n j)] 
(2  -  cr)2 [2  +  cr (rii +  rij +  1 )]
1 -
n»+l n j+ 1
Vli_ _j_ y '  ?Hj_
2 +  a (rii +  Tij + 1) I Uki "  Uki
(3.13)
P i - 2
U\.. ki=  Wi£iPi • A for i = d, f  and k = 1 , ...,n% +  1
Uoi
An equilibrium requires that technological capability be a solution to the system of N  +  1 
equations in (3.13). In a symmetric equilibrium within each economy, such that uu = u ^  = Ui, 
the first order conditions simplify to
(Ld + Lf )[2 
(2  — Cr)2 [2  -f cr
+ <r(m+nj)} f 
 (rii + nj +  1 )] 1 2 +  <7 (n» +  Uj +  1)
(rii +  1 ) +  (nj +  1) y
u i
(3.14)
uP i - 2
=  wi£ipi- L-s— for i, j  = d, f  and i ±  j  
u jOl
This expression embeds the following result:
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Proposition 1: On how th e  technology gap affects technological capability
The net marginal benefit of investment in technological capability is decreasing in the 
technology gap between countries, i.e., in the ratio of technological capabilities (Ui/uj). This 
implies that there exists a threshold level of U{/uj above which investment in technological 
capability is not optimal for the laggard economy.
Proof: By inspection of equation (3.14)1.
The consequence of Proposition 1 is that if the distance between equilibrium levels of 
technological capability (the technology gap) is sufficiently large, then one of the economies 
will cease to invest in technological capability: It is simply not optimal to try to catch up 
with the advanced economy. However, in equilibrium, we find that, in order to have positive 
market share, firms will effectively catch-up in terms of technological capability. Nonetheless, 
this does not imply that the economies catch-up in terms of income, since the asymmetry in 
initial conditions will have implications for market structure and the wage rate. When we 
analyze the effect of differences in initial conditions or ‘history’ (denoted by Ud), the result in 
Proposition 1 will drive some of our conclusions. This completes the description of the second 
stage subgame. We discuss second order conditions for this stage in Appendix 2.
2.2.3 Stage 1: T h e E ntry D ecision
In stage one, firms make their entry decision. Assume there is a sufficiently large pool of 
potential entrants. Firms will enter as long as net profits are positive. This leads to the 
following non-negative-profit condition
(Ld +  Lf)  7rjw ^  wi£i ( — ^ for i= .d, f
\ uoiJ
(3.15)
Ignoring integer effects, entry occurs until (3.15) holds with equality. Substituting the solved 
out pay-off TTki (equation 3.9) leads to
(Ld +  Lf)  
2 (2 — cr)2
1 -
r7lj + l Tij + 1
2 +  (7 (ni +  Uj +  1) \ Z-s uki “  Uki =  WiE,
Uki
tAoi
(3.16)
for i, j  — d, f  and i ^  j  and k =  1 ,..., n% +  1
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This constitutes another requirement for an equilibrium, together with (3.13). Symmetry 
within each economy allows us to write condition (3.16) as follows
{Ld +  
2(2 — '(I  ( l  -  — —  TT\ (”* +  !) +  +  !) “ 1 \  =  wi£i U{ r o^r * =  /- a ) 2 \  2 + (T(m +7^ +  1 )
(3.17)
This constitutes a system of two equations in and nj.  In a symmetric equilibrium, we can 
find an explicit solution for u in stage 2, and the equations in (3.17) reduce to a single equation
in n, which also has an explicit solution. This completes the description of the first stage of
the game played by firms in industry X.
2.3 The Labour M arket, Industry Y  and the Trade B alance
Firstly we discuss the labour market. This is followed by a description of industry Y  and the 
trade balance. Each consumer supplies a fixed amount of labour, which has been normalized 
to 1. Hence, total labour supply is fixed by population size for each country, namely, Ld and 
Lf.  Labour is internationally immobile (though within each economy it is perfectly mobile 
between industries). Demand for labour stems from the local industries only (X  and Y). The 
labour requirement by each firm in sector X  is f(uki) = £* % for i = d, / .  Industry X
employment is given by
Tii+l
Lxi ~  ^   ^ f { uki) 
fc= 1
In a symmetric equilibrium, this reduces to
Lxi = (rk +  l)/(u i) (3.18)
Any surplus labour not absorbed by industry X  is employed in industry Y. Employment in 
industry Y  in country i is labelled Ly{. The labour market clearing condition is written as 
follows
L% =  Lx% +  Lyi where LXi , Lyi £ [0 , Li] and i = d, f  (3.19)
The wage rate adjusts to ensure that the labour market clears in each economy, given that 
labour is internationally immobile and that industry Y  offers a (de-facto) minimum wage rate 
equal to the marginal product of labour in industry Y.
On the supply side, industry Y  has a simple 1:1 (constant returns to scale) technology: One 
unit of labour produces one unit of type Y good. The 1:1 technology prevalent in industry Y
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means that the marginal product of labour in industry Y  is equal to the price of type Y  good, 
qi. This good is the numeraire, so we normalize its price to 1. Hence the wage rate is bounded 
from below at 1 .
Aggregate supply of good Y  (Ysi) is composed by production of good Y  (which is identical 
to employment in the sector) and by the economy’s endowment of this good (LiYi). In a 
symmetric equilibrium, we have
Ysi =  +  LiYi = L i ( l  + Yl) -  (rii +  l) f(u i)  for i = d, f  (3.20)
Per-capita demand for good Y  is given in equation (3.4). Aggregate demand for good Y  in 
each country is obtained by multiplying per-capita demand by Li. In a Subgame Perfect 
Nash Equilibrium featuring symmetry between the firms of each country (but not necessarily 
between the firms across both countries) we have: Xki =  Xi for i = d, f .  In this case per-capita 
demand for Y  is given in expression (3.5), and aggregate demand can be written as follows
TDi = UYi =  Li [wi -f Yi -  (rii +  1) P%xi ~  (nj +  l)P jxj] for i, j  = d , f  and i ^  j
We next use the fact that in equilibrium (La +  Lf) piXi — Wif (Ui), which obtains by the free 
entry condition in equation (3.15). We can then write aggregate demand for good Y  as follows
r Di =  Li
, —  (rii  +  1) m f  (U i) (nj +  1) W j f  (U j )
W i+y‘ — z r n r ,---------------u + l , for i, j  = d, f  and i j ^ j  (3.21)
Since industry Y  uses a 1:1 technology, the marginal product of labour is given by the price of 
good Y  (q), which has been set equal to 1 (good Y  is the numeraire). This sector effectively 
constitutes a worker’s outside option: in the worst scenario the worker can always resort to 
transforming his/her labour endowment with a (freely available) 1:1  technology, and earn an 
income of qi = 1 . Thus we obtain that in (general) equilibrium W{ ^  1 . If Lyi > 0 then W{ =  1 . 
However, if demand for labour from sector X  is high enough to make Lyi =  0 (in which case 
Lxi — Li), then industry Y  is inactive, and industry X  uses all the available labour in the 
economy. In this case we have that Wi > 1 (otherwise workers would shift to industry Y  and 
earn W{ = 1 ).
We now discuss net exports (the trade balance). In sector Y  the difference between aggre­
gate supply (Tsi) and aggregate demand (TDi) for type Y  good gives the trade balance for 
good Y,  to be labelled T B yi. Since there are only two countries, we have that T B ya = —TB yf.
Exports of good X  are given by Lj (rii +  1) Pix ii while imports of good X  are Li (nj + 1 ) pjXj.
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Thus the trade balance for industry X  can be written as
T B Xi =  Lj (rii +  1) Vixi ~  Li (rij +  1 )pjXj for i, j  =  d, f  and i ^ j  (3.22)
The (overall) trade balance for each economy is given by TB{ =  T B Xi+ T B yi. In this model the 
overall trade balance is always zero, hence the trade balance for type X  goods must be equal to 
the negative of the trade balance for type Y  good (TB Xi = —T B Vi). Moreover, because there 
are only two countries in the model, the domestic trade balance for type X  goods must be 
equal to the negative of the foreign trade balance for type X  goods (TBxa =  —TB xf), which 
in turn is the negative of the foreign trade balance for type Y  good (T B xf  =  —TByf), leading 
to the conclusion that T B yd = —T B yf. Thus we have that T B yd =  —T B yf  =  T B xf  = —TBxd-
In appendix 3, we provide a discussion of value added and the trade balance in the context 
of this model, which complements the above discussion. We now proceed to characterize a 
symmetric general equilibrium for the world economy.
3 Characterization o f  a Sym m etric General Equilibrium
We begin by considering a symmetric equilibrium within each economy, such that =  uu = 
Ui, i = d , f .  After setting out the conditions for such an equilibrium, we proceed to obtain 
explicit solutions for a symmetric equilibrium across both countries, such that all parameters 
take identical values in both economies (/?* =  P, =  £, Li =  L, u<n =  uQ for i = d, f  while o 
is always identical for both economies), as well as technological capability (ud = Uf = u), the 
number of firms (n^ = n j  = n) and the wage rate (wd — w/ = w). We will simply refer to the 
latter as a ‘symmetric equilibrium’.
In the case of a symmetric equilibrium within each economy, we have nine parameters 
(P{, cr, Si, Li, for i =  d, f )  and six key variables which determine the rest of the system 
(ui, ni and Wi). A general equilibrium is characterized by the functions Ui(Pi,a,ei,Li,Uoi), 
ni(Pi,cr,£i,Li,Uoi) and Wi(Pi,o,£i, Li,Uoi), which can be derived explicitly in a symmetric 
equilibrium. We will simplify notation by dropping the arguments, so we write Ui(.) for 
Ui(Pi,a,£i,Li,Uoi), th(.) for ^(P^OjS^L^Uoi)  and Wi(.) for Wi(Pi,o-,£i,Li,Uoi). The solu­
tions will depend on whether Lyi > 0 or Lyi =  0. A Symmetric General Equilibrium in the 
open economy is characterized by:
a) World market clearing for goods of type X  and Y.
b) Market clearing for labour in each economy.
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c) A Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in Industry X  in each economy, which is 
characterized by:
i). Firms choosing (Nash) symmetric equilibrium quantities in stage 3 of the game, 
taking as given technological capabilities of domestic and foreign rivals and market structure 
in both economies.
ii) Firms choosing (Nash) symmetric equilibrium technological capabilities in stage 2 
of the game, taking market structure in both economies as given.
iii) Free entry in stage 1 of the game for both economies■.
Equilibrium  Conditions:
The general equilibrium of the world economy is characterized by three conditions for each 
country (as well as the standard market clearing conditions for goods X  and Y-). We write 
these for a symmetric equilibrium within each economy.
The first equilibrium condition is a mapping from Uj to U*, such that along this mapping 
no individual firm wishes to deviate from its strategy. The mapping is defined by the first 
order conditions for technological capability, =  0  for i = d, f  and k =  1 , ...,n* + 1 (given 
by 3.13). Symmetry within each economy allows us to write the mapping as in (3.14):
{ 1  ~  q"T— 7 T  "7TT ( ^  +  1) +  ( r i j  +  1) — 1 1
[ 2 + o’ (n* + n j  +1) w  U i ] }
(Ld +  Lf)  [2  +  c  (nj +  nj)\
(2  -  cr)2 [2 + a  ( n i  +  n j  +  1)]
=  WiSifii p for i, j  = d, f  and i ^  j
(3.23)
0 i- 2u7
Secondly we have the free entry condition, as stated in (3.17):
2(Ld + Lf)  f 
2(2- u Y  \ (ni +  1) +  (nj 4-1) ^2  +  <7 (r^ +  rij- +  1 )
Pi- 2u •=  Wi£i----p— for i , j  — d, f  and i j=- j
(3.24)
U'
Thirdly we have labour market clearing, (equation 3.19). Upon substituting Lx{ from (3.18), 
this becomes:
Li =  Lyi +  L ^  =  Lyi + (ni + 1 )ei ( —  ) for i =  d, f  (3.25)
\ u oi /
Market clearing for type Y  and type X  goods in world markets is ensured by construction. 
These conditions determine the general equilibrium values for technological capability (ud,Uf), 
for the number of firms (n^ +  1 , n /  +  1 ) and for the wage rate (wd, w/).
In a symmetric equilibrium across both economies, we can find explicit solutions as follows.
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Let all parameters take identical values in both economies and let ua =  u /  =  u, rid — "nf — n 
and Wd = Wf = w. We obtain an expression for u  from (3.23), given by
. =  ( 4 ________________  - 1 ^  (3.26)
|  we(5 ( 2  -  a) [2  +  a (2 n  +  l ) ] 2 J
Noting that n  =  we can express the above expression in terms of the world number of 
firms, as follows
2 LvS 2 +  t r ( N - l )u = weft ( 2  — (t) ( 2  +  <tN ) 2
This is the result obtained in equation (2.26), with a doubling of market size (we now have 2L 
instead of L).
The next step is to use condition (3.24) to obtain the number of firms. In a symmetric 
equilibrium, this simplifies to
L = w e - * -  (3.27)
[2 +  <r(2 n +  l ) ] 2 vS
Substitute u from equation (3.26) into (3.27) and solve for n. This gives the equilibrium number 
of firms:
n + 1 = W -  * ) - 4 + 1
Noting that n  =  > the number of entrants simplifies to
+ 1  =  + 1  (3.28)
4<r
iv +  1 = ( £ - 2 ^ ) + 1
2a ■ - (3'29>
which is equation (2.27). Note that the number of firms does not change whether we consider 
a closed economy, or a two country world: Having two countries can be treated as a doubling 
of market size (population).
Substituting n  +  1 (equation 3.28) into (3.26) we obtain the (symmetric) equilibrium level 
of technological capability, as a function of parameters and the wage rate:
which is equation (2.28), with twice the population.
This completes the description of the symmetric Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium for 
industry X .  To complete the characterization of general equilibrium, we now determine the
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equilibrium wage rate.
In a symmetric equilibrium the labour market clearing condition (3.25) simplifies to
(3.31)
The wage rate is obtained by substituting (3.30) and (3.28) into (3.31) and solving for w. This 
yields
The general equilibrium number of firms is given by (3.28). This completes the characteriza-
remaining variables are obtained by substituting the solutions obtained above.
To summarize:
1) Technological Capability:
If Ly =  0 (w > 1), then u(.) is given by equation (3.33). On the other hand if Ly > 0 
(w =  1), u(.) is given by equation (3.34).
2) N um ber o f  Firms:
n(.) is given by equation (3.28).
3) W age Rate:
w(.) is given by equation (3.32).
The symmetric general equilibrium outcomes for the open economy axe summarized in the 
following table (cf. table 1 in chapter 2 ):
(3.32)
If Ly =  0 (w > 1), the general equilibrium solution for technological capability is obtained by 
substituting the wage rate in (3.32) into (3.30):
L  1
U~ U° p ft(2—g)—4 ■ , 
4a ^  L
(3.33)
If Ly > 0 (w =  1), general equilibrium technological capability is obtained by simply setting 
w =  1 in (3.30):
tion of a symmetric general equilibrium in the open economy. Equilibrium outcomes for all
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a) If Ly =  0 (w > 1)
w = v% ( j ) e
0(2-<r)~
4a^ + i ]
T=T
r. i ^  
eSEEET^I 
„ +  i = = f l * g h i  +  i
U =  UQ
b) If Ly > 0 (w =  1)
w =  1
w +  l =  ^ 2^ ~ -4 +  l
i1=2
Table 1: Symmetric General Equilibrium Outcomes for the Open Economy.
A natural question to pose relates to the existence of asymmetric equilibria. We can in fact 
rule out a class of such equilibria, as is shown in the following proposition.
P roposition  2: N on-existence o f a T ype of A sym m etric E quilibria
Consider the following type of equilibrium: Both economies have identical parameter values 
and firms within each economy set a symmetric level of technological capability, which is not 
necessarily symmetric across economies. Then there are no equilibria in which firms in one 
economy set a different level of technological capability to firms in the other economy.
Proof: See Appendix 4.
This proposition can be extended to rule out all asymmetric equilibria, provided one is 
wilhng to assume that the zero profit condition holds exactly for each firm. The proof is along 
the same fines to the proof of Proposition 2.
A N ote on W elfare
The welfare indicator is denoted by W*. Substituting equilibrium solutions into the utility 
function (equation 3.1) yields the indicator. We find that the utility function contains the 
term: 2a Y^k=i ^  Yltyk 7^  • This poses the following difficulty: When we impose within- 
country symmetry (x^  = Xi, =  Ui for i = d, f )  the term Ya&c ^  can be written as either
{ni +  1 ) f* °r  as ni ^  +  (nj +  1) , depending on whether the good we drop is produced
by the domestic or the foreign economy. Thus we write the welfare measure as follows
Wi =  max(W 0i, Wbi) (3.35)
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where
Wai = (ni + 1 ) r i j  +  1) ( X j  -  - §
uj
—2(7 (n< +  1) —  +  ( r i j  +  1) —Ui u•3 J
(rii + 1) — 4- r i j —
Ui XLn + y
Wti = ( m  +  1) ( X i -  +  {r i j  +  1) f X j - ^
U7
— 2 a (m + l)^ + (nj + l)ZL
Ui Ui
u :
rii f- (r i j  +  1) —
Ui Uj  j
+  y
for i, j  = d, f  and i ^  j
In a symmetric equilibrium this simplifies to
,2
W  =  2 (n +  1) -  4(7 (n +  1 ) (2n +  1 ) ^ 0  +  Y
In the next section, we analyze the general equilibrium of the model, and how the economy 
reacts to changes in parameter values.
4 Analysis of th e  Sym m etric Equilibrium
In this section we present some results and analyze how the key variables in the model change 
as we vary the parameters of the system. We find the following result:
P roposition 3: C onsequences o f  Free Trade for th e  W age R ate  
In a symmetric equilibrium, free trade results in a higher wage rate.
Proof: By comparing the equilibrium wage rates in the open and closed economy models 
(equations 2.29 and 3.32)B.
C orollary 3:
In a symmetric equilibrium, free trade results in higher welfare.
Proof: By substituting the symmetric general equilibrium outcomes (table 1 in this and 
the previous chapters) into welfare indicators (equations 2.32 and 3.35) and then comparing 
these for the open and closed economy■.
Proposition 3 and its corollary are familiar results from the literature on trade under imper-
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feet competition (see Brander, 1981 and the recent survey by Chui et al., 2002)2 . We proceed 
to analyze how the key variables of the model change with parameters, for the symmetric 
equilibrium. In this section we impose the restriction that all parameters are equal in both 
economies. Thus, we have that fa =  fa % =  7 , e* =  e, Li =  L, = u0 (i = d, f )  and a is 
always identical for both economies. We change each parameter, holding all other parameters 
constant.
We will present our analysis with the aid of figures similar to those used in Section 4 of 
chapter 2. In the figures we will show the equilibrium outcomes for the open economy, and 
for comparative purposes, we will also depict those for the closed economy. Open economy 
variables are shown as continuous fines and closed economy variables as dotted fines. In each 
figure, the top left graphs shows technological capability (u), the bottom left graph shows the 
number of firms in each country (n +  1 ), the top right graph shows the wage rate (w) and the 
bottom right graph shows exports and imports of goods produced by industry X.  We show 
the analysis for > 1 (the case of Wi =  1 is similar to that presented in chapter 2 ).
4.1 Analysis of C hanges in /3 
We present the main results in Figure 4.1.
2 Equating the wage for the open and closed economies we find th a t they are equal along the following locus: 
cr* =  • cr* defines a boundary or separation in (/3, cr)-space. The wage rate in the open economy is lower
than under autarky above the a* locus. Conversely, the wage rate in the open economy is higher than under 
autarky below the a* locus.
As & goes to infinity, <r* converges to its lower asymptote of 2. However, a  €  (0,1), so the open economy 
features a higher wage rate than autarky (hence Proposition 3). Nonetheless, the existence of a* is of interest 
for chapter 5, where we will find that the region for which the closed economy features a higher wage rate than 
the open economy does include values of cr €  (0,1).
The wage separation locus emerges because there are two effects generating the difference in wages between 
the closed and the open economy. On the one hand, opening the economy yields a larger market size (a doubling 
of population). The increase in market size raises demand for labour via higher technological capability, and 
thus tends to raise wages, ceteris paribtis. On the other hand, in a symmetric equilibrium half of the firms 
in each economy will exit. This reduces labour demand and tends to  lower the wage rate, ceteris paribus, a* 
defines the locus where the two effects exactly offset each other. Since welfare is determined by the wage rate, 
there also exists a separation locus for welfare.
In chapter 5 the wage separation locus becomes relevant, and identifies the conditions under which free trade 
may or may not be associated with a higher wage rate, relative to autarky.
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Figure 4.1: The Effect of ft, open v. closed economy.
We can see that technological capability is decreasing convexly, and it is higher in the open 
economy relative to the closed economy. This can be corroborated by comparing the equilib­
rium outcom es for technological capability for w >  1 (equations 2.30 and 3.33), from which 
we can see that technological capability in the open economy is the same as technological 
capability in the closed economy, with half the number of firms.
Meanwhile, the number of firms is increasing linearly, w ith more firms in the closed economy 
(to be precise, the number of firms in each open economy is half that in the closed economy). 
This is a reflection of the fact that technological capability is higher in each of the open 
economies relative to the closed economy, and this implies higher sunk costs.
To understand the consequences of this for the wage rate, we need to  consider the demand 
for labour from industry X .  W hile the number of firms is higher in the closed economy (thereby 
generating relatively higher demand for labour from industry X  ), technological capability is 
lower (reducing -relative to the open econom y- demand for labour from industry X ) .  The two 
effects result in a stronger demand for labour in the open economy, leading to the result that 
the wage rate in the open economy is always higher than in the closed economy.
Finally, we have included in Figure 4.1 a graph depicting imports and exports by industry 
X .  We can observe that imports and exports take the same value, and hence the trade balance
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for industry X  is zero, as is the trade balance for industry Y  and for the whole economy. This 
is a result which is generated by the symmetry of the equilibrium under consideration3, and 
will not extend to the case of asymmetric parameter values (presented in section 5).
The behaviour of exports and imports tracks that of the wage rate (by budget balanced­
ness), and the model exhibits intra-industry trade in equilibrium: In a symmetric equilibrium 
consumers in both economies choose identical bundles of goods, and since each firm produces 
a differentiated product, the bundle includes goods from every firm in the world. Thus, since 
the distribution of firms in the symmetric equilibrium is such that half of the firms are located 
in each country, half of the output of each country is exported.
4.2 Analysis of Changes in cr
The following figure summarizes the results.
c.
X•ooo0
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T B = T B = T B = 0
0 cr
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Figure 4.2: The Effect of cr, open v. closed economy.
We can see that technological capability is increasing concavely, and is higher in the open 
economy, while the number of firms decreases convexly and is lower (by half) in the open
3Under a symmetric equilibrium, the trade balance cannot be different from zero. Otherwise T B d  =  —T B j  
would not be satisfied: If the trade balance for industry X  is zero, the trade balance for industry Y  must also 
be zero.
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economy. The wage schedules are ‘U’-shaped, and the open economy wage rate lies above the 
closed economy wage rate. Exports are equal to imports, and they exhibit behaviour similar 
to  the open economy wage rate. The intuition for this pattern of behaviour is similar to that 
outlined in section 4.2, chapter 2: On the one hand we have that when a  is relatively low, 
the number of firms is large, with each firm having relatively low technological capability. 
The effect on labour demand of the falling number of firms is greater than the effect of rising 
technological capability. Whence the wage rate falls with a  (the ‘market structure’ effect 
dominates the ‘technological capability’ effect). On the other hand, for relatively high values 
of a  the situation is reversed. We now have a small number of firms, each with a relatively high 
level of technological capability. It is now the increase in technological capability, rather than 
the fall in the number of firms, that drives the demand for labour from industry X , and hence 
the wage rate becomes increasing (now it is the ‘technological capability’ effect that dominates 
the ‘market structure’ effect).
4.3 Analysis of Changes in e
We present the results in the following figure.
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Figure 4.3: The Effect of e, open v. closed economy.
In Figure 4.3 we see that technological capability, the wage schedule, exports and imports are
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decreasing convexly in e, while the number of firms is invariant in e. Technological capability 
is higher in the open economy, while the number of firms is lower. The wage rate is higher in 
the open economy.
4.4 Analysis of Changes in uQ
The effect of uQ is shown in the following figure. uQ has an effect similar to 1/e.
............
1 w,'o
T B = T B = T B = 0
w,1 'o
Open  ~  C losed  • • • • • • • • •
Figure 4.4: The Effect of uQ, open v. closed economy.
Figure 4.4 shows that technological capability increases linearly with u0, and it is higher for 
the open economy. The number of firms does not change with uQ, and it is higher in the closed 
economy. The wage schedule increases convexly with uQ, as a consequence of the convexity of 
the labour requirement, f (u )  =  e . We find that the open economy features a higher 
wage rate. Export and imports of type X  goods increase convexly in uQ) tracking the wage 
rate.
4.5 Analysis of Changes in L
The effect of L  is summarized in the following figure.
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Figure 4.5: The Effect of L, open v. closed economy.
In Figure 4.5 we can see that technological capability, the wage schedule, exports and imports 
are increasing concavely in L. The number of firms does not change with L. Technological 
capability is higher in the open economy, while the number of firms is lower. The wage rate is 
higher in the open economy.
This completes the analysis of the symmetric equilibrium with identical parameter values. 
In the next section, we analyze the case of asymmetries in initial conditions.
5 The Im pact of A sym m etric Initial Conditions and th e  W elfare Consequences of 
Catching-Up
In section 3 we characterized a symmetric equilibrium, within a model of two identical economies. 
In this section, we ask the question: What happens when the economies no longer share the 
same initial conditions? We focus on the consequences of changing initial technological capa­
bility for one particular country (u^), while leaving all other parameters fixed. We examine 
the case of ‘large’ changes in u^. An analytical characterization is not possible in this case, 
and the results reported are based on numerical analysis.
After we analyze the impact of asymmetries in initial conditions, we proceed to investigate
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the effects of industrial policy to allow the disadvantaged or laggard economy to catch-up with 
the advanced economy. The policy we will consider takes the form of a subsidy which reduces 
the marginal cost of technological capability. More specifically, industrial policy will imply 
that part of the cost of technological capability will be borne by the government. This subsidy 
will be financed with a lump-sum tax on consumers. We then ask about the welfare properties 
of such a scheme.
5.1 A sym m etric In itia l Conditions
The procedure followed in this section is to start from a symmetric equilibrium, and then 
let Uod diverge from its initial value (which, in a symmetric equilibrium, is identical in both 
economies). As we do this, we track the general equilibrium solutions of the model by using 
the equilibrium conditions we presented in section 3, given by expressions (3.23), (3.24) and 
(3.25). Overall, we have six conditions, three for each economy. These conditions determine the 
general equilibrium values for technological capability (ud, Uf),  for the number of firms (nd + 1 , 
rif +  1 ) and for the wage rate (wd, w/). Once we have solved for these, all other variables in 
the system can be obtained by substitution. The system of equations in (3.23)-(3.25) yields 
explicit solutions only in the case of a symmetric equilibrium, in which parameters take the 
same values in both economies and both countries feature identical technological capabilities, 
number of firms and wage rates (ud =  u / =  n, 71^  +  1 =  n /  +  l =  n +  l  and wd = W f  = w).
In the case that interests us in this section, where we allow for asymmetric initial conditions, 
the system of equations can only be solved numerically. The procedure is to begin from a 
symmetric equilibrium, with determined parameter values. We then change Uod by a small 
amount and obtain the numerical solution such that (3.23)-(3.25) hold exactly, taking the 
initial symmetric equilibrium as a starting point for the equilibrium search algorithm. We 
then note the new equilibrium values, and again change uod by a small amount. Again we 
compute the new equilibrium values such that (3.23)-(3.25) hold exactly, taking the previous 
equilibrium equilibrium values (which are no longer symmetric) as the new starting point for 
the equilibrium search algorithm. This process was iterated until we had tracked the general 
equilibrium of the model for a wide range of uod.
A graphical representation of the results is offered in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. In these figures, 
the horizontal axis shows the ratio of domestic initial technological capability (i.e., domestic 
‘initial conditions’) to foreign initial technological capability (i.e., foreign ‘initial conditions’): 
Uod/v-of. Showing the ratio of initial conditions is intuitively appealing, and since the only
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parameter we are varying is the ratio of initial conditions (uod/u0f)  induces identical 
behaviour to changes in u ^ .  The vertical axes show the foreign and domestic (non-symmetric) 
equilibrium values of the key variables in the model.
For the analysis that follows it is convenient to introduce the following notions:
H orizontal Sym m etry: Two schedules are said to be horizontally symmetric if we can 
find a point through which we can draw a horizontal benchmark line such that the schedules 
are symmetric around this line.
V ertical Sym m etry: Two schedules are said to be vertically symmetric if we can find 
a point through which we can draw a vertical benchmark line such that the schedules are 
symmetric around this line.
We will see that the some of the schedules presented below exhibit horizontal symmetry, 
although not vertical symmetry. The reference point around which we draw the benchmark 
lines will be the symmetric equilibrium.
It is useful to bear in mind three points depicted in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. Firstly we have 
the threshold Uod/uQf  Wd=1t which is defined as the level of u0d/u0f  at which W& reaches its 
lower bound of 1. Secondly we have u ^ /u o f  u,/ =1) which is the level of Uod/u0f  at which wj 
reaches its lower bound of 1 . Finally we have the initial symmetric equilibrium, identified by 
Uod/ugf =  1. This value of u0d/u0f  is associated with the crossing of the domestic and foreign 
(open economy) wage schedules, as well as the crossing of schedules for the number of firms, 
per-capita demand of good Y, exports and imports of type X  goods and the trade balances.
The figures show three regimes, which will be determined by the values taken by the wage 
rates in both economies. The first regime is characterized by values of Uod/u0f  such that 
Uod/uof ^  Uod/uof Wd=1, where Uod/u0f  Wd=1 is the point at which the domestic wage rate 
reaches its lower bound of 1. The second regime is characterized by values of u0d/u0f  such that 
Uod/u0f  ^  Uod/u0f  wf =1, where Uod/u0f  wf=1 is the point at which the foreign wage rate reaches 
its lower bound of 1. The third regime lies between regimes 1 and 2, and is characterized by 
values of Uod/u0f  such that u0a/u0f  Wd=1 < u0d/u0f  < u0d/u0f  wf =1. In this regime, both wage 
rates lie strictly above their lower bounds: Wd > 1 and Wf > 1 .
As before, we use the notion of the ‘shadow-value’ of a variable. This refers to the value 
the variable would have taken had the wage rate not had a lower bound equal to 1. The 
counterpart to the shadow value of a variable will be labelled the ‘actual’ value, or simply 
referred to by the name of the variable.
Figure 5.1 depicts technological capability (top left graph), the number of firms (bottom left 
graph), the wage rate (top right graph) and employment in industries X  and Y  (bottom right
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graph). Values for the open domestic economy are shown as a continuous thick line. Foreign 
open economy values are shown as a dashed thick line. Domestic closed economy values are 
shown as a dotted thin line, and foreign closed economy values are shown as a continuous thin 
line.
CJj
u0d/u0r <  uod/uof " o r f ' V " " '  1 U o d \ f W r l “o d ^ c f1
n+1
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Open Dom estic ' ~  Open F o re ig n -Closed D o m e stic  — Closed Foreign
Figure 5.1. The Impact of Changes in Relative Initial Conditions on: Technological 
Capability, Market Structure, Income and the Distribution of Employment.
Initial conditions (uoi) affect the marginal cost of technological capability. A higher level of 
Uoi reduces the marginal cost of achieving technological capability level u* for firms in country 
i. On the other hand, firms in the other country now face a disadvantage, and must choose 
their optimal response to the change of technological capability in the advantaged country, in 
order to maintain a Sub-Game Perfect Nash (General) Equilibrium. In the top left graph, we 
find that both the domestic and the foreign economies choose identical levels of technological 
capability (shown by the continuous thick line). While one economy is improving its relative 
initial conditions (in this case the domestic economy), firms in the other economy must match 
technological capability in order to maintain a positive market share.
For values of Uod/u0f  ^  u0d/u 0f  wi =1 we find that technological capability grows at a slower 
rate. To see why this occurs, note that for these values of u0d /u 0f  the foreign wage rate is at
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its lower bound of 1 . Consequently foreign technological capability becomes increasingly more 
expensive relative to its shadow value. Firms in the domestic economy are content to match 
foreign firms’ technological capability and thereby spend less on fixed outlays than would have 
been the case had the foreign wage rate not reached its lower bound.
For Uod/uof ^  u0d/u0f  ™d=1, we find that technological capability is growing at a faster 
rate in Uod/u0f. For this range, the domestic wage rate is 1 and the shadow wage rate lies 
below the actual wage rate. As u0d/u0f  grows, the gap between the shadow marginal cost of 
technological capability and its actual counterpart is shrinking, and thus actual technological 
capability catches up with shadow technological capability. Correspondingly, firms in the 
foreign economy match (actual) domestic technological capability.
We also show technological capability for the closed economies. The continuous thin hor­
izontal line shows technological capability for the foreign closed economy (in which nothing 
changes since u0f  is held fixed throughout this analysis). The dotted thin line shows techno­
logical capability for the closed domestic economy.
The number of firms is shown in the bottom left graph. We can see that as u0a/u0f  grows 
the number of domestic firms increases, while the number of foreign firms contracts. This 
reflects the increase in fixed outlays in the foreign economy, which drives out foreign firms, 
while domestic entrants fill in the gaps left by the foreign firms. This replacement process is 
accelerated when u0a/u0f  ^  Uod/u0f  wf~1. In this case the foreign wage rate is fixed at 1, and 
the foreign industry X  contracts at a faster rate, allowing the domestic industry X  to expand. 
Meanwhile, the world number of firms remains constant (not shown). For Uod/u0f  ^  u0a/u0f  
wd=1} we find that as Uod/u0f  rises the number of domestic firms rises (and the number of foreign 
firms falls) at a steeper rate relative to the case when u0d/u0f  Wd=1 < Uod/u0f  < u0d/u0f  wf=1. 
This reflects the same mechanism as for Uod/uQf  ^  u0d/uQf  wf =1: For Uod/u0f  ^  u0d/u0f  Wd=1 
the domestic wage rate is fixed at 1 and lies above the shadow wage rate for the domestic 
economy. Moreover, the further to the left we are from Uod/u0f  u'd=1, the greater the distance 
between the actual wage rate of 1 and the shadow wage rate. Correspondingly, this implies 
that as uQd/u0f  grows, the number of domestic firms expands faster as the gap between the 
domestic shadow wage rate and its actual counterpart is reduced. Meanwhile, in the foreign 
economy the number of firms falls in order to adjust so that the world number of firms is 
constant. We can see that the schedules for the number of firms are horizontally symmetric 
around the symmetric equilibrium.
Turning now to the wage schedules, we have that the increase in foreign labour demand 
associated to the rise in technological capability is insufficient to offset the fall associated with
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the contraction of the number of foreign firms. Accordingly, the foreign wage rate contracts 
as Uodju0f  rises. On the other hand, the domestic industry X  is enjoying an increase in both 
technological capability and in the number of firms, leading to a rise in the domestic wage rate.
In the wage diagram we have also shown the wage rate for the closed economies: the 
domestic economy as the dotted thin line and the foreign economy as the continuous thin line. 
We can see that these lines intersect those of the corresponding open economy. The intersection 
of the domestic open economy wage with that of the domestic closed economy is labelled od~ cd, 
and we will refer to this point as u0a/u0f  *** cd. On the other hand, the intersection of the 
foreign open economy wage with that of the foreign closed economy is labelled o f~ cf , and we 
will refer to this point as Uod/u0f  CA The implication is that for values of Uod/u0f  lower than 
that associated with point od~cd (uod/u0f  < Uod/u0f  cd) the domestic economy achieves a 
higher wage rate (and welfare) remaining closed, while the foreign economy achieves a higher 
wage rate under free trade. Similarly, for values of u0d/u0f  above that associated with point 
of~cf  (uoti/uof > Uod/uof cf)  we find that its now the foreign economy which achieves a 
higher wage rate under autarky, while the domestic economy achieves higher wages under free 
trade.
This raises an important issue: The notion that one economy (the one with relatively 
better initial conditions) could seek to impose on the other economy a trade regime which is 
not welfare enhancing for the disadvantaged economy. This may shed some light on the nature 
of bilateral trade negotiations between advanced and laggard economies. This important result 
is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition  4. In itial C onditions, free trade and th e  w age rate
i) For u0dfu0f  < Uodju0f  0(1 cd the domestic economy achieves a strictly higher wage rate 
under autarky, and the foreign economy achieves a strictly higher wage rate under free trade.
ii) For Uod/u0f  > uQd/u0f  °f the foreign economy achieves a strictly higher wage rate 
under autarky, and the domestic economy achieves a strictly higher wage rate under free trade.
iii) For Uod/u0f  06 0(1 < Uod/u0f  < Uod/u0f  °f c? both economies achieve a strictly higher 
wage rate under free trade.
iv) For u0dfu0f  = u0d/u0f  06 the domestic wage rate is equal under autarky or free trade.
v) For Uodju0f  =  Uod/u0f  °f the foreign wage rate is equal under autarky or free trade.
This proposition states precisely the conditions under which different trade regimes will 
generate higher wage rates in different economies. So if the two economies are not too different 
regarding their initial conditions, free trade will generate higher wage rates in both economies.
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However, if initial conditions are too dissimilar across economies, the laggard economy will 
achieve a higher wage rate by remaining in autarky. On the other hand, the advanced economy 
will achieve a higher wage rate under free trade. Hence the advanced economy has incentives 
to  negotiate free trade agreements which do not necessarily benefit both parties.
Finally we analyze the bottom  right diagram, showing employment in industries X  and Y.  
For Uod/uof Wd=1 <  Uod/uof <  u0d/ u 0f  wf =1, labour demand is sufficiently high to ensure that 
all of the economies’ labour endowment is employed in industry X .  For u0d/ u 0f  ^  Uod/u0f  Wd=1 
labour demand from the domestic industry X  is smaller than the dom estic labour endowment. 
Consequently, as uod/ u 0f  falls, employment in the domestic industry X  falls below the labour 
endowment. Parallel to this, employment in the domestic industry Y  expands as it absorbs 
surplus workers. Meanwhile, the foreign economy still features sufficiently high labour demand 
in industry X  to  employ all of the labour endowment. For Uod/u0f  ^  uod/ u Qf  wf =1 it is the 
foreign industry X  which cannot generate sufficient labour demand to  employ all of the foreign 
labour force, so as uod/ u Qf  rises, employment in the foreign industry X  contracts. Accordingly, 
employment in the foreign industry Y  rises to  take in any redundant workers.
The next figure depicts per-capita demand for type Y  goods (left panel), exports and 
imports of type X  goods (centre panel) and the trade balance in type X  goods (right panel).
Demand for Good Y Exports/Imports of Good X Trade Balance for Good X
Y TB ,
Y
D om estic   Foreign  —  —  —
Figure 5.2. The Impact of Changes in Relative Initial Conditions on: Per-Capita Demand of 
Good Y ,  Exports and Imports of Type X  Goods and the Trade Balance.
In the central panel of Figure 5.2 we observe that exports and imports of type X  goods closely 
resemble the pattern displayed by the wage rate. When either of the wage rates reach their 
lower bound of 1  (that is, when either u ^ ju o f  <  Uod/uof Wd=1 or u od/ u 0f  ^  u od/ u 0f  Wf=1), 
exports of that country fall at a faster rate, reflecting the increased rate of contraction for 
the country’s number of firms. Conversely, the other country’s exports expand more rapidly
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as a consequence of the increased rate of growth for that country’s number of firms. This 
is reflected on the trade balance (right panel), which is measured by the distance between a 
country’s exports and imports of type X  goods.
Per-capita demand of type Y  goods is shown on the left panel. For u 0d / u 0f  Wd=1 <  
u od/ u o f  <  U o d / u o f  w f = 1 ) demand for good Y  exhibits similar behaviour to the correspond­
ing trade balance. The high wage country is a net consumer of type Y  goods, while the low 
wage country is a net supplier. The low wage country depletes its endowment of type Y  goods 
in order to finance its negative trade balance in type X  goods. For u0d/u0f  ^  Uod/u0f  
we find that as the domestic wage rate reaches its lower bound, production of type Y  goods 
expands as Uod/u0f  shrinks. This allows the domestic economy to cover its trade deficit in type 
X  goods, and to eventually become a net consumer of type Y  goods too (as evidenced by the 
crossing of the type Y  goods demand and the endowment line, F , point ‘a’ in Figure 5.2). On 
the other hand, for u 0d / u 0f  ^  U o d / u 0f  w f ~ 1l the pattern is similar, with the roles of domestic 
and foreign reversed.
5.2 Industrial Policy  and C atching-U p
Suppose an economy faces a historically given asymmetry in initial conditions, to its disadvan­
tage. In our analysis this corresponds to a location leftward of the symmetric equilibrium in 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2. We now ask the following questions:
1) Is it possible for this economy to subsidize industry X  and catch-up with the advantaged 
economy (in terms of income and welfare), taking into account the strategic response by foreign 
rivals?
2) If catching-up is possible, is it welfare improving to do so?
We consider the perspective of the domestic economy (the identity of the disadvantaged 
economy is immaterial). A lump-sum tax is imposed on consumers, and then redistributed 
to firms in industry X  via a reduction in the marginal cost of technological capability. The 
reduction in the marginal cost of technological capability can be achieved by reducing £d or 
(3d. As we reduce either of these parameters, firms in the domestic economy will increase their 
fixed outlays and thereby achieve higher technological capability, relative to their optimal level 
without industrial policy. This generates higher demand for labour, and thus a rise in the 
wage rate. Concentration does not change in the domestic economy, since fixed outlays paid 
by firms do not change with the subsidy, hence the only effect of industrial policy occurs 
via the ‘technological capability effect’ (see section 4). The difference between fixed outlays
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with industrial policy and those obtained without intervention will be covered by the subsidy 
(financed by the lump-sum tax).
Required fid or £d for Catching-Up
1 u od /'u o f (Relative Initial Conditions)
Net Welfare Gain from Catching-Up
0
catching-up 
is beneficial 
for laggard
1 uod/uof (Relative Initial Conditions)
Figure 5.3. The Laggard’s Response to Differences in Initial Conditions: Catching-Up
The top panel in Figure 5.3 shows a schedule depicting the level of fid or £d4 required to 
ensure that the laggard economy catches-up with the advanced economy, for a given level of 
asymmetry in initial conditions. As the foreign economy’s initial conditions improve relative to  
the domestic economy’s (uod/u0f  falls), the domestic economy must reduce its values of Pd or 
£d if it is to  maintain a wage rate equal to the foreign economy’s. Levels of /3d or ed above the 
schedule imply that the foreign wage rate will be higher than the domestic wage rate. Levels 
of f3d or ed below the schedule imply that the foreign wage rate will be lower than the domestic 
wage rate.
The bottom  diagram shows the net welfare gain of catching up with the foreign economy, 
as measured by the welfare indicator (expression 3.35). The net welfare gain will depend on 
whether the higher wage rate associated with industrial policy is higher than the wage rate 
without intervention (net of the lump-sum tax associated to industrial policy). We find that 
whenever the domestic economy is lagging behind, it is always welfare improving to impose a
4 Both parameters generate similar behaviour in the diagrams depicted in Figure 5.3, although their effect on 
other variables is not always identical.
lump-sum tax in order to finance a subsidy to R&D, in the form of paying for the difference 
between the non-intervention fixed outlays benchmark and the fixed outlays outcome with 
industrial policy.
6  Conclusions
In this chapter we have extended the closed economy model presented in chapter 2 to an 
open economy setting, with strategic interaction and endogenous terms of trade (i.e., we have 
considered the economies to be large, as opposed to considering the small open economy case). 
In doing so, the following results have emerged:
We found that the marginal benefit of the vertical differentiation variable is decreasing in 
the overseas rivals’ value of such a variable. In particular, the marginal benefit of technological 
capability is decreasing in rivals’ technological capability. The implication of this is that there 
exists a threshold for the ratio of technological capabilities (that is, the technology gap), above 
which the marginal benefit becomes negative. This in turn means that in the absence of 
industrial policy, catching up will be feasible only if the technological gap is not too wide.
We found that the model exhibits intra-industry trade in all occasions, and free trade is 
welfare improving whenever both economies are identical. However, when we introduce asym­
metric initial conditions, we find that a backward economy (with low technological capability) 
will benefit from trade with an advanced economy (with high technological capability), pro­
vided the gap between technological capabilities is not too large. If the gap is too large, the 
backward economy achieves a higher wage rate (and welfare) in autarky. On the other hand, 
the advanced economy always benefits from trading with the backward economy. This clar­
ifies the incentives for bilateral free trade agreements between an advanced and a backward 
economy.
If we compare the results from chapter 2 (Proposition 1), with the open economy symmetric 
equilibrium, we find that the development strategy conclusions for the closed economy also 
follow for the open economy: The ‘high-tech’ configuration5 is still associated with a higher 
wage rate (and welfare) than the ‘proliferation’ configuration, unless a is low (in which case 
it is the proliferation configuration which yields the higher wage rate and welfare). So, in 
considering the symmetric equilibrium, what is good for the closed economy is even better for 
the open economy (since the latter will feature an even higher wage rate and welfare).
5 Recall the definitions given in chapter 2:
1) A ‘h ig h -te ch ’ con figuration : The economy has few firms each with a high level of technological capability.
2) A ‘p ro life ra tio n ’ con figuration : The economy has many firms, each with a low level of technological 
capability.
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Once asymmetries in initial conditions are introduced, the question arises of whether 
catching-up is feasible and welfare enhancing. We analyze this issue by introducing indus­
trial policy in the form of a subsidy to technological capability, funded via a lump-sum tax. 
The subsidy takes the following shape: The government pays for the extra investment in tech­
nological capability required to ensure that the backward economy achieves the same wage 
rate as the advanced economy. We find that with this policy catching-up is feasible and it is 
welfare enhancing (after accounting for lump-sum taxes).
These conclusions run the risk of being misinteipreted as supporting government interven­
tion in the form of closing the economy and subsidizing industries in backward economies. It 
is important to stress that closing the economy is not what is being suggested. Rather, the 
conclusion is that under Cournot competition trade agreements between economies that are 
not too dissimilar in their technological capabilities will be beneficial. The focus that emerges 
is: How can we transform the economy so that it will benefit from free trade? The transfor­
mation implies ensuring that the technological capability gap is sufficiently small to achieve 
welfare gains from free trade, and will invariably lead to higher wages than permanent closure 
the economy.
This leads us to the second caveat on intervention. Given that we wish to close the tech­
nological capability gap, it seems that a subsidy to investment in technological capability is 
sufficient to achieve this. The developing world is full of examples of failed industrial poli­
cies. Such policies are ripe for capture by rent-seekers. Once the subsidies are instituted, 
the resources devoted to such directly-unproductive rent-seeking activities (Bhagwati, 1982) 
constitute a heavy burden on the rest of the economy. Moreover, apart from introducing dis­
tortions in the allocation of resources, our calculations assume that the opportunity cost of the 
subsidy is unity (taking the form of forgone consumption). This is a strong assumption, for it 
is likely that the effectiveness of subsidies in raising technological capability is less than that of 
private efforts. In particular, if the subsidy loses efficiency as the technological capability gap 
widens, it is likely that industrial policy will be welfare improving only when the technology 
gap is not too large.
Such considerations highlight the need to devote resources to studying the precise form 
of intervention, particularly on how to make such schemes impervious to rent-seeking. The 
mechanism design literature (see Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005; Salani6 , 2005) could provide 
useful insights in this task. Until such issues have been dealt with, the case for industrial policy 
remains dubious. Nonetheless, our findings provide a benchmark for such (more detailed) 
studies.
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A ppendix 1: Solving th e  Final Stage Subgam e for Industry X
In this Appendix, we solve the final stage subgame (Cournot competition), in order to obtain 
‘solved-out payoff’ functions for domestic and foreign firms. Recall the first order conditions 
for this stage of the game (equation 3.8):
/ r  , r \ d n ki WiSiPi ( u k i \ 0i  f  . ,{Ld +  L f)  ——  = -------- —  for i = d, f  and k =  1 ,..., +1
d u ki Uki \ U o i J
Let us begin by substituting the inverse demand functions (equation 3.3) and its derivative 
for i = d, f )  into the first order conditions. Adding and subtracting 2 (7 % ,^ we obtain
k i  Uk i
1 - 2 (2 - £ 7) ^ - —  ( y ' -  +  y i  —  I = 0  for i, j  = d, f  and i ^  j  (Al.l) 
u l i  u k i y f ^ u H f - f u i j J
We multiply (A l.l) through by Uki  and re-organize the expression as follows
*ki to (as155+521^)
2(2  -  a )Uki
for i , j  = d, f  and j  (A1.2)
The next step is to sum (A1.2) over k and solve for fjS This yields
for i , j  =  d, /  and i ^  j
2 = 1
2 (2 +  <772*) (A1.3)
The equations in (Al.3) constitute a pair of linear equations in and
Solving for these we obtain
"ST * «  _  (2  +  crrij)  1 u ki -  <7 (ti* +  1) ^ 2 ^  u k jfii_
k  u« ~ 2  ( 2  -  cr) [2 +  a (n* +  r i j  +  1)]
for i, j  =  d, f  and i ^  j  (Al.3')
To obtain the solution for x ki, substitute expression (Al.3') back into (A1.2). This yields the 
following solution for x ki
u
%ki — ki2(2 -  a )
1 -
2 +  a  (rii  +  r i j  +  1) I ^  Uki  
for i, j  — d, f  and i ^  j
Hi+1 ni+l
E Ujj Ulj_" “  Uki
2 = 1
(A1.4)
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Symmetry between firms within each country, such that Uk% =  uu = Ui and Ukj = uij =  Uj, 
yields the following simplification
‘ 2 (2 - a )  i 1 2 +  a (ni 4- nj +  1) 
for i , j  = d, f  and i ^  j
( r i i  +  1 )  +  { n j  +  1 )  — (A1.4')
With symmetry across countries, such that ua =  Uf = u, and noting that N  = 2n 4-1, this 
expression becomes
* =  o / o ^ - an (A l-4")2 (2 +  crN) 
which is equation (Al.4;).
To solve for prices (pki), add and subtract 2cr£$i to the inverse demand functions (equationUki
3.3), to obtain
p ki =  1 -2 (1  — +53 “ ) for *» 3  =  d * f  211(1 * ^ •? (AL5)uli uki uu S  y
Next substitute %  from equation (Al.4) and the expressions in (Al.3') into (Al.5). This 
yields the solution for pkf-
Pki = 2  —  <7
1 -
Tli+l Tlj+1
i=1 UM Uki
for i, j  =  d, f  and i ^  j
(A1 .6 )
By imposing symmetry between firms within each economy (such that Uki = uu = Ui and 
Ukj = uij = Uj), we obtain the following simplified solution
P i (n* +  1 ) +  {nj +  1 ) -j-Ui2  +  cr {ni +  nj +  1 )
for i, j  = d, f  and i ^  j
(AL6 ')
If there is symmetry across economies, such that ua = Uf =  u, and noting that 2n 4-1 =  N, 
this expression becomes
(A1.6")
r  2 + a N
which is equation (Al.6 ;), but now N  represents the worldwide number of firms (minus one).
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The solved-out payoff is given by the product of equations (A1.4) and (A1 .6 ). This yields
2
Kki( U) =
uki
2(2 -  a)2
1 -
T l i+ l  Tlj + 1
Uu_ uij_
2 +  <7 ( m  +  n j  +  1) I ^  u ki “  u ki 
for i, j  = d, f  and i ^  j
(A1.7)
The solved-out payoff is written as equation (3.9) in the main body of this chapter.
Appendix 2: Second order conditions for the Second Stage Subgame
The second order conditions are obtained by differentiating the first order conditions (equation 
3.12) with respect to for i = d, f .  We obtain the following
(La +  Lf)
(2 - a y
2  +  a (ni +  nj)
2 +  a ( n i + r i j  + 1 ) uPi
for i — d, f  and k = 1 , ...,71* +  1 (A2.1)
If we substitute out Uku ni and W{ with their equilibrium values, (A2.1) provides a restriction 
on (<7 ,/^)-space. This restriction implies that u  cannot be too high and cannot be too low 
(in any case we require > 2). If any one of these parameters crosses its bound, the other 
will need to compensate by moving inward from its bound.
Appendix 3: Value Added and the Trade Balance
Value added is identical to the wage rate because labour is the only production factor, profits 
are zero and there are no international monetary transfers. We can trace value added generated 
by industry X  and by industry Y. We consider measurement of value added on the production, 
income and expenditure side. Consider first industry X .
Since there are no intermediate goods, value added in industry X  measured on the produc­
tion side is equal to world-wide revenue from good X ,  which is given by (Ld +  Lf) (r^ +1 )piXi 
for i = d, f .  Dividing by Li yields per-capita value added (as measured by production):
VAPxi =  V A xi =   ^(m +  l)piXi for i = d, f  (A3.1)Li
As measured by income, value added in industry X  is given by workers’ wages (VAIXi =  
WiLXi for i = d, f ) .  Moreover, employment in industry X  (Lxi) is given by (nj +  l ) / j ( u j )
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(where fi(tii) was defined in section 2.2.2 as fi(ui) = s* *)■ The free entry condition
(2.14) can be written as (La +  Lf)  7r* =  Wifi(ui), so =  (La 4- Lf)  iti/wi.  From equation
(3.7) it follows that n* =  PiXi, substitution of this into V A IXi, yields the same result as above: 
V A IXI = VA xt =  f e g r l  (m +  l)PiXj for i = d , f .
As measured by expenditure, value added in industry X  is made up by consumption ex­
penditure and net exports of good X  (i.e., the trade balance in industry X ),  since there are no 
savings (investment) in this model. Consumption of good X  is L i  [(nj +  1) p i X i  4- ( r i j  -f  1) P jX j]  
in country i. Exports of good X  are equal to Lj (rii 4- 1 )piXi, while imports of good X  are 
Li ( r i j  4-1) P j X j  for i, j  = d, f  and i ^  j .  The trade balance for industry X  can be written as
T B xi =  Lj (rii + 1 ) piXi — Li (rij +  1) PjXj for i, j  =  d, f  and i ^  j  (A3.2)
By adding consumption expenditure and the trade balance, dividing by population (Li) and 
simplifying we obtain the same result previously found in per-capita terms: VAExi =  V A Xi =
,C^+L/-l(n . _|_ l)piXi.
Value added for the production side in industry Y  is VAPyi =  qi(L{ — LXi). Noting that 
qi = 1 (good Y  is the numeraire), hence value added in industry Y  is the supply of Y  goods, 
which (from the 1:1 technology) is the same as employment in industry Y  (Lyi). Per-capita, 
this is given by:
VAPyi = VAyi = ( L i - L xi) /L i  = Lyi/Li for i = d, f  (A3.3)
Measured by income, value added in industry Y  is equal to wages obtained by workers in 
industry Y, V A Iyi =  WiLVi. From section 2.3 we have that whenever Lyi > 0, the wage rate is 
unity. So we obtain: VA Iyi =  V A yi =  LyijLi (the same result as measured by production).
Measured by expenditure, value added in industry Y  is constituted by consumption and 
net exports of good Y. Consumption expenditure is defined from equation (3.4) as
Li [wi -  (rii + 1 ) PiXi -  (rij +  1 ) PjXj]
Net exports (i.e., the trade balance for industry Y)  are given by the difference between aggre­
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gate supply and aggregate demand of good Y :
Li [tUi — +  1) V%xi ~  (nj  +  l)P jx j] f°r h 3 — d, f  and i ±  j  (A3.4)
Aggregate 
Dem and
and we obtain the same (per-capita) value added as measured by production and income: 
V  AEyi — V Ayi — Lyi jL%.
Total (per-capita) value added is the sum of value added for both industries: V Ai — 
V A Xi +  VAyi. The trade balance for each economy is given by TB{ =  T B xi +  TByi with the 
following relationships holding: TBi  =  —T B j , TBxi = —T B xj  and T B yi = —TByj  for i, j  = d, 
f  and i ^ j .
TByi   Lyi
Aggregate
Supply
A ppendix 4: P ro o f  o f P roposition  2.
The proof proceeds by obtaining an expression which makes it clear that any asymmetry of 
the above kind is inconsistent with the general equilibrium conditions of the model. We attain 
this by working with the equilibrium conditions for each economy: (3.23), (3.24) and (3.25). 
To simplify these expressions, define:
A  =  2 +  a (rid +  « / +  1)
We can then re-write the equilibrium conditions as follows.
The first equilibrium condition is given by expression (3.23), and it is a mapping from Uj 
to Ui, such that along this mapping no individual firm wishes to deviate from its strategy:
(Ld +  Lf)
(A — cr)(T 0 - 2= wieP -L-r  i , j  = d , f , i ^ j  (A4.1)
Uq(2 - o f  A*
Secondly we have the zero profit (free entry) condition, from (3.24), which simplifies to
(Ld + Lf )
2(2 - a ) 2 A 2
— -  (rn +  1 ) -  (nj +  1 ) ^<7 Ui
0 -2
= wie^Lj -  i , j  = d , f , i ^ j  (A4.2)
Uo
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Thirdly we have the labour market clearing conditions
Li =  Lyi +  (71* +  1) e * =  dyf (A4.3)
If Lyi > 0, then W{ = 1 . Otherwise Wi > 1 . For the case of Wi > 1 , we can divide the 
labour market clearing condition for economy i by that for economy j  to obtain the following 
expression:
(A4.4)• = * /u
Squaring (A4.1) we obtain:
(La +  Lf)
(A — cr) cr
^  -  (m +  1) -  (nj + 1 )  ^
p- 2
( 2  — (t) 2 j42J
Dividing (A4.5) by (A4.2) we obtain the following relationship:
(Ld +  Lf ) i ~ d , f
(2 -  cr) A z vr0
=  I Wiep-±-p- j  = ^  j
(A4.5)
(A4.6)
Dividing the expression in (A4.6) for economy i by the corresponding expression for economy 
j  we obtain:
u. 1 - 2i _  W3
u8r 2 wf
(A4.7)
We now proceed to divide expression (A4.1) for economy i by its counterpart in economy j &:
£  -  (rii +  1 ) -  (nj + 1 ) Wi uf~ 2 . . . .
A _ (nj +  1 )_ (n< +  1 ) t  =  ^  =
Substituting (A4.7) into (A4.8) we can simplify the latter to:
(rii +  1) +  (rij +  1) — =  (nj +  1) +  (rif +  1 ) — t, j  = d , f , i ^ j  (A4.9)Ui Uj
We now substitute expression (A4.4) in (A4.9) and we obtain an expression relating rii to rij:
£=ii
(rii + 1 ) 1 -
rij + l \  ? 
rii + 1 =  (nj  + 1 ) \ nj + l )
£=il0
= (A4.10)
From this expression it is clear that if rii i 1 nj  the left hand side will be of opposite sign to the
5The same result obtains if we divide the expressions in (A4.2).
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right hand side, which is a contradiction. It follows that for both economies to have the same 
number of firms they must also have identical technological capabilities and wage rates.
It remains to consider the case when Lyi > 0. In this case W{ = 1 and (A4.7) tells us that 
vm =  Uj, and the result follows through as beforeB.
117
Part II
Introducing Collusion into a 
General Equilibrium Framework 
w ith Oligopolistic Interactions
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C hapter 4
Collusion in General Equilibrium  
w ith Oligopolistic Interactions: 
Autarky
1 In tro d u ctio n
This chapter extends the closed economy framework developed in chapter 2 by incorporating 
profit sharing in industry X .  To achieve this, we introduce a generalized profit function which is 
a weighted average of a firm’s and its rivals’ profits. The generalized profit function provides a 
directly measurable alternative to the (non-measurable) notion of conjectural variations. This 
function provides the basis for a discussion of competition policy, which is characterized by a 
parameter in the generalized profit function (denoted by 7 ). By varying this parameter, we 
encompass all intensities of competition ranging from individual profit maximization to perfect 
collusion (joint profit maximization). This is of interest not only to development economists, 
but to industrial economists at large, since it provides an alternative to conjectural variations, 
with the considerable advantage that it is directly measurable.
Aside from the generalized profit function, the structure of the economy is identical to 
that introduced in chapter 2: We have a two-sector economy, constituted by an industrial 
sector and a ‘traditional’ sector. The industrial sector (labelled industry X )  is characterized 
by increasing returns to scale, which are associated with endogenous sunk costs. In turn, sunk 
costs determine technological capability. We use the same three stage game as in chapter 2 to 
model the behavior of firms in the industrial sector. In the first stage firms decide whether to 
enter the market. In the second stage, firms invest in technological capabilities, taking current
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market structure as given. In the third stage, firms compete in quantities, taking as given 
current market structure and each firm’s technological capabilities.
The other industry is a ‘traditional’ sector (industry Y), characterized by 1:1 constant 
returns to scale technology (1 unit of labour input produces 1 unit of output). The presence 
of this sector ensures that the labour market clears. Since the model is general equilibrium, 
wages are determined endogenously. Labour is the only factor of production.
As before, there is a representative consumer who consumes goods produced by industries 
X  and Y, subject to a budget constraint. Consumers allocate labour between industries X  and 
Y. The demand for labour from industry X  stems from investment in technological capability 
and from the number of firms. Workers are employed by industry X  with the sole purpose 
of developing technological capability. As before, variable costs in industry X  are set to zero. 
Industry Y is the outside option for all workers who cannot find employment in industry X.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2 we develop the model. In section 3 we 
characterize a symmetric general equilibrium. In Section 4 we analyze how the equilibrium 
solutions change as we vary parameters. Section 5 discusses some general remarks about the 
model. We conclude in section 6 .
2 Closed E conom y General Equilibrium  M odel w ith  Profit Sharing
The consumers’ problem, industry Y and the labour market are identical to those presented in 
chapter 2. To avoid repetition, we will refer to the equations we derived in chapter 2. Industry 
X  is similar, but now incorporates a generalized profit function.
Industry X
Firms play a three stage game, similar to the game featured in chapters 2 and 3. In the first 
stage the entry decision is made. In the second stage investment in technological capability is 
chosen. In the final stage, firms compete in quantities. In all stages firms participate in profit 
sharing or cross ownership within the industry. The equilibrium concept remains subgame 
perfection.
One of the central questions of this chapter is the issue of how an economy changes as we 
vary the ‘intensity of competition’. A similar concept (the ‘toughness of competition’) was 
introduced by Sutton (1991, ch. 1, p. 9). Both terms refer to the changing nature of competi­
tion as the industry changes from a perfectly competitive setting, to Bertrand competition, to
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Cournot competition, to joint profit maximization (perfect collusion). The perfectly competi­
tive setting and Bertrand competition would be considered the toughest type of competition, 
followed by Cournot and then by joint profit maximization (the weakest form of competition, 
equivalent to a perfectly collusive agreement). It should be noted that this is a different notion 
to that of ‘substitutability’, although the two are sometimes used in the literature to refer to 
‘competition’ in a broad sense. Indeed, one of the reasons why we chose the utility function 
set out in equation (2 .1 ) is that it provides a measure of ‘substitutability’ (a), and this will 
allow us to disentangle the effects of the ‘intensity of competition’ and ‘substitutability’.
To model the ‘intensity of competition’, we have allowed firms to maximize a generalized 
objective function, which will include not only their own profit, but also their rivals’ (partners’). 
This will internalize to some extent the effect that a firm’s actions have on its rivals’ payoffs, 
and will allow the ‘intensity of competition’ to be varied by changing a parameter (labelled
v).
As required by backward induction, we begin by describing the final stage in the game.
2.1 S tage 3: Q uan tity  C om petition  w ith  Profit Sharing
Firms choose quantity, taking as given their rivals’ strategies, technological capabilities and 
market structure. We assume that production (variable) costs are zero. Gross profits per 
consumer for the kth firm are therefore given by
TTfc =  PkXk (4.1)
and the firm’s objective now becomes
(1 -  7 )7rfc +  7 7f_fc (4.2)
where 7 denotes firm fc’s gross profits per consumer, 7f_fc is the average of gross (per-consumer)
0 , N7V+1 is the intensity of competitionprofits of firm k fs rivals (given by and 7  €
parameter. In Cyert and DeGroot (1973) and Symeonidis (1997), 7  has been interpreted as a 
‘coefficient of cooperation’1. It measures the extent to which a firm values its rivals’ payoffs. 
It can also be interpreted as the extent of collusion prevalent in the industry. If 7  is zero, firms 
take into account only their own profits, and we obtain Cournot competition. As 7  converges
1 Cyert and DeGroot (1973) and Symeonidis (1997) propose a slightly different formulation. In their studies, 
the objective function is tt*. +  A with A € [0,1]. For our purposes, it is more convenient to use the
formulation set out above.
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to , firms value their rivals’ average profits as much as their own, and we are in the presence 
of perfect collusion. The upper limit of 7 , namely 7^ 7 , is imposed to avoid the case of a firm 
valuing its rivals’ average profits more than its own.
An alternative interpretation of 7  is that it is the extent of cross-ownership within the 
industry, that is, 1 — 7  measures the percentage of firm k owned by its rivals and measures 
the share that firm k owns in each of its rivals. Under this interpretation, 7  measures the extent 
of profit sharing in the industry. The cross-ownership interpretation of 7  has the advantage of 
being directly measurable, and although such data is not easily accessible, it does exist. This 
opens the possibility of future tests for predictions of the model.
Another interpretation for 7  is that it is a reduced form measure of the sustainability 
of collusion or cooperation in a repeated game setting (based on some version of the ‘Folk 
Theorem’). A high value for 7  would imply that it is easy for firms to sustain cooperation 
in an infinitely repeated game. Reasons which would induce this include high observability, a 
tough punishment phase, etc. Likewise, low values of 7  would indicate tha t collusion is difficult 
to sustain2.
Yet another interpretation of 7  has been suggested to us3. This relates to the presence of 
‘industrial oligarchies’, in which a reduced group of families own a sizeable percentage of firms 
in an industry. Our parameter 7  could be related to the extent of within-oligarchy marriages. 
Marriage can be regarded as a mechanism for the redistribution of property rights within an 
industry. Thus marriage between families who hold property rights in rival firms can act as a 
mechanism to reduce the intensity of competition between such firms. It is a well documented 
fact (Hausmann and Rigobon, 1993; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001) that in many developing 
countries (especially in Latin America), a small group of oligarch families hold high percentage 
of industrial assets. Moreover, it is often the case that the offspring of these families find 
spouses within the same social stratus. This could be associated to a reduction in the intensity 
of competition.
There is another implication of the generalized profit function in equation (4.2), which is 
quite important from the point of view of economic theory. This generalized objective function 
actually serves as an alternative basis for the characterization of ‘conjectural variations’, with 
the advantage that it is directly measurable. So, the model we present for industry X  could also 
be considered as a new way of thinking about ‘conjectural variations’, without the problems
2 We are grateful to Kam Ki Tang for this interpretation.
3We are grateful to a participant a t the Australian Economic Workshop (University of Melbourne, 2004) for 
this suggestion.
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of non-observability that plagued previous models (Dixit, 1986). We shall usually refer to 7  as 
the ‘intensity of competition’.
Firms optimize their objective (equation 4.2) by choosing x/-. The first order condition for 
the kth firm is
(1 -  7 ) ( Pk +  f ^ x*) " =  0  for fc =  1......N  + 1 (4.3)
In Appendix 1 , we find a symmetric Nash equilibrium and obtain Xfc as a function of the number 
of firms (N  +  1) and of firms’ technological capabilities, given by the vector U  =  ( iq ,..., un+i )1. 
Substituting the solutions derived in Appendix 1 into the firm’s objective yields the solved-out 
payoff that the kth firm extracts from each consumer (which, following backward induction, is 
used to solve the second stage of the game):
7Tfc(U) = 1 - 7
2 [(2 — <t)(1 - 7 )  -  j f ] ‘ “* (2 +  crN)(l -  7) +  <t~i
(4.4)
(1 _ 7 _ n\ Uk _ (iz lfin z ih  y;«,
\  N /  (2 +  aN){ \  — 7) +  ^7 '
Total gross profits are given by L  7Tfc(U). If firms choose a symmetric quality level (denoted 
by u), profits per consumer simplify to
Jr_ (1 —7 ) [ 1 - 7 ( 1 -O')] u 2 
2 [(2 +  <tN)(1 -  7) +  (T7]2
Upon setting 7  =  0, this expression reduces to
(4.5)
7r = 2(2 + aN )2
which is the expression derived in chapter 2 (expression 2.9).
(4.6)
2.2 S tage 2: C om petition  in Technological C apability  w ith  P rofit Sharing
In this subgame, firms choose their investment in technological capability, taking as given their 
rivals’ strategies and market structure. The investment is a sunk cost. In this stage the firm’s 
objective is given by
(1  -  7 )IIfc +  7 n _ fc for k =  1,...,IV +  1 (4.7)
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where life is net profit of the kth firm and II_fc is the average net profits of the kth firm’s rivals
y'TV
(—hjv fc)- Net profit is life =  L 7Tfe(U) — F(itfe,tu), where L  denotes population size, 7Tfc(U) 
is solved-out gross per-capita profit (equation 4.4) and F(uk,w) is a fixed outlays function, 
defined as before: F(uk, w) = w f(u k ), where w is the wage, and f(uk)  =  s is the firm’s
labour requirement in industry X .  is assumed greater than 2 (to ensure that the second 
order conditions hold, see Appendix 2), e > 0, and Uk > uQ ^  1 . fi is the elasticity of f(uk) 
with respect to Ufc. e is an exogenous set-up cost. uQ represents the initial (inherited) value of 
technological capability, an exogenous parameter.
Firms maximize their objective (equation 4.7) with respect to Uk, with first order conditions:
(4.8)
h£k
where the derivatives of the profit function are taken using the solved-out payoff in (4.4): 
( 1 - 7 )dnk
duk 2 [ ( 2 - ff) ( l - 7) - 9 :]2
» ( l - 7 + f r )  \ ( l  * 1 )  ( l - 7 ) ( l - 7 - ^ ) c r
U k  ( 2 + a i V ) ( l - 7 )+ c r 7  2 ^ 1= 1 u l 1  N  )  ( 2 + f f i V ) ( l - 7)-|-<77
(4.9)
+ K1  I N )  k  ( 2 + a 7V ) ( l - 7 )+<T7  2 ^ 1= 1  u l 1 -
0 -7+ iW
( 2 + < r iV ) ( l - 7 ) + f f 7
d'Kh  _________( 1 - 7 ) ______
2 [ ( 2 - a ) ( l - 7) - f ] :
(4.10)
f
U h  ~
r ■
+ (1 - 7 “
Ul ( 1 —7 ) ( l ~ 7 ~  w  ) g  (2 + c i V ) ( l — y)+<T7
N ( 2 + < r iV )(l
I N J +  .
- 7 ) 4 - 0 7  2 ^ / 1= 1 Ul
( 1 - 7  + # v  
(2 + o . / V ) ( l —7 ) 4 -0 7
The first order conditions (together with other equilibrium conditions, to be introduced below) 
will allow us to solve for the equilibrium level of technological capability (section 3). If firms 
choose a symmetric level of technological capability (denoted by u), the first order conditions 
simplify to the following expression:
nP~2
LT = wep— ZUo
(4.11)
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where
(1 -  7 )2 { g N  [2 -  7(2 -  <7)] +  2 [2 -  a  -  7(2 -  <r(2 -  a))]}
r _________________- y [ 2 - 7 ( 2 - 7) (2 -„ ) ]______________
[(2 -  (t)(1 -  7 ) -  7 ?] [(2 +  g N )(1 -  7 ) +  <7 7 ] 2 
Upon setting 7  =  0, the first order condition simplifies further to
r 2 +  0- (JV — 1)T =  wep-
(2 - g ) (2  +  g N )2 " u l
which is expression (2.13).
This completes the description of the second stage subgame (see Appendix 2 for second 
order conditions).
2.3 Stage 1: T he E ntry D ecision w ith  Profit Sharing
We assume there is a sufficiently large pool of potential entrants. Firms will enter until gross 
profits equate fixed outlays. This leads to the following free-entry condition
(1 -  7)nfc + 7n_fc  ^0 k = 1 , N  + 1 (4.13)
Ignoring integer effects, entry occurs until condition (4.13) holds with equality. Since IT* =  
Z/7Tfc — condition (4.13) can be written as follows
„  4r . x / “ A * .  £ E » “ e ( s y l
( l - 7 ) L 7 r fe +  7 ---- ^ ----->  (1 — 7)«,e ( — 1 + 7 ---------- N  (4.14)
where 7r* and tth denote gross profits per consumer (from equation 4.4). The zero profit 
condition implies that entry by any firm induces a redistribution of property rights to ensure 
that all firms perceive a fraction (1  — 7 ) of their own net profit and hold claims to a fraction 
7 /iV in each of its rivals’ net profits. In a symmetric equilibrium, using (4.5), we can rewrite
(4.14) as follows
r ( 1  -  7 ) [1 -  7 ( 1  -  <r)] 2
L —-r ^  =  we— 3 -  (4-15)
2 [(2 + gN)  (1 -  7 ) + <77] ul
Upon setting 7  =  0, this simplifies further to
L vP 2
( 4 ' 1 6 )
which is expression (2.15).
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This completes the description of the game in industry X.  In the following section, we 
characterize a symmetric general equilibrium.
3 Characterization o f a Sym m etric General Equilibrium
We now have six parameters (/?, 7 , <7 , e, L  and u0). As before, u, N  and w pin down the general 
equilibrium. The solutions are functions of the parameters: u ((3,7 , cr, e, L, uQ), N  (ft, 7 , cr, e, L, uQ) 
and w (/?, 7 , cr, e, L, u0). We drop the arguments for ease of notation, hence we write u(.) for 
u  (/?, 7 , <7, e, L, u0), N(.) for N  (/?, 7 , <7, e, L, u0) and w(.) for w (f3,7 , <7 , e, L, u0). Our definition 
of a symmetric general equilibrium is the same as in chapter 2. We now present the equilibrium 
conditioils. These are used to find a symmetric equilibrium.
E quilibrium  C onditions
The first condition corresponds to the first order conditions for technological capability 
from (4.8):
—  < - >
where the derivatives and were defined in (4.9) and (4.10), respectively.
The second is the free entry condition, from (4.14):
( l - 7 ) L 7 r fe +  7 --------^ --------^ ( i _ 7 ) w £ ^ _ j  + 7 -------^  V )  (4 1 8 )
The third equilibrium condition is labour market clearing, from (2.17)
L  =  Ly +  Lx (4* 19)
Market clearing for type Y  and type X  goods holds by construction. We now consider a 
symmetric equilibrium, such that all firms set the same technological capability (u). In this 
case, the first order conditions for technological capability (4.17) simplify to
^ 2
LT  = weP^-g- Z  (4.20)
Uq
where T  was defined in (4.12). After substitution of symmetric gross profits (4.5), the free
126
entry condition (4.18) simplifies to
L (1 -  7 ) [1 -  7(1  -  <7)] u
/3-2
=  W £- (4.21)
2[(2 +  <riV)(l - l )  + crj] vrQ
and use of (2.16), allows the labour market clearing condition (4.19) to be written as follows
P
L - L y  + ( N + l ) e ( j £ j (4.22)
We next show that conditions (4.20-4.22) allow us to solve for u(.), N(.) and w(.). Prom (4.20) 
we solve for u:
f  ^ . t \ AU — \ZweP (4.23)
where T  was defined in (4.12). When setting 7  =  0, the above expression simplifies to
u = ' ImS 2 + a ( N - l )weft (2 — cr)(2 +  <tN )2
which is the result obtained in expression (2.26).
Solving for the number of firms requires substituting (4.23) into (4.21). We obtain a 
quadratic equation in N:
<r( 1 -  7)2 [2 -  7(2 -  cr)] N 2 
+(1 -  7 )2 [2 {2 -  <7 -  7  [2 -  <7(2 -  cr)]} -  0(2 -  a) [1 -  7(1 -  (7) ] ]  N  
-cr~i {2 -  7(2 — 7 )(2 — cr) -  0(1  -  7 ) [1 -  7(1 -  a)]} =  0
Solving for N  and adding 1, we obtain the equilibrium number of firms:
Zc — (1  — 7 ) [2  { 2  — <7 — 7  [2  — <7 ( 2  — <7)]} — 0 ( 2  — (7 ) [1 — 7 ( 1  — a)]] 
2 (7 (1. — 7 ) [2 — 7 ( 2  — <7 )]
where
(4.24)
(4.25)
Z c =
(1 -  7 ) 2 [2 {2 -  <7 -  7  [2 -  <7(2 -  <r)]} -  f}(2 -  (7) [1 -  7 ( 1  -  cr) ] ] 2 
+ 4 <727  [2 -  7 ( 2  -  (7 )] {2 -  /3(1 -  7 ) [1 -  7 ( 1  -  <t)\ -  7 ( 2  -  7 ) (2 -  (7)}
(4.26)
Note that we have suppressed the negative solution (which features —Z c instead of Zc), since 
market forces will ensure that only the positive solution holds. If we set 7  =  0, the number of
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entrants simplifies to
N + 1 = j ± - . m - ° ) + l
2a
which is expression (2.27). In the case of 7  =  0, the negative solution to equation (4.24) 
becomes zero.
Substituting N  + 1 from (4.25) into u (equation 4.23), we obtain an expression for tech­
nological capability as a function of exogenous parameters (/?, 7 , a , e, L, uD) and the wage rate 
{w):
\  2l 4  ( i - 7 )2 [2- 7 (2 _-<,)]:»[! _ . , ( ! _ „ ) ]  ) **
\  we [[1 -  7(l -  „)] {2 [2(1 -  7 ) + <7] + /3(1 -  j)(2 -  <r)} + z f j
where Z c was defined in equation (4.26). In the case of 7  =  0, equation (4.27) simplifies to
'  u i  L  1u  =
which is expression (2.28).
The equilibrium wage rate is obtained by substituting u  (equation 4.27) into the labour 
market clearing condition (4.22). If labour demand from industry X  is insufficient to clear the 
labour market at a wage rate higher than 1 , workers will shift to industry Y. In this scenario, 
the wage rate will be equal to the marginal product of labour in industry Y, which is given 
by q =  1. Whence, if Ly =  0, w > 1 (otherwise workers would shift to the freely available 1:1 
technology), and if Ly > 0, w =  1 (that is, workers use the 1 :1  technology). In a symmetric 
equilibrium the (general) equilibrium wage rate can be solved to yield
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where T  was defined in (4.12) and N  is given in (4.25). If we set 7  =  0 , this expression 
simplifies to:
w =  max < (7)
ul / L \ f
which is equation (2.29).
All that remains to complete the characterization is to obtain the general equilibrium level 
of technological capability. To obtain this, substitute the solution for the wage rate (4.28) into
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equation (4.27). The number of firms is given by equation (Lj/Jg)- Thus we have characterized 
a symmetric general equilibrium in autarky. The symmetric general equilibrium solutions in 
autarky are set out in the table that follows, where T  is defined in (4.12) and Z c in (4.26):
w  =  max
2 Lv?n (1—7 )2[2—7 (2 —a)12 [ l—7 (1 —g)l
« «  [[1 -7 (1-< t)]{2(2(1—7 )+<7] + 0 ( l —7 )(2 —< r)} + Z < f
_  ^c~ (1—7)[2{2—g—7[2—<t(2—g)]}—ff(2—g)[l—7(1—g)]] .
W -7 )P - 7 (2 - g ) ]
Table 1 : Symmetric General Equilibrium Outcomes in Autarky with 7  > 0.
As before, concentration does not depend on market size (L), initial conditions (u0) or 
set-up costs (s). It depends only on /?, 7  and <7 . Thus concentration does not fall to zero as
market size increases indefinitely (we have ‘non-convergence’).
We are now in a position to analyze how the economy reacts to changes in parameter values. 
This is the task for the next section.
4 A nalysis o f  th e  Sym m etric Equilibrium
Similarly to chapter 2, we analyze how changing each of the parameters changes outcomes 
for a symmetric equilibrium. In this section, we report on the same variables as in chapter 2 
(section 4), namely:
a) W age rate (equal to  per-capita value added): iu(.) (listed in table 1).
b) Technological capability: u(.) (listed in table 1).
c) N um ber o f firms: N  (.) +  1 (listed in table 1).
d) Welfare: W  (.) (equation 2.32).
e) Em ploym ent in industry Y : Ly — L — Lx (from equation 4.19).
f )  Em ploym ent in industry X : Lx (.) (equation 2.16).
We discuss changes in the equilibrium outcomes of the system as we change each of the 
parameters, ceteris paribus. The analysis of all remaining variables is presented in Appendix 
3. We use the same notation as outlined in chapter 2, section 4. The analyses of e, u0 and
L  do not differ from those in chapter 2 (section 4), and need not be repeated. The analysis
of is identical to that presented in section 4.1 in chapter 2, except for the number of firms. 
When 7  > 0, the number of firms rises convexly with /3. This is a consequence of the presence
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of cross-ownership within the industry, which leads to a more than proportional reduction in 
technological capability (and hence in sunk costs). The reduction of entry costs allows a more 
than proportional increase in the number of entrants for any given level of /3. We find that the 
presence of 7 does affect the analysis of cr, and there is, of course , the analysis of how 7 itself 
affects the system. We begin by presenting the latter.
4.1 A nalysis o f  Changes in 7
Let us begin with an intuitive explanation of how changes in 7 affect the equilibrium outcome. 
As mentioned previously, 7 is the ‘intensity of competition’ in industry X  (alternatively, the 
extent of cross ownership within the industry). Recall that as 7 converges to zero, the model 
collapses to the usual individual firm profit maximization framework, and as 7 converges to 
its upper bound (77^7), we approach the case of joint profit maximization (perfect collusion). 
Intermediate values of 7 generate modes of competition that lie between these extremes.
It is important to note that all of the 3 stages in the game played by firms in industry X  are 
affected by 7. To see this, consider the objective function in stage 3 (quantity competition): 
(1 — 7)71* +  77F—fc, where 7T* is firm fc’s gross (per capita) profit, and is the average of 
gross (per capita) profits of firm k's rivals/partners (given by — 1). A unilateral increase 
of quantity by firm k will have two effects. First, there is the marginal benefit associated 
to the increase in firm fc’s own profit (tt*), as it commands a larger market share at the 
expense of its rivals. The second effect is a marginal cost, which is due to the reduction of its 
rivals’ (partners’) profits, and this will reduce firm fc’s profit via its participation in the other 
firms’ profits (namely ^ ) . There would usually be a third effect, namely, the marginal cost of 
producing the extra quantity, but we have assumed marginal cost is zero4. Thus the incentive 
to expand production is curtailed by firm k 's consideration of the effects of its actions on its 
rivals’/partners’ profits.
Similarly, in stage 2 (competition in technological capability) 7 reduces the incentives for 
firm k to increase its technological capability, since any expansion in sales (due to higher 
technological capability) will be obtained at the expense of its rivals (partners).
In stage 1 (entry), the effect of higher 7 is to allow a larger number of entrants to survive. 
This effects works via a reduction in sunk costs (which are smaller since the industry now 
features lower technological capability).
4The model can be extended to  incorporate non-zero marginal costs. Provided the marginal costs of produc­
tion are small relative to  fixed outlays associated with technological capability, setting these to zero does not 
change the analysis substantially.
130
To consider the effects of 7  on the economy, we present diagrams similar to those in chapter 
2. Before proceeding, we need to note that the results that follow (with the exception of the 
wage rate, as will be explained below) depend on the values taken by (3 and cr. In particular, 
we identify two different patterns of behaviour:
Case (a): W hen fi and cr are ‘sufficiently high’.
Case (b): W hen (3 and a  are not ‘sufficiently high’(i.e., when either of j3 or a  are ‘sufficiently 
low’).
The wage rate, however, exhibits different behaviour depending on whether (3 is high or 
low (irrespective of cr, which only shifts the wage schedule, but does not change its essential 
properties when plotted against 7 ). The meaning of ‘sufficiently high/low ’ will be made precise 
in Proposition 7  (below). For the following intuitive explanation, we shall use the terms 
informally.
We start by presenting the case when (3 or  cr are sufficiently low in Figure 4.1a, where we 
plot the symmetric equilibrium outcomes for varying values of 7 . The top left graph depicts 
technological capability, the top right graph shows the wage rate, the bottom  left graph plots 
the number of firms and the bottom  right graph shows employment.
N + l
L,LX
rr
Figure 4.1a: The effect of 7  when f3 or a  are sufficiently low
Figure 4.1a shows two scenarios. One in which (3 is low (denoted by (3lo) and another in which 
(3 is high and cr is low (denoted by /3hicri0). The only variable which changes its overall pattern
131
in these two scenarios is the wage rate. Technological capability and the number of firms 
experience a shift of their levels, but no change in their shape. Employment is not affected, 
since the wage rate does not reach its lower bound of 1 (for the general case when w =  1 see 
Proposition 7, below).
When or cr are sufficiently low, technological capability is decreasing in 7 at an increasing 
rate. As the intensity of competition falls (7 increases), the incentives to invest in technological 
capability are reduced. The effect of investment in technological capability is to shift outward 
the firm’s demand function, at the expense of its rivals. Given that profit sharing becomes more 
important as 7 rises, it is now less profitable for the individual firm to incur the expenditure 
required to achieve a given increase in its technological capability. Moreover, the fall in u  
occurs at an increasing rate as 7 reaches its upper bound. This is an important notion, since 
it implies that if the intensity of competition is high (7 is low), the effect on the level of 
technological capability of a reduction in intensity is relatively small. It is when the intensity 
of competition is already low (7 is high) that further reductions will have a large effect on 
technological capability.
The pattern seen in the number of firms (or market structure) is the mirror image of the 
pattern in technological capability. The number of firms increases with profit sharing, at an 
increasing rate. This reflects the fact that as there is less investment in technological capability, 
each firm incurs a smaller sunk cost, and this will induce a larger number of entrants. As the 
intensity of competition reaches its lower bound (profit sharing reaches its upper bound, 7*), 
the number of firms becomes increasingly large5.
To analyze the wage rate, we consider first the scenario of low /3. In this case the wage 
is decreasing in 7 at an increasing rate. This means that the ‘market structure effect’, which 
increases the demand for labour at the industry level (via a larger number of firms), will not be 
sufficient to offset the ‘technological capability effect’, which decreases the demand for labour at 
the firm level (via a fall in technological capability). Moreover, as with technological capability, 
it is when 7 is already high that a further increase will depress the wage most substantially.
In the remaining scenario of high (3 and low <7, there is a large number of firms each with 
relatively low technological capability. We find that the wage rate is concave, increasing at 
first, reaches a global maximum and is decreasing afterwards. Thus, for low values of 7 we 
find that the ‘market structure effect’ is stronger than the ‘technological capability effect’, that
5 A word of caution is due regarding the approach of 7  to its upper bound (namely 7 * =  We should
be careful to note th a t as N  rises with 7 , the upper bound (7 *) will approach the value of 1 from the left. This 
means tha t in Figure 4.1a the upper bound will shift to the right as 7  increases. Other than this caveat, we 
need not be concerned about this issue.
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is, the increase in the number of firms generates a stronger effect on labour demand than the 
reduction in technological capability. This situation is reversed for high values of 7 .
Regarding the occupation of the labour force, we find that employment in sector Y  is zero 
throughout, and all workers are employed by industry X .  The reason behind this is that the 
parameter values on which Figure 4.1a is based, do not generate a wage rate equal to 1  at 
any value of 7  €  [0 , In particular, the low levels of (3 generate too  high a technological
capability to permit w =  l 6.
We proceed to analyze the case when f3 and a  are ‘sufficiently high’. We present the 
corresponding graphs in Figure 4.1b.
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Figure 4.1b: The effect of 7  when (3 and a  are sufficiently high
Figure 4.1b shows in continuous lines the symmetric equilibrium outcomes. Dashed lines have 
been used to depict the outcomes that would have prevailed had the wage rate not had a lower 
bound of 1  (in the two top graphs) and had employment not been restricted to the interval 
[0, L] (in the bottom  right graph), that is, the ‘shadow values’.
In this case, technological capability is no longer monotonic, and has a sinusoidal shape.
6 We could have chosen parameter values which could generate w  =  1 for some values of 7 , and we shall see 
this in the case of /3 and o  sufficiently high, as well as in Proposition 7 . However it was deemed convenient to 
keep the analysis simple at this stage.
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Aghion et al. (2005) find an ‘inverted-U’ relationship between innovation and product sub­
stitutability (which they identify with ‘competition’) in the context of an endogenous growth 
model with quality ladders and a CES production function. As a first approximation, let us 
concentrate on the outcomes when the wage rate does not have a lower bound. Thus the 
analysis will refer to actual outcomes for w > 1 and to the shadow values (dashed lines) for 
w =  1. In the top left graph we can see that as 7  increases, u  falls, reaches a local mini­
mum, rises to reach a maximum and then falls. Let us discuss the intuition for this pattern. 
Disregard the effect of 7  for the moment, and concentrate on (3 and cr. When (3 and a are 
‘sufficiently high’, the marginal cost of increasing technological capability (associated to /?) is 
high, and goods of type X  are close substitutes. The industry pattern that emerges from such 
a parameter configuration is one of intermediate values for technological capability and the 
number of firms: On the one hand, the high marginal cost of technological capability induces 
low levels of technological capability and a large number of entrants (via reduced entry costs). 
On the other hand, the high substitutability of products induces high technological capability 
and hence a reduced number of firms. This comes about through the market stealing effect: 
If an individual firm decides to unilaterally increase its technological capability (escalation) it 
will capture sales from its rivals. The closer substitutes the goods are, the stronger the market 
stealing effect will be, thereby enhancing the marginal benefit from investment in technological 
capability. Thus, in equilibrium, higher values of a lead to higher technological capability and 
fewer firms -due to increased entry costs (a full analysis of the effects of a  is provided in section 
4.2). The two effects (high {3 and a) combine to generate intermediate values of technological 
capability and of the number of entrants. A similar pattern could also be generated by low 
a (low substitutability) and low j3 (low marginal cost): The low substitutability induces low 
technological capability and a large number of firms, whilst the low marginal cost generates 
high technological capability and a small number of firms. The effect of cr works through the 
marginal benefit of technological capability, while f3 affects the marginal cost of technological 
capability.
So why do /? and a ‘sufficiently high’ generate the pattern in technological capability dis­
played in Figure 4.1b? For either high or low values of 7  we see that increases in 7  lead to lower 
technological capability. The analysis of this case is similar to the case when (3 is ‘sufficiently 
low’ (Figure 4.1a), and need not be repeated. On the other hand, for intermediate values of 7  
we observe an increase in technological capability as 7  rises (the intensity of competition falls). 
What is occurring in this range is that the net marginal benefit of technological capability rises 
with 7 , hence the increment in technological capability. Note that the marginal benefit is en­
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hanced by the close substitutability of products. Regarding the marginal costs, we can identify 
two sources. Firstly, the profit reduction of other firms (in which the firm owns a share ^ ) . 
Secondly, the extra investment required to achieve the new level of technological capability. 
Thus, marginal costs are not sufficient to offset the enhanced marginal benefit, leading to an 
increase in technological capability. To see this, consider the case when (3 is low and a is high. 
In this scenario the incentives to increase technological capability are quite strong. Hence 
the escalation mechanism is enhanced. This would lead to very large profit reductions for 
rivals/partners, which would be a strong deterrent to the individual firm (since it internalizes, 
partly albeit, the consequences of its actions on its rivals/partners through ownership of shares 
in their profits). Thus the individual firm responds by reducing its technological capability as 
-7  rises (as shown in Figure 4.1a). In the case at hand (when (3 and a are high) we observe 
that for an intermediate range of 7 , the above mechanism reverts. It is because /3 is high (and 
hence any escalation is relatively minor), that an individual firm may find it optimal to raise 
its technological capability as 7  rises: The costs arising from the harm it would inflict upon its 
rivals/partners and the additional required investment are not sufficient to offset the benefit 
from escalating (which is enhanced by having a high a and compounded by the relatively low 
level of 7 ).
The number of firms rises with 7  at first, reaches a local maximum, falls to reach a local 
minimum (which corresponds exactly with the global maximum of u) and then rises convexly. 
The ‘technological capability’ effect and the ‘market structure’ effect combine to determine the 
wage rate. Initially, the market structure effect dominates the technological capability effect, 
thus the wage rate is rising and tracks the number of firms. Once technological capability 
ceases to fall, the balance is reversed, and the technological capability effect takes over the 
market structure effect. Hence the wage rate tracks technological capability.
Employment in industry X  (Lx) exhibits properties similar to the wage rate. As 7  grows, 
Lx rises at an increasing rate at first, then at a decreasing rate, reaching a maximum and then 
falling at an increasing rate for high values of 7 . Employment in industry Y  is residual labour 
not employed in industry X .
Let us now bring into the analysis the lower bound of the wage rate [w =  1), and link this 
to employment in both industries. In Figure 4.1b we observe two thresholds for 7 , 7 ^ ^ ^  
and (which will be clarified in Proposition 7 ). When 7  is sufficiently low (i.e., 7  ^
7to^1^ /? )> wage becomes 1 . Similarly, when 7  is sufficiently high (i.e., 7  ^  Ih ig h ^^  )> 
the wage also becomes 1. This leads to industry Y  becoming active in both cases. For values 
of 7  between the thresholds, all labour is employed in industry X  (leading to zero employment
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in industry Y ).
For 7  ^  actual technological capability is increasing in 7 . This arises because the
shadow wage rate lies below the actual wage rate, implying that the actual cost of technological 
capability is higher than its shadow cost, resulting in an actual technological capability which 
is below its shadow counterpart. As 7  grows, the two wages converge. Accordingly actual 
technological capability converges to its shadow value, generating the observed increase.
Similarly, for 7  ^  Ih ig h ^ ^  the wage rate is unity. Hence observed technological capability 
is below its shadow value. As 7  grows, the gap between the wage and its shadow value rises, 
leading to an also rising gap between technological capability and its shadow value.
In addition to the development configurations discussed in chapter 2 (proliferation and 
high-tech), the inverted-U depicted in the wage graphs in figures 4.1a-b leads to a third option: 
an in term ed iate  configuration. An intermediate economy is characterized by middling 
technological capability and concentration, and (so long as (3 is sufficiently high) the highest 
wage will occur at intermediate levels of 7  (regardless of cr).
We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition (which is completed in 
Appendix 3).
P roposition  7 : Effects o f 7
Recall that 7  G [0, 7^ 7 ].
a) W age rate: Define a threshold level of (3, (3W, given by the lowest value of (3 such 
that =  0. For the case when (3 < 8W, we can find a threshold for 7 ,
such that w =  1 for all 7  ^  7 U,=l \P<F° , provided j w=1\P<Pw £ |o, 7^ 3 ] ■ When f3 < {?“ and 
7  < y t,=1l£</5'" t the wage rate is strictly decreasing and strictly concave in 7 : ^  < 0 , < 0 .
If f3 < and 7  ^  7 u;=1l0<PW } the wage rate is equal to 1.
If instead (3 ^  (3W, we define two thresholds for 7 , and 7 / ^ ^ ^  • These
thresholds are ranked as follows: 7 ^ 1^ ' 8 < (see Figure 4.1b). If 7  ^  Ih ig h ^^
then w =  1 . In the case of 7  ^  > we a^ce 811 additional requirement for w = 1 within
the relevant range of 7 , i.e., for 7 ] ^ ^  G 0 ,7 /J J l^ ^  The requirement is that a  be 
sufficiently high: cr > crw=1 (where <jw==1 is such that for all cr > crw=zl, w = 1 obtains).
When (3 ^  (3W and 7  G (max (0 , 7 ! ^ ^ ^  ) , IhTgh^^ )» we obtain that as we increase 
7 , w is at first strictly increasing (§jf > 0 ), reaches a global maximum (§j*J = 0 ), and then 
becomes strictly decreasing ( ^  < 0) in 7 . It also follows that as we increase 7 , w is at first 
strictly convex ( | ^  > 0 ), reaches an inflection point ( ^  =  0 ) and finally becomes strictly 
concave in 7  ( f ^  < 0). If 7  g (max (o ,7 j ^ 1|/J>/5" )  , 7 ^ ' ^ " ) ’ then w =  1.
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b) Technological capability: Define thresholds (j3u,a u) given by the lowest values of 
(/?, a) such that u  ^ =  0. For (3 < (3U or a < <ru, u is strictly decreasing and strictly
concave in 7 : < 0 , < 0 .
For j3 ^  (3U, o ^  <ru we distinguish two cases. Firstly, 7  £ (max  ^ , ^ 7 7 ^-
Then n is sinusoidal: it begins being strictly decreasing < 0), reaches a local minimum 
( § 7  =  ®)> becomes strictly increasing > 0 ), reaches a global maximum =  0 ) and 
becomes strictly decreasing ( |^  < 0 ). Correspondingly, u begins being strictly convex >
0), reaches an inflection point =  0) and becomes strictly concave < 0) in 7 . Secondly, 
if 7  < 7 / ^ 1^ Ss/? j then u is strictly increasing and strictly convex: ^  > 0 , > 0 .
u exhibits kinks at 7  =  and at 7  =  7 .
c) N um ber of firms: For (3 < (3U oi cr < au (defined in part (b) of this proposition), 
N  + 1 is strictly increasing and strictly convex in 7 : > 0, — ^ 2^  > 0-
For j3 ^  f3u and cr ^  au, increasing 7  induces the following behavior: N  + 1 is at first 
strictly increasing in 7  > 0 ), reaches a local maximum =  0 ), becomes strictly
decreasing < 0 ), reaches a local minimum =  0 ) and is finally strictly increasing
> 0). Correspondingly, iV +  1 is initially strictly concave ( - < 0 ), reaches an
inflection point (9 — 0 ) and becomes strictly convex ^  > 0 ) in 7 .
d) W elfare: W  exhibits behavior similar to the wage rate (with different numerical values). 
However, when w =  1, W  becomes flatter, generating a kink in W. This change of slope occurs 
for the same reason as outlined in part (d) of Proposition (3, chapter 2: Once the wage rate 
becomes 1 , the fall in welfare is mitigated by the fact that the wage cannot not fall any further.
e) Em ploym ent in  in d u s try  Y : Ly, is equal to 0 for w > 1. Industry Y  becomes active 
when w =  1. Let us begin by introducing a threshold 0 w=sl: the lowest value of (3 that satisfies
w =  1 for all 7 € 0, • When (3 ^  (3W 1 we obtain that as we increase 7, Ly is at first
or dLstrictly decreasing (-g* < 0 ), reaches a global minimum — 0 ), and then becomes strictly
Q T
increasing (-5 ^  > 0) in 7. It also follows that as we increase 7, Ly is at first strictly concave 
{-q^- < 0 ), reaches an inflection point =  0 ) and finally becomes strictly convex in 7
(% ^  > 0 ).
Consider now the case when (3 E (f3w=1,^ w). Recall that threshold level /3W is given by 
the lowest value of B such that ^  =  0. In this case, we can find two thresholds for 7,p=pw
. w = l\r=1>^Pw , . . .  ,  , ,  . , .namely 7 ^  1 and ryhigh , with the following properties:
w =\\r=x>P>Pw , w=i\^=1> ^ r  r N 1 . .
E 7 ^  7high and 7high € °> 77+1J » then w =  1 and Lv 1S strictly
increasing and strictly convex in 7: > 0 , 7 ^  > 0 .
yw= 1
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11 7  <  7 /L 1^  and e  °> 77+1 i then w =  1 and Ly is strictly
decreasing and strictly concave in 7 : < 0, -Q f^- < 0. To ensure that ^ low 1 ^ €
0 , it is sufficient to require <7 > crw=1 (where aw==1 is such that for all a  > crw=1, w =  1 
obtains, as defined in part (a) of this proposition).
Finally, for the case when j3 < (3W, we can find a threshold for 7 > 7 tu- 1l0 <^  , such that 
w =  1 for all 7  ^  y"=i|/3<0“’t When j3 < (3W and 7  < <yw=1\P<Pw } w > 1 and Ly = 0. If j3 < j3w 
and 7  ^  ^w=i|£</3u’ , w =  1 and Ly is strictly increasing and strictly convex in 7 : > 0 ,
> °T*
As before Ly € [0, L] in equilibrium.
f) Employment in industry X : L® is equal to L — Ly. Thus its behavior is the reverse 
of Ly. Ly supplements Lx to use all of the available labour supply (given by L).
Proof: By inspection of the appropriate variables, their derivatives and associated thresholds I
4.2 A nalysis of Changes in cr
The effects of <7 depend intricately on the values that /3 and 7  take. We distinguish four cases:
(a) When fi and 7  are very low.
(b) When (3 and 7  are low.
(c) When (3 is high and 7  is high.
(d) When (3 is high and 7  is low.
As previously, the precise meaning of terms such as ‘low’, ‘very low’ or ‘high’, will be 
clarified in Proposition <7, stated below. Notice that the case when /? is low and 7  is high 
has not been included. This is because the second order conditions axe violated under such 
a parameter combination (see Appendix 2 for more details on the second order conditions). 
Nonetheless, to aid exposition, we will refer to this parameter configuration on one occasion.
The analysis proceeds by explaining two diagrams: One for cases (a) and (b) -Figure 4.2a- 
and the other for cases (c) and (d) -Figure 4.2b-. In Figure 4.2a, a  is plotted on the horizontal 
axes. Dashed thick lines correspond to case (a), when (3 and 7  are very low (labelled /?v2o7 vio), 
while continuous lines represent case (b), when /3 and 7  are low (labelled /?io7 io). Dashed thin 
lines show the projection of the corresponding function, had the wage rate not had a lower 
bound equal to 1 (‘shadow values’). The top left graph in Figure 4.2a depicts technological 
capability. The top right graph shows the wage rate. The bottom left graph illustrates the
7This case corresponds to Figure 4.1a, but it is not depicted. The case shown in the figure is fi <  j9w and 
7  <  ry*>=i\P<Pw (for which w >  1 and Ly =  0).
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number of firms and the bottom right graph exhibits employment in industries X  and Y.
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Figure 4.2a: The effect of cr when: (a) f3 and 7  are very low and (b) f3 and 7  are low.
In case (a), when (3 and 7  are very low (dashed thick lines), technological capability achieves its 
highest level for all parameter combinations, and is increasing concavely in a. Correspondingly, 
the number of firms is at its lowest level, and is decreasing convexly in a. The wage rate is at 
its highest level8, and is ‘U’-shaped. Employment in industry X  equals the economy’s labour 
endowment, and consequently employment in industry Y  is zero (industry Y  is inactive).
The intuition behind this pattern is as follows. When (3 and 7  are very low there are strong 
incentives to  escalate. Firstly, very low values of f3 imply a very low marginal cost of escalation. 
Secondly, very low 7  implies that the firm cares little for its rivals’/partners’ profits, and this 
also contributes towards a low marginal cost of escalation. The net effect is that as cr grows, 
the net marginal benefit of escalation grows, and each firm finds it optimal to increase its 
investment in technological capability. This in turn raises the investment required to survive 
in the industry, thereby reducing the number of entrants.
The combination of the ‘technological capability’ effect and the ‘market structure’ effect 
will determine the demand for labour in industry X , and hence the wage rate. For low values
8 That technological capability reaches its highest level, the number of firms its lowest level, and the wage 
rate its highest level for this parameter configuration follows from the results in sections 4.1 (on the effects of 
0) and 4.2 (on the effects of a) in chapter 2.
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of cr, the effect of increasing technological capability is not sufficient to offset the decreasing 
number of firms, thus the wage falls (the ‘market structure’ effect dominates). For high values 
of cr the balance is reversed, leading to an increasing wage rate. Since demand for labour in 
industry X  does not fall below the economy’s labour endowment, the wage rate does not reach 
its lower bound of 1, and industry Y  remains inactive throughout.
The only substantive difference between case (b) -/?j07 j0-  and case (a) -Pvi0l vio~ ^ e s 'm 
that the wage reaches its lower bound of 1 in case (b) for values of a between cr^ 1 and cr^r^. 
This implies that industry Y  will become active while w =  1.
In the case of technological capability, we observe that it attains a lower level in its entirety 
as compared to case (a), while maintaining the same shape so long as w > 1 . When w = 1 we 
find that technological capability is rising at an increasing rate as cr grows, beginning with a 
flatter slope than was the case when cr < cr^j1, (i.e., when w > 1 ). This is due to the wage 
being fixed at 1 : As shown by the ‘shadow’ wage rate (dashed thin line), when cr increases 
past crg^1, had it not been for the lower bound of 1 the wage rate would have continued 
falling, would have reached a minimum and would have begun growing. The effect of this 
for technological capability is that when the wage would have continued falling, but was fixed 
at 1 , the net marginal benefit of technological capability is rising at a relatively slower rate 
than its shadow counterpart. Thus technological capability rises at a slower pace than its 
corresponding shadow value. Once the wage rate reaches a minimum and begins rising, the 
process is reverted: The shadow wage rate rises faster than the actual wage (w = 1 ), hence the 
actual net marginal benefit grows faster than its shadow value, leading to the steeper slope of 
actual technological capability, relative to its shadow value. Once cr passes the value c r)^ , the 
wage rate becomes strictly greater than 1 , and technological capability recovers its underlying 
(concave and rising) shape.
Between crj^ 1 and cr™^ the wage rate is equal to 1 since demand for labour in industry 
X  is insufficient to clear the labour market. Thus, surplus labour is absorbed by industry Y. 
Employment in industry Y  is zero for values of a below and above Between these
values employment in industry Y  is increasing, reaches a maximum and then is decreasing. 
This behaviour reflects the pattern followed by the shadow wage rate. Similarly, employment 
in industry X  (Lx) equals the economy’s labour endowment minus employment in industry Y, 
and consequently exhibits reciprocal behaviour to employment in industry Y  (Ly): For values 
of a below alow1 and above , employment in industry X  is equal to the economy’s labour 
endowment. For a between c r f^  and cr^h , ^  1S decreasing, reaches a minimum and becomes 
increasing.
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The number of firms is not affected by whether the wage rate reaches its lower bound (see 
equation ??), and is merely shifted upwards by increasing P and 7 .
This completes the analysis of cases (a) and (b). We now present the corresponding graphs 
for cases (c) -w hen  P and 7  are high- and (d) -w hen P is high and 7  is low-. These can be 
seen in Figure 4.2b, below.
u
&
S*u
O
10
1  
8  H
P hiYu
PhiYhi
W,o W=1
u fiuru
arrH’=;
°Pur*
N+l
w
P hi Yhi
1
g
I PhiYhi
a
Figure 4.2b: The effect of a  when: (c) P and 7  are high and (d) P is high and 7  is low.
Figure 4.2b is very similar to Figure 4.2a. Continuous lines represent case (c), when P and 7  
are high (labelled P h il hi) and dashed thick lines refer to  case (d), when P is high and 7  is low 
(labelled Philio)- As before, dashed thin lines are the projection of the corresponding function, 
had the wage rate not reached its lower bound of 1: The ‘shadow’ value of the corresponding 
schedule.
In case (c), when P and 7  are high (continuous lines), technological capability achieves the 
lowest level for all parameter combinations, and -provided w  >  1 -  is increasing concavely in 
cr. Once w  =  1, technological capability becomes decreasing in cr, at a decreasing rate.
Why does technological capability exhibit such behaviour? On the one hand, when w  >  1 , 
technological capability rises at a decreasing rate with u  because as goods become closer 
substitutes a firm can capture an increasing market share by escalating its investment in 
technological capability. However as technological capability continues to  rise, the convexity of 
the fixed outlays function -F (.)-  implies that escalation becomes increasingly expensive. This
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explains the decreasing slope of technological capability.
On the other hand, when w = 1 and 7 is high (regardless of /?) we have that technological 
capability contracts at a decreasing rate. To see what is occurring in this case, note that the 
shadow wage rate continues decreasing. That the actual wage rate does not fall, but rather 
remains constant at a value of 1, implies that investment in technological capability becomes 
increasingly expensive relative to its shadow cost (which is associated with an increasingly lower 
shadow wage). Furthermore, a high value of 7 means that any reduction in profit inflicted on 
other firms by escalation of a firm is internalized to a great extent. These two effects combine 
to yield a contraction in technological capability as a grows.
The analysis in the previous paragraph is valid for any value of ft. Thus in the case when 
fi is low and 7 is high we observe the same pattern as in case (c) -when /3 and 7 are high. 
The only difference is that the technological capability schedule is shifted upwards. Moreover, 
other variables also exhibit similar behaviour in both cases. The case of ft low and 7 high will 
not be analyzed explicitly because, as was mentioned previously, the second order conditions 
may be violated. Moreover, this case does not provide any additional insights to those already 
presented.
In the bottom left diagram we see the number of firms. In case (c) the number of firms 
achieves the highest level of our four cases and decreases at a decreasing rate. On the other 
hand, the wage rate is at its lowest level and also falls at a decreasing rate until it reaches 
a value of 1, after which it remains constant9. The wage is falling because the increase in 
technological capability is not sufficient to offset the exit of firms, leading to a reduction in 
labour demand.
Employment is shown on the bottom right graph. So long as employment in industry X  
equals labour supply in the whole economy, the wage rate is strictly greater than 1. As soon as 
labour demand from industry X  falls short of the economy’s labour endowment, any surplus 
labour is employed by industry Y. This makes the wage rate constant at a value of 1 (which is 
the constant marginal product of labour in industry Y). In this case, employment in industry 
X  falls at a decreasing rate. Conversely, so long as industry X  generates sufficient employment 
opportunities, employment in industry Y  is zero. Otherwise it rises at a decreasing rate.
Case (d) -when fi is high and 7 is low- is qualitatively similar to case (b) -when and 7 
are low- and is shown in Figure 4.2b for completeness. The only difference lies in that since
9That in this case technological capability and the wage rate are a t their lowest levels, and that the number 
of firms is a t its highest level for all parameter configurations also follows from the analysis in sections 4.1 and 
4.2 in chapter 2.
142
now fS is higher, we find that it would take <r > 1 for the wage rate to return to levels above 
its lower bound of 1. Thus for admissible values of a, technological capability remains below 
its shadow value while the wage rate lies above its shadow value.
Let us focus on the technological capability graph in Figure 4.2b. What generates the
difference in the technological capability schedules once the wage rate reaches unity? As 
compared to the case when 7  is high (in which when w = 1 , technological capability falls), we 
now find that technological capability continues to increase (albeit below its shadow value). 
This is a consequence of the incentives that a high intensity of competition generates. When 
7  is low, the firm does not care much for its rivals’/partners’ profits. Hence as goods become 
closer substitutes, firms spend more on technological capability, to capture a greater share of 
the market.
Note that technological capability in case (d) is strictly greater than in case (c). Similarly, 
in case (d) the wage rate is (weakly) greater than in case (c). Accordingly, employment in 
industry X  is (weakly) higher in case (d) than in case (c). Consequently, employment in 
industry Y  in case (d) is (weakly) lower than in case (c). The number of firms, on the other 
hand, is strictly lower in case (d) than in case (c).
So long as w > 1 , the behaviour induced by increasing a  on technological capability and the
number of firms is similar in all four cases. This can be summarized as follows: Technological 
capability is increasing in <7 , at a decreasing rate (regardless of j3 and 7 ). The number of firms 
is decreasing in cr, at a decreasing rate (regardless of ft and 7 ).
The results discussed above and others are stated more precisely in the following proposition 
(which is completed in Appendix 3).
Proposition  cr: Effects o f a
Recall that cr £ (0,1).
a) W age ra te : Define a threshold 7 ™ to be the highest value of 7  such that for 7  ^  7 ™, 
^  > 0  holds for some a € (0 , 1 ).
If w > 1 and 7 ^ 7 ™ then w is ‘U’ shaped: As we increase a , w is strictly decreasing 
< 0), reaches a global minimum ( ^  =  0) and becomes strictly increasing ( ^  > 0). It 
follows that w is strictly convex in a: > 0. This corresponds to case (a), above.
Alternatively, if w =  1 for some cr £ (0,1), then define two thresholds: and
such that for aU a e  [ ^ 1 |7 <7 ">crS l7<7"]» w =  1 obtains. Provided 0 < ' 
a ^ 117^ 7  < cr^ “^ 7 ^ 7  < 1 , for cr < w is strictly decreasing and strictly convex
in cr ( ^  < 0, > 0). For <7 > w is strictly increasing and strictly convex in cr
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> 0). This corresponds to case (b).
For 7  > 7 ™, define a threshold Cru;=1 l7 >7 u’ such that for all cr ^  (Tw=1h>'rw ^ w = 1. For 
cr < cr1i,=1l7>7wj is strictly decreasing and strictly convex in a <  0, > 0). This case
corresponds to cases (c) and (d).
b) Technological capability: For w > 1 , we have that u is strictly increasing and strictly 
concave in <r: ^  > 0 , ^  < 0 .
When w =  1, u is strictly convex in cr: > 0. To consider the slope of u, let us define the
threshold 7 “ , such that l7=7« =  Then for 7  < 7 u, u is strictly increasing in a > 0) 
and for 7  > 7 “ , u is strictly decreasing in cr ( ^  < 0 ). 7 “ defines the cut-off for distinguishing
between a low or high 7 , in cases (b), (c) and (d). 
u  is kinked at the point where w becomes 1 .
c) N um ber o f firm s: N  +1 is strictly decreasing and strictly convex in a\ d ^  < 0,
q ^ x , .
d) W elfare: W  exhibits behavior similar to the wage rate (with different numerical values). 
However, when w =  1, W  becomes flatter, generating a kink in W . This change of slope occurs 
for the same reason as outlined in part (d) of Proposition 7 .
e) Em ploym ent in in d u s try  Y : Ly = 0 for w > 1 . If to =  1 then Ly > 0. In this case,
LiLy is strictly concave: < 0. To analyze the slope of Ly, use the threshold 7 ™ defined in
part (a) of this proposition. If w =  1 and 7 ^ 7 ™ then Ly is ‘IT shaped: As we increase cr,
&Tj &TjLy is strictly increasing {~q£- > 0 ), reaches a global maximum (-7^  =  0 ) and becomes strictly 
decreasing (-q£  < 0). This refers to cases (b) and (d).
dLIf w =  1 but 7  > 7 ™ then Ly is increasing in cr ( - ^  > 0) -this is case (c). As before 
Ly £ [0, L] in equilibrium.
f) Em ploym ent in in d u s try  X : Lx is equal to L — Ly. Thus its behavior is the opposite 
of Ly. Ly supplements Lx to use all of the available labour supply (given by L).
Proof: By inspection of the appropriate variables, their derivatives and associated thresholds■.
This completes the analysis of how the economy changes as we vary each of the parameters.
We now summarize some of the most important results of the model.
5 R em arks C oncerning G eneral Features o f th e  E x tended  M odel
In this section we re-take the remarks made in section 5 of chapter 2. In choosing a devel­
opment configuration, the wage rate is the outcome of the technological capability effect and 
the market structure effect. In the basic model with Cournot competition (chapter 2), two
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development configurations emerged: proliferation and high-tech. In the model with vary­
ing degrees of intensity of competition developed in this chapter, another possibility emerges: 
an intermediate configuration. The following proposition summarizes the changes required to 
extend Proposition 1 in chapter 2 to the current framework.
P roposition  1: D evelopm ent Configurations in A u ta rk y  w ith  A djustable In ten­
sity  of C om petition
A ‘high-tech’ configuration is associated with a higher wage rate (and welfare) than a 
‘proliferation’ configuration, unless:
(1) cr is low (for any fi and any 7 ). In this case a ‘proliferation’ configuration features a 
higher wage rate (and welfare).
(2) is high and 7  takes intermediate values (for any cr). In this case an in term ediate 
configuration with intermediate values for the number of firms and technological capability 
features a higher wage rate (and welfare).
Proof: By inspection of the equilibrium solution functions for technological capability, the 
number of firms and the wage rate in table 1 and Figures 4.1a-b and 4.2a-bB.
This proposition is based on the analysis in Section 4 of this chapter and chapter 2. In case 
(1 ), when cr is low, goods are poor substitutes and we observe an economy with many firms 
each with a low level of technological capability. This proliferation of technological trajectories 
is associated with a higher wage rate (and welfare). In case (2) we find that for high /? 
and intermediate 7  the economy exhibits an intermediate number of firms and technological 
capability. Since the wage rate is ‘D’-shaped, this will be associated with a higher wage rate 
(and welfare).
6  Conclusions
This chapter extends the closed economy model presented in chapter 2 by allowing for varying 
degrees of intensity of competition (7 ). The extension has allowed us to  analyze development 
configurations when competition is less intense than individual profit maximization. We de­
tailed the effects of changes in the intensity of competition in Proposition 7 . The main results 
are: If the elasticity of the fixed labour requirement (/?) is low, then technological capability 
and the wage rate decrease concavely in 7 , while the number of firms increases convexly in 7 . 
On the other hand, if j3 is high, the wage rate achieves a maximum for intermediate values of 
7 . This means that ‘more competition is better’ is only true when the industry features a low
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f3. When /? is high, there is an intermediate value of 7  which maximizes the wage rate (and 
welfare). These insights can serve as a positive and normative basis for competition policy, 
which is represented by the intensity of competition.
The extended model gives rise to a third development configuration in addition to those 
introduced in chapter 2 (proliferation and high-tech): An intermediate economy (Proposition 
1). This economy is characterized by high (3 and achieves a maximum wage rate for intermediate 
values of 7 . That is, some degree of collusion may be desirable if the economy is constrained 
to having a high elasticity of the fixed labour requirement (and the associated high marginal 
cost of technological capability). This is associated to intermediate values for technological 
capability and concentration.
A ‘replication argument’ similar to that introduced in chapter 2 can be made to extend the 
analysis to multiple industries, provided industries axe linked only via the demand for labour 
inputs (i.e., they have no demand or supply linkages).
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A ppendix 1: Solving th e  Final Stage Subgam e for Industry X
Let us solve the final stage subgame, in order to obtain a ‘solved-out’ payoff. The first order 
conditions for this stage are given by (equation 4.3):
(i
\ f  ,9 p k
- 7 T t  +  a ^ :x k + 7 N
=  0 for k = 1, N  +  1
x k = 1 - (l ~ 7 +  ]y) y - ' ui(2 +  oN )( 1 -  7 ) +  0 -7  uk2  [(2 - 0 0 ( 1  - 7 ) “  %]
Assuming symmetry between firms (such that ui = uk), x k simplifies to
(1 ~  7 Wx = 2 [(2 +  oN )(l -  7 ) +  0 -7 ] 
If we set 7  =  0 this expression becomes
u*
x  =
2 ( 2  +  ffN)
(Al.l)
Substituting inverse demand from (2.3) and its derivatives ( | |£  and | |£ )  into the first order 
condition yields
\  uV  '  N > U k w s u'
Add and subtract ( l — 7  +  and re-arrange (Al.l) to obtain
x k ( l - 7 K - ( l - 7  +  ^ ) 2 a E a l gt 
uk 2  [ ( 2  — <r)(l — 7 ) — 7 ^]
Summing (Al.2) over k, and solving for yields
^  ui 2 [(2 -|- a N )(l — 7 ) +  0 7 ]
Now substitute (Al.3) back into (Al.2). This yields the solution for x k, as follows
(Al.2)
(Al.3)
(A1.4)
(A1.4;)
(A1.47/)
which is expression (Al.47). Price (pk) can be solved by adding and subtracting 2o^$ to the 
inverse demand function (2.3) to obtain
o w+i
1 0 / 1  \ X k  2 ( 7  X lpk =  1 - 2(1 -  o') 2  V  —
ul  Uk ^  ui
(A1.5)
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Next we substitute Xk from (A1.4) and the expression in (A1.3) into pk, to obtain the following 
solution:
Pk =
/  _  o-y\ _  (1 — 7 ) ( 1 —7 — n ) c 'T"'
V 7  N )  (2 +  <riV)(l-7 ) +  <T7  uk (A1 .6 )
Assuming symmetry (that is, ui =  Uk), price simplifies to
l - 7 (l-<r)
V = (2 +  a N )(l -  7 ) +  0 -7  
Upon setting 7  =  0, p reduces further to:
1
(Ai.6 ')
p = (2 +  criV) (A1 .6 ")
which is equation (Al.6 ').
The solved-out payoff is obtained by multiplying (A1.4) and (A1.6), from which
TTfc =
1 - 7
2  [(2 — <t)(1 — 7 ) -  7 ^]
( 1 - 7  +  * ) *  '
Uk (2 +  o N )(l -  7 ) +  0 -7  S  ^ (A1.7)
( l  T g 7 WI 7  N )  k (2 + < rN )(l-y ) + cry
this is equation (4.4) in the text.
ui
A ppendix  2: Second o rder conditions for th e  Second Stage Subgam e
Differentiating the first order conditions (4.8) with respect to Uk to obtain the second order 
conditions yields the following
0 - 2
(A2.1)
Uq
where
H
(1 - 7 ) /  07 \  (1 —7 ) ( l ~ 7 ~w)*7
\  1  N )  (2 +  o N )(l  — 7 ) +  <^7
1 - (2 + crN)(l - 7 ) + 0 -7  
( l - 7 ) V ( l - 7 - ^ )  ( 1 - 7  + #)  
[(2 -  <j)(1 -  7 ) -  ^ ] 2 [(2 +  aN )( 1 -  7) +
(A2 .2 )
(A2.3)
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We analyze the second order conditions in the neighbourhood of the symmetric equilibrium. 
Upon substituting equations (4.29), (4.29), (4.27) and (4.25) into the second order condition 
(A2.1), we obtain a restriction in (/?,7 , <r)-space: The restriction implies that for the second 
order conditions to hold f3 cannot be too low (and f3 must be at least strictly greater than 2 
in all cases), 7  cannot be too high and a cannot be too high. This defines bounds on each of 
these parameters, for given values of the remaining parameters. If a parameter gets close to or 
crosses its bound, the others may compensate by moving inward and away from their bound, 
thereby ensuring that the second order conditions continue to hold.
This can be stated more formally by defining the bounds as follows. Let usoc  be the
highest value of a  such that for given values of (/?, 7 ) expression (A2.1) holds with equality, let
7 50C be the highest value of 7  such that for given values of (/?, a) expression (A2.1) holds with
equality and let f3so c  be the lowest value of (3 such that for given values of (7 , a) expression
(A2.1) holds with equality. We can operationalize the bounds by considering expression (A2.1)
with equality as defining implicit functions in (/?, 7 , <r)-space. Prom expression (A2.1) with
equality we can define (implicit) functions as follows: fiso c  =  B  (7 , <r) or <ysoc  =  r  (/?, er)
or <rso c  =  E (/?, 7 ), with the following properties (which obtain by direct application of the
implicit function theorem): - > 0 , > 0 , > 0 , d*^°C < 0 , > 0 ,
rso
W^ ^ < 0 .
A ppendix  3: A nalysis of O ther V ariables of In te rest
This Appendix continues the analysis of the effects of 7  and a for the remaining variables of 
the model, continuing with the same format as in Appendix 4 in chapter 2.
The remaining variables are:
g) P rice  of good X : p =  (equation A l.6 ', Appendix 1).
h) P rice-quality  ra tio  of good X : ^
i) P er-firm  o u tp u t of good X  (per-capita): x  =  2[(2+gN^i-7 )+(77i (equation Al.4', 
Appendix 1 ).
j )  In d u s try  o u tp u t o f good X  (per-capita): X  = (N  +  1) x  
k) Econom y o u tp u t o f good X i x  = L X
1) D em and for Good Y  (per-capita): Y  = w — (N  + l)p x  (equation 2.5).
r f
m) A ggregate D em and for G ood Y : T D — w L — (N  + l)s  J (equation 2.18). 
n) A ggregate Supply of G ood Y : T 5  =  Ly =  L — (N  +  l)e  ^ (equation 2.19).
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0) V alue added in in d u stry  X  (per-capita): V Ax =  (N  +  1 )px (see Appendix 3, 
chapter 2 ).
p) V alue added  in in d u stry  Y  (per-capita): VAy = LyfL  (see Appendix 3, chapter
2). Note that in equilibrium, this is the same as physical per-capita production of good Y . To 
see this, note that good Y  is the numeraire, so its price (q) has been set equal to 1, and sector 
Y  is assumed to use a 1:1  technology. Thus VAy — Y .
We proceed to complete the corresponding propositions.
P roposition  7 : Effects of 7  (continued)
g) P rice  o f good X: p is strictly increasing in 7  ( ^  > 0). To assess the concavity of p, 
let us define threshold levels ((3P, ap) such that =  0.
V /3=/P, <7=<7P
For <t < crp, p is strictly convex in 7  ( | ^  > 0), regardless of /?. For a  ^  <jp and /3 < (3P, 
p is strictly concave in 7  < 0). For a ^  ap and (3 ^  (3**, p has an inflection point at
7 p ( ^  =  0 ), is strictly convex for 7  <  7 P ( | ^  > 0 ) and is strictly concave for 7  > 7 p
< 0).
h) P rice-quality  ra tio  of good X: ^ is strictly increasing and strictly convex in 7 :
q£. q2 £
-5% > 0, > 0. Being a composite variable, it inherits its properties from p and u.
In particular, when a ^  ap and /3 ^  /3P, (i.e., p exhibits an inflection point, see part (g) of 
this proposition), 2  will become flatter at the inflection point.
Let us increase 7  for the case when (3 ^  (3U and a ^  au. In this case u has a sinusoidal 
shape (see part (b) of this proposition). As 7  increases £ will become flatter as u passes by its 
local minimum (approaching from the left) and steeper when u passes by its global maximum 
(also approaching from the left).
When w  becomes equal to 1, £ inherits any kinks from u, and it becomes flatter if u  
becomes steeper (and viceversa).
1) P er-firm  o u tp u t of good X  (per-capita): x  is strictly decreasing in 7  ( |^  < 0). 
To assess the concavity of x, consider the threshold levels (/3P, crp) (defined in part (g) of this 
proposition).
For a  < <tp, x  is strictly concave in 7  (|^§ < 0), for any /3. For a  ^  ap and j3 < j3P, x  
is strictly convex in 7  ( |^ f > 0). For a ^  up and (3 ^  (3P, x  has an inflection point at 7 P
(|^§ =  0 ), is strictly concave for 7  < 7 P (f^f < 0 ) and is strictly convex for 7  > 7 Pcn 7=7p 7
( f t  > 0)-
When w becomes 1 (see part (a) of this proposition), x  inherits the kinks in u, and falls at 
a faster rate.
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j )  Ind u stry  o u tp u t of good X  (per-capita): X  is strictly decreasing < 0) and 
concave ( ^ r  ^  0) in 7 - When w becomes 1, X  inherits the kink in u, and falls at a faster 
rate.
k) Econom y o u tp u t of good X : x, exhibits behavior identical to X ,  except that it is 
multiplied by L.
1) D em and for good Y  (per-capita): Y  has properties identical to Ly, and we refer the 
reader to Proposition 7 , part (e).
m) A ggregate D em and for G ood Y : YD, has the same properties as Y , but it is 
multiplied by L  (in equilibrium, T D =  Ly).
n) A ggregate Supply of G ood Y : T 5  =  Ly, always matches Y D in equilibrium, and 
thereby exhibits identical behavior.
o) Value added  in  in d u stry  X  (per-capita): V A X, exhibits behavior similar to w . 
The only difference is that when w =  1, V A x does not (like w) become flat at a value of 1. 
Instead it becomes steeper. To see this, note that the wage variation which occurs as 7  changes 
acts like a ‘buffer’ in attenuating the adjustment of sector X . Once the wage rate reaches its 
minimum value of 1 , the ‘buffer’ is exhausted and sector X  adjusts at a faster rate.
p) Value added  in  in d u stry  Y  (per-capita): VAy, has the same value as per-capita 
demand for good Y  and displays identical behavior.
Proof: By inspection of the appropriate variables, their derivatives and associated thresholds■.
P roposition  a: Effects o f a (continued)
g) P rice  of good X: p, is strictly increasing in a ( |£  > 0). To assess the concavity of p,
o2n
let us define a threshold level up, such that =  0. For a < ap, p is strictly convex in ad<T a=aP0?
> 0)’ For (7 > ap, p is strictly concave in a  ( |^ f < 0). To ensure that ap G (0,1), we need 
to specify thresholds (t?ou;, 7 high)  ^ w^ere 'flow 18 e^ast value of 7  such that 
and ~fhigh is the highest value of 7  such that = 0 .  For 7  < 7 jj^, ap ^  1 , i.e., p is
^~Yhigh
strictly convex in u (|^§ > 0) for a G (0,1). For 7  > 'fhigh> <JP ^  0, i.e., p is strictly concave in
<* ( S  < 0 ) for a e  (M)-
h) P rice-quality  ra tio  o f good X :  There exist two thresholds, J3p/U and yp/u, which 
divide the parameter space into four regions, as follows:
Region 1. For J3 < (3p/u and 7  < 7 p/u, J  is strictly decreasing and strictly convex: < 0,
a #  > °-
Region 2. For > (3p/u and 7  < 7 P//u, ^ is ‘U’-shaped: As 0  grows, £ is strictly decreasing
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(-q£ < 0 ), reaches a mioinmm and becomes strictly increasing ( -^  >  0 ). ^ is strictly convex
( 0 > o ) .
Region 3. For (3 < (3p/u and 7  > 7 p/u, £ is strictly increasing and strictly convex: > 0,
a #  > °-
/  /Region 4. For /? > /3P' U and 7  > 7 P' U, p is strictly increasing and strictly concave: > 0,
£ inherits its properties from p and u. Thus, it will exhibit a kink at the point where u 
has a kink, i.e., when w reaches its lower bound of 1 .
i) Per-firm  o u tp u t o f good X  (per-capita): x  is ‘fl’-shaped. As 7  rises, x  shifts 
downward and leftward. As /? rises, x  shifts downward and rightward. Accordingly, the section 
of x  corresponding to a  € (0 , 1 ) will exhibit non-monotonic behaviour, depending on whether 
the maximum of x  corresponds to a value of a within the interval (0 , 1 ).
Let us define the following thresholds:
•) 7Um 18 such that If „ = J  = °'
“) Thigh is 8ucl1 that If l^ * ^ , <r=0 = °-
iii) is such that f f  r=0 =  0 .
iv) Phigh is such tllat if  <.=1 = °-
These thresholds partition the parameter space into the following three regions.
Region 1. When 7  < 7 ^  or (3 > f3%igh, x  is strictly increasing in cr: > 0.
Region 2. When 7 < 7  < y£igh and < /? < (3%ighi x  is ‘fT-shaped in a\ At first x  is 
strictly increasing in cr (^ | > 0), reaches an interior maximum =  0 ), and becomes strictly 
decreasing in cr < 0 ).
Region 3: When 7  > 7 %igh or (3 < x  is strictly decreasing in <j \ ^  < 0.
x  is concave whenever w > 1 and convex whenever w =  1 , and exhibits a kink at the point 
when the wage rate becomes 1 .
j)  In d u s try  o u tp u t o f good X  (per-capita): X  is strictly convex in cr. To assess the 
slope of X ,  define thresholds ((3X , *yx ) such that =  0. Then for (3 < (3X and
7  < 7 * , X  is ‘U’-shaped in cr: It is strictly decreasing at first <  0), readies a minimum 
(££ =  0), and lastly becomes strictly increasing > 0)- Otherwise, X  is strictly decreasing 
« < 0 ).
k) Econom y o u tp u t o f good X : x  exhibits behavior identical to X ,  except that it is 
multiplied by L.
1) D em and for good Y  (per-capita): Y  has properties identical to Ly, and we refer the 
reader to Proposition <7 , part (e).
m ) A ggregate D em and for G ood Y : T D, has the same properties as Y , but it is 
multiplied by L  (in equilibrium, T D =  Ly).
n) A ggregate Supply o f G ood Y: Ts  = Ly, always matches T D in equihbrium, and 
thereby exhibits identical behavior.
o) Value added in  in d u s try  X  (per-capita): VA X, exhibits behavior similar to w . 
The only difference is that when w =  1, V A x does not (like w) become flat at a value of 1. 
Instead it becomes steeper. To see this, note that the wage variation which occurs as a changes 
acts like a ‘buffer’ in attenuating the adjustment of sector X . Once the wage rate reaches its 
minimum value of 1 , the ‘buffer’ is exhausted and sector X  adjusts at a faster rate.
p) Value added in  in d u s try  Y  (per-capita): VA y, has the same value as per-capita 
demand for good Y and displays identical behavior.
Proof: By inspection of the appropriate variables, their derivatives and associated thresholds■.
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Chapter 5
Collusion in General Equilibrium  
with Oligopolistic Interactions: 
Open Economy
1 In troduction
This chapter extends the open economy framework developed in chapter 3 by introducing ad­
justable intensity of competition (collusion or profit sharing). This is introduced by means of 
the same generalized profit function used in chapter 4. A firm’s objective is now a weighted 
average of the firm’s and its rivals’ profits. This allows us to encompass intensities of compe­
tition ranging from the benchmark individual profit maximization to perfect collusion (joint 
profit maximization). Alternatively, this chapter can be regarded as an extension of the closed 
economy with profit sharing developed in chapter 3, to an open economy setting.
We present a general equilibrium model of two economies, each with two industries. Each 
economy has the same structure to that presented in chapter 4. There is free trade in the goods 
market. Consumers choose between a homogeneous type Y  good and vertically differentiated 
type X  goods. Each consumer’s labour supply is constant, and has been set to 1 . Labour is 
assumed perfectly immobile between the economies, but perfectly mobile within each economy. 
Each country has a population of Li (i =  d, f )  consumers/workers. Labour demand stems 
from industries X  (denoted LXi in country i = d ,f)  and Y  (denoted Lyi in country i = d ,f). 
Labour is the only input. Consumers’ income is constituted by their wage payments, profits 
accruing from shares owned in firms, and an endowment of type Y  goods. We will see that, in 
equilibrium, profits are zero, so they drop out from the budget constraint.
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In industry X , firms play a three stage game. In stage 1 the entry decision is made, and 
a zero profit condition emerges. In stage 2, firms invest in technological capabilities (denoted 
u^), taking market structure as given. Investment in technological capability is a sunk cost 
which implies increasing returns to scale. Industry X  uses labour to generate technological 
capability (in the form of sunk costs). As before, we assume that variable costs are zero. In 
stage 3 firms choose quantities (#*), taking market structure and technological capabilities as 
given. In all stages the firm’s (generalized) profit function is a weighted average between its 
own profits and its rivals’.
Industry Y  uses a 1:1 technology with constant returns to scale. This technology implies 
that the output of industry Y  is equal to employment in that industry. Good Y  is treated 
as the numeraire, so its price is set to 1. The marginal product of labour in industry Y  is, 
therefore, equal to 1. This constitutes workers’ outside option, and establishes a minimum 
wage of unity.
A symmetric general equilibrium for the world economy is characterized. This features 
identical values for all variables in both economies, and a symmetric Sub-Game Perfect Nash 
Equilibrium in industry X .  The chapter provides an analysis of how the symmetric equilibrium 
changes as parameters vary. We find a separating surface which divides the parameter space 
into two areas: One in which trade is welfare improving, and another in which the gains-from- 
trade-theorem breaks down. The view that emerges is that each trade regime is optimal under 
certain circumstances. One of the contributions of this research is to provide a framework which 
allows a clear typification of thesei circumstances, with a precise set of predictions amenable to 
testing.
We also performed an exercise where we allow the economies’ initial conditions to differ and 
then to ask whether catching-up is feasible and welfare-enhancing. The procedure is identical to 
that followed in section 5 of chapter 3: We start from a symmetric equilibrium, and then allow 
initial conditions to differ between the economies while tracking the new (general) equilibrium 
solutions (which are no longer symmetric). The asymmetry in initial conditions generates 
asymmetry between the economies’ wage rates, and we end up with an advanced (high-wage) 
economy and a backward (low-wage) economy. The economy with better initial conditions 
becomes the leader. In this exercise we find that under certain circumstances, the advanced 
economy may attain a higher wage rate by engaging in free trade, while the backward economy 
would achieve higher income by remaining in autarky. This raises the issue of (unfair) trade 
negotiations, in which a powerful country may coerce other (less powerful) nations into trade 
regimes that decrease their welfare. Regarding catching-up in wage rates, we found that it is
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always feasible and welfare-enhancing. Thus, the results are identical to those in chapter 3, 
and we refer the reader to section 5 of that chapter for further details.
In considering trade policy, we come across results about the trade balance. On the one 
hand, we find that there is intra-industry trade in all circumstances. On the other hand, 
inter-industry trade is only present when there are asymmetric initial conditions, and takes 
the following form: The high wage (advanced) economy will be a net exporter of type X  goods 
and a net importer of type Y  goods. The reverse holds for the low wage (backward) economy. 
This inter-industry trade pattern may require that the backward economy satisfy the high wage 
economy’s demand for type Y  goods by depleting its endowment of this kind of good, since its 
production of this good will not be sufficient to meet demand by the advanced economy (in 
parallel with the backward economy’s own thirst for imported type X  goods).
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2 we develop the model. In Section 3 we 
characterize a symmetric general equilibrium. Section 4 presents an analysis of the comparative 
statics properties of the symmetric general equilibrium. Here we analyze how the equilibrium 
solutions change as we vary parameters (one at a time), assuming that all parameters are 
identical in both economies. This section focusses on what happens when both economies face 
identical changes in their structural/institutional characteristics. Section 5 presents results on 
the existence and properties of the separating surface, and policy implications are addressed. 
We conclude in Section 6 .
2 The O pen Econom y G eneral Equilibrium  M odel w ith  Profit Sharing
The treatment of the consumer’s problem, the labour market and industry Y  are identical to 
that presented in chapter 3, and need not be repeated. We will, however, invoke the equations 
presented in that chapter.
Industry X
The structure of the game is the same as in previous chapters. To model the ‘intensity of 
competition’, firms maximize a generalized objective function, which includes, as well as firm’s 
own profit, their local rivals’ (partners’). Thus we have two groups of firms (cartels) which 
embark upon profit sharing agreements: A domestic cartel and a foreign one.
That all local firms are members of a cartel internalizes the effect that a firm’s actions 
has on its local rivals’ payoffs. However, since cartels are constituted only by local firms, the 
effect of a firm’s actions on its overseas rivals is not internalized. As in chapter 4, we will vary
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the ‘intensity of competition’ by changing a parameter (to be labelled *7 d’ for the domestic 
economy, and ‘7 ^’ for the foreign economy).
Recall the two notions of symmetry introduced in chapter 3. First, we have symmetry
within each economy, but not necessarily across economies. Second, we have symmetry within
and across economies. For symmetry across economies parameters must take the same value 
in both nations. We label this a symmetric (general) equilibrium.
Backward inducting to find a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, we proceed to the de­
scription and solution of the final stage in the firms’ decision problem.
2.1 Stage 3: Q uantity C om petition w ith Profit Sharing
In stage three we seek a symmetric Nash Equilibrium in quantities, taking technological capa­
bility and market structure as given. Gross (per-consumer) profits of firm k in country i are 
defined as
TTfci =  PkiXki for i = d, f  (5.1)
The firm’s objective is now
(1 -  7 4)7rjbi +  7 47f_w for i = d, f  (5.2)
where:
7Tjigi denotes firm k ’s gross profits per consumer, located in economy i = d, f .  
n~ki is the average of gross (per-consumer) profits of firm fc’s (local) rivals, located in 
economy i = d, f  (7f_w =  —****■*).
7* ^ ni+ll 13 in e^nsity of the competition parameter in economy i = d, / .  An 
extensive discussion of the meaning of 7  was offered in chapter 4, section 2.2.1.
Firms maximize their objective (5.2) by choosing xm , with the following first order condi­
tions:
(1 - 7 i) (pki +  ^ - ^ X k i)  +  7 t 9Xki * = 0  for i = d, f  and k =  1 ,.. .,n{ +  1 (5.3)
\  OXk i  J  Ui
In Appendix 1 , a symmetric Nash equilibrium is obtained by solving the system in (5.3). We 
obtain solutions for vectors x d and xy in terms of market structure ( n d + 1  and n f  + 1 ) and the 
vectors of technological capabilities (U d and U /). Substituting these into the firm’s objective
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we obtain the solved-out payoff, given by (see Appendix 1 for details)
ww(U) = l ~ 7 iKi
n»+l n5+l
u ki B i  ^  ^ Un Q  ^  ^ U ij 
1 = 1  1 = 1
, - v  n i + 1  « i + l
(1 -  7( — ~  j  Uki  -  D {  Y ' U u - E i Y j U l J  
'  ^  '  1=1 1=1
for i, j  =  <2, /  and i ^  j
(5.4)
where:
Ki
Bi
Ci
=  2 ( l - 7 j) ( 2 - < r ) - ^ i
Tli
=  J  ( ( 1  -  7 i) [(2 -  a) -  27 j ( l  -  £r)] +  ^  [2 +  £m( -  7j (2 -  ct +  o th )])
(1 - .7 ,) (1 — 7i) (2 — f)  — rii (5.5)
Di = 
Ei =
A =
a_ ^  ^  I (1 -  7f) [(2 -  cr) -  27 / ( l  -  cr)]
A 7t - S { 2 + £ r [nj ( 1 _ a ) _<Tl _ ^ ( 1 _<7 ) l2+<7(nJ +  1)]}
(1  -  7 J  ( 2  — a) —£7in*
[ (1  -  7 d) ( 2  +  <rnd )  + 7 da] [(l -  7 /) ( 2  +  an /)  +  7 / a] 
- a 2 (1  -  7d) ( n d  +  ! ) ( ! -  7 / )  (™/ +  1)
Gross profit of the kth firm in country i is given by (Ld +  L /)7Tfcf(u). Assuming firms choose 
a symmetric quality level within each country (denoted by u d  and U f ) ,  we obtain a simplified 
expression for the payoffs
^  ^  -  -B* (n* +  1 ) -  Q  (r i j  +  1) ^
Upon setting 7 d =  7 /  =  0, this expression reduces to
1 -  7 j -  —  -  Di (nj + 1 )  -  Et (nj + 1 )  ^Tli Ui
(5.6)
_  ui r .  _
* 2 ( 2  -  <t) 2 i 2 +  a  (ni +  rij +  1)
Ua(n, +  l) +  (n/ +  l ) U^i for i, j  =  d, f  and i ^  j  
(5.7)
which is expression (3.10). Moreover, upon setting ud = Uf =  u and noting that N  +  1 =  
nd 4 - r i f  +  2 , the above expression simplifies to
u
7T =
2(2 +  criV) 2
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which is expression (2.9).
2.2 Stage 2: C om petition  in Technological Capability w ith  Profit Sharing
In stage two, firms invest in technological capability, taking as given their rivals’ technological 
capabilities (domestic and foreign) and the number of firms (domestic and overseas). The 
investment is sunk, and materializes through a fixed outlays function, F(.). Net profit for firm 
k in country i is given by
IIjw =  (Ld +  Lf ) 7rfci(U) -  F(ukh Wi) for i = d, f  (5.8)
where Li stands for population size in economy i, 7Tfc*(U) is the solved-out gross per-capita 
profit function for firm k in country i (equation 5.4) and F(uki, Wi) is the fixed outlays function: 
F(uki,Wi) =  Wi f(u k i), where W{ is the wage rate prevailing in country i, and f ( u ki) =  
£i is firm ife’s labour requirement to achieve a technological capability of uki. As before,
assume Pi > 2 (required for the second order conditions to hold), £i > 0 , and uki > Uoi ^  1 . 
The firm’s objective is given by
(1  -  7 i)IIfci +  7 jII_fci for i =  d, f  (5.9)
where 11*;* is net profit for the kth firm and EL** is the average net profits of firm fc’s local
J2ni n hi
rivals: —^ — -. Firm k maximizes the objective in equation (5.9) by choosing uki. The first 
order conditions are as follows
(1 -  7.) ( L *  +  L f ) ^  +  I ( L d  + L f ) £ ^  = (1 -  7j) ^  f  (5.10) 
ouki nt h&s M \ uoi J
for i =  d, f  and k =  1 ,..., n* + 1  
where and are taken using (5.4) to yield the following:d u j e i  d U f f i
diTki _  1 — 7t f  (Ufci — E r d 1 UU ~ C i  “  7t ~  ~nt ~
^  1 +  [ ( l  -  -  S ? ) u ki  -  D i  5 3 S 1 «« -  E * E Z i 1««] (1 -  Bi)
for i, j  = d, f  and i ±  j
(5.11)
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dnhi
duki
1 - 7  j
Ki
(«M -  A E S !1 “« -  ° i  E w 1 “«) A  
+  [(I -  7i -  “ ) «M -  A  EHtf1 «H -  A  E K t1 «u
for i, j  = d, f  and i ^  j
Bi
(5.12)
A Nash equilibrium is constituted by technological capabilities which solve the system in (5.10). 
Assuming a symmetric equilibrium within each economy (with uu =  Uki = Ui) the first order 
conditions can be written as follows
1 -  B{ (n* +  1) -  C* (nj +  1) —Ui ( i - l i - ^ - A )  (1 -  7 i) -  7 iA (5.13)
K,
-WiSiPi-
(Ld +  L f )
Upon setting 7 * =  0, this expression simplifies to
{ -
for i = d, f
(Ld 4- Lf)  [2 +  c  (n* +  nj)\
(2 -  a)2 [2 + a (ni + rij + 1)] 2 +  <r (n* +  nj  +  1) (n* + 1 ) 4-
(5.14)
/54- 2U-=  WiEiPi —^3 for i, j  =  d, /  and i ^  j  
u j
which is expression (3.14). It can be shown that Proposition 1 from chapter 3 still holds for 
7 * > 0: The net marginal benefit in the first order conditions (5.13) is decreasing in the ratio 
Ui/uj. Second order conditions for this stage are discussed in Appendix 2.
2.3 Stage 1: T he E ntry D ecision w ith Profit Sharing
Assume there is a large number of potential entrants. Firms enter until net profits are zero. 
Thus we have the following ffee-entry condition
(1  -  7 i)Ylki +  7 in -fci > 0  for i = d, f (5.15)
where 11** represents net profit, as defined in (5.8), and II_** represents average net profits 
of firm k's local rivals: —^ I n  equilibrium, ignoring integer effects, entry occurs until 
condition (5.15) holds with equality. Moreover, in a symmetric equilibrium condition (5.15) 
reduces to
11* ^  0 for i =  d, /  (5.16)
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where lit denotes the symmetric level of net profits for each firm in country i. Equation (5.16) 
holds with equality in equilibrium, thus it can be written as
(Ld + Lf)  7Ti =  W{£i I  —  ) for i =  d, /  
\ U o i  J
(5.17)
Substituting gross profits for a symmetric equilibrium within each economy (7r*} from equation 
5.6), we can rewrite this as follows
( 1  — Ti) ( 1 — Bi (n i +  1 ) -  Q  ( n j  +  1 ) —
Ui
1 ~ 7 i ~  —  ~  ^  (ni +  1) -  Ei (nj + 1 )Tli Ui
(5.18)
=  ( I  + L  \ w<ei~L$~  for *’ j  = d, f  and i ^  j
■' Uoi
If we set =  0, condition (5.18) reduces to the condition set out in expression (3.17):
( L d  +  L f )  (  _  
2(2 - a Y  I 1 2 +  cr (ni +  nj +  1) (ni + 1 ) +  (nj +  1 )
U j ] V  <<
—  > =  Wi £4 —
P i - 2
Ui J J { i 1 p for i =  d, fu
This completes the description of the first stage of the game played by firms in industry X .  
We now characterize a symmetric general equilibrium for the world economy.
3 Characterization o f  a Sym m etric General Equilibrium  O utcom e
Consider a symmetric equilibrium within each economy, with Uki = uu =  Ui, i =  d ,f.  We 
first specify the equilibrium conditions, and then obtain solutions for a symmetric equilibrium 
across both economies, with identical parameters values in both nations (/?* =  {3, 7  ^ =  7 , 
£i = £, Li = L, Uoi =  u0 for i =  d, /) ,  and identical technological capability (ud = Uf =  u), 
number of firms (nd = n f  = n) and wage rate (wd = Wf = w).
A general equilibrium is characterized by the functions ^ ( ^ , 7 ^(7 , ^ , ^ , ^ ) ,  
ni((3i, ~fi, a , £i, Li, Uoi) and Wi(^i}Ji, cr, £i, Li, Uoi), for which explicit solutions can be found in a 
symmetric equilibrium. We write Ui(.) for Ui(P{, 7 ,^ cr, £{, Li, Uoi), n,(.) for rn(Pi, 7 ^ a, £i, Li,Uoi) 
and Wi(.) for Wi(^i,^i,cr, £i, Li,Uoi). The definition of a symmetric (general) equilibrium is the 
same as in chapter 3. We now set out the equilibrium conditions and then use these to seek a 
symmetric equilibrium.
Equilibrium  Conditions:
Six conditions characterize the general equilibrium of the world economy (three for each
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country), as well as the standard market clearing conditions for goods X  and Y.  The conditions 
are stated for a symmetric equilibrium within each economy.
The first condition is defined by the first order conditions for technological capability (given 
by 5.10). For a symmetric equilibrium within each economy it can be written as (5.13):
( l - 7i — ~ ~ )  - A ( n i +  l ) - . E i (ry +  l ) ^ [ (1  — Bi) ( 1  — 7 () — +
U i
1 -  Bi (rii +  1) -  Ci (nj +  1) —Ui (5.19)
Ki ■WiEiP, u
P i - 2  
ki___
11 % oi(Ld +  Lf)
The next condition corresponds to free entry, from (5.18):
for i = d, f
(1 -  7i) ( l  -  Bi  (n< + 1 )  -  Ci (rij + 1 ) l - ' ) i -  —  - D i (m + l ) - E i ( n j  + l ) ? iTli TL{
U i
(5.20)
Ki
(Ld +  L f ) Wi£i'
u.Pi~2 for z, j  =  d, f  and i j=- j
The third condition is labour market clearing, from (3.19). After substituting LX{ from (3.18), 
we obtain the same condition as in chapter 3:
Li — Lyi -f- Lxi — Lyi -f- (fii -j- l)s» ( | for i — d, f
\ uoiJ
(5.21)
Market clearing for type Y  and type X  goods in world markets holds by construction. These 
conditions pin down the general equilibrium outcomes for technological capability (ud, u/) ,  
the number of firms (nd + 1, n /  +  1) and the wage rate (wd) w/) .  We set out to find explicit 
solutions in a symmetric equilibrium across both countries. If all parameters take the same 
values in both economies and ud — Uf =  u , nd =  n f  =  n  and wd =  Wf =  w,  we can solve for 
the following expression for u  from (5.19),
“ = < ^ J
Luo
(5.22)
162
where
J  =
8 (1 -  7)4 -  2cr2 (1 -  7) { £  (3 -  27) +  2n (1 -  7)2 (1 -  37) +  7 [3 -  7 (7 -  47)]} 
+4(7 (1 -  7)3 (2n  -  1) (1 -  7 +  g) -  j a 3 {(1 -  7) [2n -  1 -  27 (3 -  27) (n -  1)] +  g }
[(2 -  <r)(l -  7) +  (7 7 ] [(2 -  (7 ) (1  -  7) -  2g] [2 +  u (2n  +  1) -  2 7  +  1)]'
(5.23)
Setting 7 =  0  and n =  expression (5.22) simplifies to
u  = 2Lug 2 +  g(JV -  1) we(3 (2 — a)(2 +  a N )2
10-2
This is equation (2.26), with twice the size of the market (2L  instead of L). Now use condition
(5.20) to solve for the number of firms. In a symmetric equilibrium, we have
L ( l - 7 ) [1 - 7 (1 - a ) ]  _  ufi 2
[2 +  (7 (2 n + 1 ) — 2 7  (an +  1 )]J
=  we- (5.24)
Uo
To solve for n, substitute u  from (5.22) into (5.24). This yields the equilibrium number of 
firms:
Z _ L  7  *
(5.25)Z  + Zn + 1 =  < - - + 14ct(1 — 7  )Z*
where
Z  =
\
Z * 2 +  S'ya2Z** { (1 -  7)
Z* = ( 1 - 7 )
4 ( 1 -  j )2 +  2 7 a  (3 -  2 7 ) 
- £ [ 1 - 7 (1 -  a)] [2 -  (7 -  2 7  (1 -  a)\
£ (2 — a) [1 -  7  (1 — (7 )] [2 — (7 — 2 7  (1 -  a)]
—8(1 — 7 ) 2 +  4c(l — 7 ) (1 — 3 7 ) +  2^a2 (3 — 4 7 )
Z "  =  [2 -  7 ( 2  -  a)] [2 -  (7 -  27  (1 -  *)]
+  7(72|  (5.26)
— 7(73 (l — 67 +  472)
(5.27)
(5.28)
Setting 7 =  0  and noting that n  =  , the number of entrants can be written as follows
w . v z m z * ) + 1
2 cr
which is equation (2.27), from which we can see that concentration does not change whether 
we consider a single economy in autarky, or a two country world.
Substituting n  +  1 from (5.25) into (5.22) yields the (symmetric) equilibrium level of tech-
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nological capability, as a function of exogenous parameters and the wage:
« =  f  ^ d - 7 ) [ l - 7 ( l - ^ ) I ( S - ) M *  (5.29)
|  we [Z *** +Z] J
where Z  and Z** were defined in (5.26) and (5.28), respectively, and
I /? ( 2  — cr) [1 — 7  (1  — cr)l [2 — (7 — 2 7 ( 1  — O’)] 1 ,
Z*** = ( l - j ) {  I _ 7 (73 ^ _ 2 7 (5_27)]
+8(1 -  7)2 +  4cr(l -  7) (1 +  3 7 ) -  2 <r2 (2 -  7y)
If 7  =  0, equation (5.29) simplifies to
Uo L  1
(5.30)
1
u =
which is equation (3.30).
This completes the characterization of a symmetric Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in 
industry X . We now determine the equilibrium wage rate, to look for a general equilibrium. 
For this, use the labour market clearing condition (5.21). In a symmetric equilibrium, this 
simplifies as follows
L  =  Ly +  (n +  l)e I —  J (5.31)
To solve for the wage rate, substitute (5.29) into (5.31) and solve for w. We obtain the following
w =  max / l ,  ^ ( f ) j ( n + j ) V 4  (5.32)
where J  was defined in (5.23) and n in (5.25). To finish the characterization we need to solve
for the general equilibrium level of technological capability, which is obtained by substituting 
the solution for the wage rate (5.32) into equation (5.29). The general equilibrium number of 
firms is readily given by equation (5.25), for which no further substitutions are necessary. This 
completes the characterization of an open economy symmetric general equilibrium with profit 
sharing. The symmetric general equilibrium solutions for the open economy are presented in 
the following table, where J  is defined in (5.23) and Z, Z*, Z** and Z*** in (5.26), (5.27), 
(5.28), (5.30), respectively:
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-2
w =  max
4Lug d-^i-ra-g)]^**)21 T=*u = tl/£
n + 1 =  + 1
Table 1: Symmetric General Equilibrium Outcomes for the Open Economy with 7  > 0.
The question of existence of asymmetric equilibria also arises in this framework, and it 
can be shown that the same non-existence result developed in Proposition 2, chapter 3, goes 
through in this more general case. Similarly, provided one is willing to accept that the zero 
profit conditions hold with equality for each firm, this proposition can be extended to rule out 
all types of asymmetric equilibria. In the next section we analyze how the economy reacts to 
changes in parameter values.
4 Analysis of the Symmetric Equilibrium
In this section we analyze how the key variables in the model change as we vary the parameters 
of the system. In this exercise, we start from a situation in which both economies have identical 
parameter values, and the world economy is located at the symmetric equilibrium characterized 
in section 3 (table 1). We then vary each parameter, ceteris paribus, such that the change in 
parameters is identical between the two economies, that is, we impose the restriction that 
fii =  /?, =  7 , £{ = e, L{ =  L, =  uo (for i = d, f )  while cr is always identical for both
economies.
This is an interesting exercise because it allows us to see what happens when a particular 
parameter (which has the same value in both economies) is changing at the same rate on a 
worldwide basis: Starting from identical parameter values, we change the relevant parameter 
by the same magnitude simultaneously in both economies.
The analysis will focus more incisively on how open economy results compare with those 
for the closed economy (which was developed in chapter 4). In the symmetric equilibrium with 
identical parameter values we find that welfare (Wi) exhibits qualitatively similar behaviour to 
the wage rate, thus it will be particularly interesting to study how the wage rate in the open 
economy fares against that of the closed ieconomy. We concentrate on parameter values for 
which the wage rate is strictly greater than 1 .
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The comparison between the closed and open economies allows us to answer one of the 
fundamental questions of this study: Is it always welfare improving to open the economy? If 
not, under what conditions will trade lead to higher welfare? After we analyze the different 
parameter changes, we will be in a position to answer these questions.
We present the analysis w ith the aid of similar figures to those used in chapter 3, section 4. 
Open economy variables are shown as continuous lines and closed economy variables as dotted  
lines. In the horizontal axes we show the parameter in question. The top left graph shows 
technological capability (u). The bottom  left graph shows the number of firms (n 4 - 1). The 
top right graph depicts the wage rate (w ) and exports and imports of type X  goods are shown 
in the bottom  right diagram.
4.1 The effect of changing /3
We present the main results in Figure 4.1.
P
n+1 X r
T B = T B = T B = 0
Open Closed
Figure 4.1: The effect of (3 in the symmetric equilibrium
In Figure 4.1, technological capability decreases convexly, and the open economy schedule lies 
above the autarky schedule. Conversely, the number of firms increases convexly, with more 
firms under autarky. This reflects the fact that in the symmetric equilibrium for the open
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economy each country features half of the total number of firms, whereas the closed economy 
contains the total number of firms. In the limit, as 7  converges to zero, we find that the 
worldwide number of firms in the open economy is exactly the same as the total number of 
firms in the closed economy, thus for 7  =  0 we have n +  1 =  : The number of firms in
each country is half the number of firms in the closed economy (this result was initially found 
in chapter 3). This can only occur if (indeed, it is a reflection of the fact that) technological 
capability is higher in each of the open economies relative to the closed economy.
The demand for labour from industry X  determines the wage rate. Although the number of 
firms is higher in autarky, technological capability is lower. The two effects result in a stronger 
demand for labour in the open economy for values of /? < /?c~°, where /?c~° is a threshold level 
of (3 defined by the wage rate in the open economy being equal to the wage rate in the closed 
economy. For values of j3 > (3C~° we have the opposite result.
The crossing of the wage schedules is generated by the following behaviour. As /3 falls, 
technological capability rises at a faster rate in the open economy, while the number of firms 
falls at a slower rate in the open economy. This combination ensures that the wage rate of the 
open economy rises at a faster rate as /? falls, which implies an eventual crossing of the two 
schedules. This is a result that will also hold for changes in 7  and cr, and in it lies the answer 
to the question: Under what conditions is it welfare improving to open the economy? We will 
be in a position to propose a full answer to this question once we have completed the analysis 
of the remaining parameters for the symmetric equilibrium.
Now we ask: Why does technological capability rise at a faster rate as (3 falls in the open 
economy? The answer to this question lies in the fact that the profit-sharing scheme occurs 
only between local firms, and not between local and overseas firms. Since firms only internalize 
the consequences of their escalation on their local rivals, there is an ‘overseas market stealing’ 
effect which strengthens the incentive to escalate for the local firms: Local firms do not care 
about the losses inflicted upon their overseas rivals through their escalation. Of course, this 
argument also applies to the other economy. Thus in a symmetric equilibrium both countries 
exhibit technological capability which is not only higher in the open economy relative to the 
closed economy, but also rises faster.
In the bottom right graph, we can observe that imports and exports take the same value, 
so trade is balanced for industry X . Likewise, trade is also balanced for industry Y, implying 
a zero trade balance overall. This result is specific to the symmetric equilibrium, and breaks 
down in the case of asymmetric parameters. Budget balancedness implies that exports and 
imports follow the same pattern as the wage rate, and the model exhibits intra-industry trade
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in equilibrium.
4.2 The effect o f changing 7
In considering the effect of 7 , two cases need to be distinguished:
a) W hen either (3 or a  are low.
b) W hen f3 and a  are high.
We present the main results in Figures 4.2a and 4.2b. In Figure 4.2a we present techno­
logical capability (u), the number of firms (n +  1 ), the wage rate (w) and exports and imports 
of goods of type X  as functions of 7 . The open economy is represented by continuous lines, 
while the closed economy is shown as dotted lines.
r
n+1
X = M r
....
T B = T B = T B = 0
7
Open  1 Closed
Figure 4.2a: The effect of 7  in the symmetric equilibrium, when either /3 or a  are low.
Technological capability decreases concavely in 7 , and is higher in the open economy. The 
number of firms is increasing convexly in 7 , and is lower in the open economy. Regarding 
the wage rate, we saw (chapter 4, section 4.1) that the autarky wage in case (a) exhibits two 
patterns of behaviour, which we have reproduced in Figure 4.2a:
(a .l)  For /? low, we find that the closed economy wage is decreasing and concave.
(a.2) For (3 high and cr low we find that it is ‘f l’-shaped.
168
On the other hand, the open economy wage exhibits the same pattern in both scenarios: 
It is decreasing concavely in 7 , and is lower when (3 is high and c  low. In both sub-cases (a .l 
and a.2 ) the closed economy wage rate crosses its open economy counterpart, at and at 
^C0h° i^o ’ resPectively' Above these thresholds, the closed economy exhibits a higher wage rate. 
The crossing of the wage schedules responds to  mechanisms similar to those discussed when 
analyzing the effect of changing (3 (see section 4.1).
We have also presented the schedules corresponding to subcases (a .l)  and (a.2) for the other 
variables. It is clear that technological capability, the number of firms and exports are also 
affected. However these do not change their shape in these two subcases, and all that occurs 
is a shift of the corresponding schedules. In particular technological capability and exports are 
lower when (3 is high and a  low, while the number of firms is higher.
Finally, exports and imports of type X  goods exhibit similar behaviour to  the open economy 
wage rate, and there is intra-industry trade.
As mentioned previously, when 7  converges to zero the number of firms in any of the open 
economies converges to half of the number of firms in the closed economy.
We now present the corresponding graph for case (b): W hen (3 and <j  axe high.
Y
n+1
lim{n+l)=^{r’A +l)7-+0 2
X = M r
T B = T B = T B = 0
Y Y
O p e n   Closed
Figure 4.2b: The effect of 7  in the symmetric equilibrium, when f3 and a  are high 
The analysis of Figure 4.2b is similar to that presented in section 4.2, chapter 4. Note that
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technological capability is higher in the open economy relative to the closed economy, while the 
number of firms is correspondingly lower. The wage schedule for the open economy is initially 
above that for the closed economy, until they cross at l°p°.ahi• We also observe intra-industry 
trade.
4.3 The effect of changing a
The following figure summarizes the results.
Others"'7*
a
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x X = M r
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XW T B = T B = T B = 0
a
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n+1
vioi
cr
O p e n   C lo se d .................
Figure 4.3: The effect of cr in the symmetric equilibrium
We consider two cases:
(a) When (3 and 7  are very low (labelled Pvi0^vi0)-
(b) Other parameter combinations (labelled ‘O th e rs’).
In both cases, technological capability increases concavely, and is higher in the open econ­
omy. The number of firms decreases convexly and is lower in the open economy. Exports and 
imports of type X  goods are equal, and they track the open economy wage rate. Technological 
capability, the number of firms and exports do not change their shape in the two cases and all 
that occurs is a shift of the corresponding schedules. More specifically, technological capability
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and exports (imports) are higher when (5 and 7  are very low, while the number of firms is 
lower.
In both cases the open economy wage rate decreases convexly in cr, and is higher in case 
(a). The closed economy wage rate decreases convexly for case (b) and is ‘U’-shaped when /? 
and 7  are very low. The open and closed economy wage schedules cross at l in case
(a), and at (^others case O3)- For cr <  cr^~°7 j in case (a), and cr <  crCQ^ers in case (b), the 
open economy wage rate is higher, while for values of a  above the respective threshold, it is 
the closed economy which exhibits the higher wage.
4.4 The effect of changing e
In analyzing the effect of e we need to consider the underlying values of /?, 7  and a. These 
will affect whether the wage rate in the open economy lies above or below that of the closed 
economy. However, the qualitative pattern followed by technological capability, the number 
of firms and exports and imports of type X  goods with respect to  e is invariant with respect 
to  / ? , 7  or a  (although these schedules will of course shift in accordance with the analysis of 
sections 4.1-4.3). We present the results in the following figure.
w
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Figure 4.4: The effect of e in the symmetric equilibrium  
In Figure 4.4 technological capability, the wage schedule, and exports and imports of type
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X  goods decrease convexly in e, while the number of firms is invariant with respect to e. 
Technological capability is higher in the open economy, while the number of firms is lower. 
The wage rate is higher in the open economy for all values of e when /?, 7  and cr are sufficiently 
low. Conversely, when /?, 7  and a  are sufficiently high, we find that the wage rate is higher for 
the closed economy, for all values of e.
4.5 The effect of changing no
Figure 4.5 depicts the effect of changing no (the effect of which is the same as changing 1/e).
n+1
w,1 'o
X = M r
T B = T B = T B = 0
u,1 'o
Open  Closed
Figure 4.5: The effect of no in the symmetric equilibrium
In figure 4.5 technological capability increases linearly in no, and it is higher in the open 
economy. The number of firms is invariant in no, and it is lower in the open economy (relative 
to autarky). The wage rate is rising convexly in no. This results from the convexity of the 
labour requirement, f (u )  =  £ . For /?, 7  and a  sufficiently low, we find that the open
economy features a higher wage rate, while for ^ , 7  and cr sufficiently high it is the closed 
economy wage rate that is higher. Export and imports of type X  goods rise convexly in no, 
following the wage rate.
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4.6 The effect of changing L
The effect of changing L  is shown in the following figure.
O p e n   Closed
Figure 4.6: The effect of L in the symmetric equilibrium
Figure 4.6 shows that technological capability, the wage rate, and exports and imports of type 
X  goods rise concavely in L. Meanwhile, the number of firms is unchanged. Technological 
capability is lower in autarky, and the number of firms is higher. For / ? , 7  and a  sufficiently 
low the wage rate is higher in the open economy. Instead for /?, 7  and a  sufficiently high, the 
wage rate is higher in the closed economy.
5 On Free Trade Versus A utarky
In section 4, we saw that the wage schedules for the open and closed economies exhibit a 
crossing as we vary /?, 7  or <7 . Pursuing this notion further, we come across one of the main 
results of this study, which is summarized in the following proposition. The analysis that 
follows refers to  the case of wage rates strictly above unity.
Proposition 1: Existence and properties of a  separating  surface for the  sym­
m etric equilibrium  betw een the  open and closed economy wage rates.
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There exists a separating surface in (/3, 7, cr)-space along which the wage rate for the open 
economy is equal to the wage rate of the closed economy. In the region of (/?, 7, <x)-space lying 
above the surface, the wage for the open economy is strictly less than the wage for the closed 
economy. Conversely, in the region lying beneath the surface, the open economy wage is strictly 
greater than the closed economy wage.
The separating surface can be represented as a function a =  s(/3,7), with the following 
properties:
(i) Slope w ith  respect to  7: Define a threshold (3* as the largest value of j3 such that 
=  0 for some 7 G [0, Then for /? > (3* we have < 0. For (3 ^  {3*, define
two thresholds 7* and 7** with 7* < 7** such that &  = 0  and = 0 ,
07 W ,  7=7* 07 /?</?*, 7= 7**
which characterize two extreme points. Then for 7 < 7* we have ^  < 0 (s is decreasing), for 
7* < 7 < 7** we have ^  > 0 (s is increasing) and for 7 > 7** we have ^  < 0 (s is decreasing). 
Hence s(/3,<t) is ‘“’-shaped for f3 ^  (3*.
(ii) C oncavity w ith  respect to  7: Define a threshold 7*** such that =  0 (an
2 7 7=7***
inflection point). Then for 7 < 7*** we have > 0 (s is strictly convex), and for 7 > 7***
we have J^f < 0 (s is strictly concave).
(iii) Slope w ith  respect to  {3: Define thresholds 7' and 7", with <  7", as follows. Let 
T7 be the smallest value of 7 such that 4§ = 0 , and 7" be the largest value of 7 such thatp 7 = 7 '
fijh " =  0. For 7 < t 7 we have ^  > 0. For 7 > t 77 we have < 0. For t 7 ^  7 < 7" we
have that s(/?, 7) is ‘U’-shaped: Define a threshold ft' such that I# =  0 (a minimum). For
P=P'
f3 < (3' we have < 0 (s is decreasing) and for /? > /?7 we have J-| > 0 (s is increasing).
(iv) C oncavity w ith  respec t to  /?: Define a series of thresholds 7Z < 7ZZ < 7ZZZ such 
that:
- 7Z is the smallest value of 7 such that =  0.
00 7=7^
- 7 /z satisfies 77 < 7ZZ < 7ZZZ and =  0 for some (3" G (2,00), where (3"1 1 1 1  dp* 7 =7 / (£=0 " ^ \ 1
defines an inflection point.
n o  r > f  <v c n o V i  tV i  a t- 7 ZZZ is the largest value of 7 such that J^f in  =  0 for all f3 G (2 ,0 0 ).
We then have:
- For 7 < 7Z, < 0 (s is concave).
- For 7Z < 7 < 7ZZ, J-gf > 0 (s is convex).
- For 7ZZ < 7  < 7ZZZ and /? < yd77, > 0 (s is convex). If 7ZZ < 7 < 7/zz but /3 > /?",
a2s
W
- For 7 ZZZ < 7 , > 0 (s is convex).
then < 0  (s is concave)Op s '
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Proof: The proof proceeds by showing how the separating surface is derived and then 
showing how to analyze its properties.
The separating surface is obtained by equating the wage rate for the closed economy (table 
1, chapter 4) and the wage rate for the open economy in the symmetric equilibrium (table 1, 
this chapter). This generates an equation in /?,7 and cr, from which we can solve (implicitly) 
for any of these parameters as a function of the others. Thus, any of the functions a =  s({3,7), 
P =  b(7, a) or 7 =  g((3, a) are valid (and equivalent) representations of the equation. We chose 
to present the analysis in terms of a =  s(/3,7).
Using the implicit function theorem we obtain the properties outlined in parts (i)-(iv) of 
this proposition^.
C orollary la : There exists a separating surface for welfare (W) with similar properties 
to the separating surface for the wage rate.
Proof: In a symmetric equilibrium, welfare (W) exhibits the same pattern as the wage 
rate. By equating the equilibrium welfare indicators for the open and closed economies and 
using the implicit function theorem we obtain the corresponding properties^.
Corollary lb :  There exist separating surfaces for per-firm output of good X  (x ) and 
labour demand from industries Y  (Ly) and X  (Lx) with similar properties to the separating 
surface for the wage rate.
Proof: By equating the equilibrium values of the corresponding variables for the open and 
closed economies and using the implicit function theoremB.
Proposition 1 and Corollary la  state that even in the case when the two economies are in 
a symmetric equilibrium (i.e., they are identical), there is a region of (/?,7, <7)-space for which 
free trade is not optimal for either of the economies: Both countries are better off in autarky.
Since our framework features economies with an increasing returns to scale industry, the 
result that there may not be gains from trade is not unexpected. Indeed, it is a well documented 
fact that when the economy features some industries with increasing returns to scale, gains 
from trade may not accrue (see Markusen and Melvin, 1989). The novelty of Proposition 1 lies 
in the characterization of a new set of mechanisms that generate the result. In particular, the 
separating surface is originated by the trade-off between the ‘technological capability’ effect 
and the ‘market structure’ effect.
We plot the separating surface in the following figure.
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Figure 5.1: The separating surface for the wage rate in the symmetric equilibrium
Proposition 1, Corollary la  and Figure 5.1 provide a framework to inform decisions about the 
optimal trade regime. The key issue lies in identifying the industry’s values of (3, 7  and 0 . 
W ith this information it becomes clear which trade regime will lead to higher wages. The 
parameters (3 and a  can be estimated econometrically and 7  is directly measurable (it is the 
extent of cross-ownership within the industry).
Let us illustrate the mechanisms behind the separating surface as shown in Figure 5.1, by 
reference to  two extreme parameter configurations. Firstly, consider the configuration where 
ft, 7  and cr are high, in which autarky yields a higher wage rate than free trade. This case 
features a high marginal cost of technological capability, a low intensity of competition and 
goods which are close substitutes. High values of (3 and 7  reduce the level of technological 
capability, and induce entry by a large number of firms. Recall that the number of firms 
is always larger in the closed economy relative to the open economy, and that technological 
capability is always lower in the closed economy, relative to the open economy. As the economy 
is opened, firms exit and technological capability of the survivors rises. The net outcome for 
the wage rate depends on the net of these effects on labour demand. In this case, the exit effect 
of opening the economy is not offset by the increase in technological capability. Moreover, a 
high a  implies that market-stealing is strong, and competition by foreign rivals is substantially
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harmful. This, together with the fact that there is a lot of (local) profit-sharing going on (high 
7 ) leads to the conclusion that autarky welfare-dominates free trade in this scenario.
Secondly, consider the case when /?, 7  and a  are sufficiently low (i.e., the economy is located 
close to the origin in Figure 5.1). In this scenario free trade results in higher wages relative 
to autarky. This case features a low marginal cost of technological capability (low /3)} high 
intensity of competition (low 7 ) and low substitutability between type X  goods (low cr). In this 
case, the economy is characterized by few firms, each with high technological capability. When 
the economy is opened, some of these firms exit, but the resulting increase in technological 
capability more than compensates for this. A low a implies that foreign competition is not as 
harmful as when a is high.
These configurations are but two examples of possible parameter combinations. A more 
complete analysis can be constructed by providing a taxonomy of industry types. Sutton (1991 
and 1998) provides the elements for constructing such a taxonomy of industries based on the 
level of marginal cost of technological capability (related to (3) and product substitutability 
or horizontal product differentiation (<r). To illustrate, we present some benchmark cases in 
Figure 5.2, below. The vertical and horizontal axes measure <7 and /?, respectively.
Case A: Case D:
High Technological Capability Intermediate Technological Capability
High Concentration Intermediate Concentration
E.g.: Aircraft E.g.: Flour
Case B: Case C:
Intermediate Technological Capability Low Technological Capability
Intermediate Concentration Low Concentration
E.g.: Flowmeters E.g.: Cement
p
Figure 5.2: A taxonomy of industries based upon their product substitutability (cr) and the 
marginal cost of technological capability (related to j3).
In case A, a high degree of horizontal product differentiation (high a) together with a low 
marginal cost of technological capability (low (3) results in a highly concentrated industry 
with high technological capability (top left box in Figure 5.2). Examples of this include the 
aircraft industry (Sutton 1998, ch. 16), digital switches, colour film (ibid., ch. 5) and liquid
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chromatography (ibid., appendix 5.1).
Reducing product substitutability we move downwards, to case B. Provided the marginal 
cost of technological capability remains low, the industry is now characterized by lower concen­
tration and higher technological capability. An example of this type of industry are flowmeters 
(ibid., ch. 6).
As we move rightward horizontally (holding a  constant) the marginal cost of technological 
capability rises with (3. Accordingly, technological capability is lower relative to the left side 
of the diagram. If products from one firm are not easily substitutable with those of other 
firms (including overseas rivals), then the industry will have the least concentrated structure 
and also the least technological capability of all the possibilities in the diagram (case C). The 
cement industry could be included in this category (ibid., ch. 12), since high transport costs 
make it uneconomic to ship the product over long distances, thus rendering a structure similar 
to Hotelling’s horizontal product differentiation model (Hotelling, 1929).
On the other hand, if products are easily substitutable (case D), but the marginal cost of 
technological capability remains high, the industry will feature lower concentration and higher 
technological capability than in case C. An example of this is the flour industry (Sutton 1991, 
ch. 7).
At this point a caveat must be made. The characterization of industries in terms of a 
limited set of parameters (in this case (3 and a) necessarily implies simplification, and even 
those industries offered as examples will have many other determinants which are not being 
considered. That is the trade-off between encompassing a wide range of industries and tailoring 
the model to suit a particular industry: Generality versus specificity (Sutton, 1996). These 
examples are offered as an illustration of the mechanisms at work in the models we have 
developed.
We continue with the analysis by projecting the contours of the separating surface s(/?, 7) 
for given values of 7 onto (a, /3)-space. The procedure is to take a given value of 7 =  70, and 
plot the function s(/3,7 0) in (cr, /3)-space. This is repeated for different values of 7 G [0, 7777]. 
The result is a family of separating curves along which the open economy wage rate is equal to 
that of the closed economy. The curves divide the space into a region where the closed economy 
wage rate is higher than its open economy counterpart (lying above the curve), and a region 
when the reverse holds (beneath the curves). Figure 5.3 presents the family of separating 
curves:
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Figure 5.3: Contours of the separating surface for the wage rate for different values of 7 .
Each curve in Figure 5.3 represents a locus where the open and closed economy wage rates 
are equal, for a given value of 7 . The curves divide the parameter space into two regions. 
The region above each curve features a higher wage rate for the closed economy, while the 
region below features a higher wage rate for the open economy. As the intensity of competition 
decreases ( 7  increases), the curves shift down, implying that for higher 7  a larger region of 
(<7 , j3) parameter space will feature a higher wage rate in autarky relative to the open economy. 
Note that in the top left corner (high a  and low f3) the closed economy will feature a higher 
wage rate, for any value of 7  different from zero. Similarly, the bottom  left comer (low <7 and 
(3) always features a higher wage rate for the open economy, regardless of the value of 7 .
Superimposing on this diagram the taxonomy we developed in Figure 5.2, we can draw 
some conclusions for trade policy. In an economy characterized by an industry featuring low 
product substitutability (low cr) and low marginal cost of technological capability (low f3), free 
trade will generate a higher wage rate relative to autarky, for any intensity of competition 
(e.g., flowmeters). On the other hand, if the economy features an industry with high product 
substitutability and low marginal cost of technological capability, free trade will generate a 
lower wage rate relative to autarky, for any intensity of competition but the harshest (e.g., 
aircraft). For other industries, the optimal trade regime depends intricately on the intensity 
of competition. We can see that reducing the intensity of com petition implies a ‘crowding-out’ 
of the industries for which free-trade is optimal.
In the limit, as the intensity of competition reaches its minimum level ( 7  converges to 7 7 ^3;),
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the only industries for which free trade will be optimal are those characterized by low product 
substitutability (since this lessens the harmful effect of competition from overseas rivals). This 
is shown in Figure 5.3 by the lowest separating curve, labelled 7 high. The negative slope of the 
curve implies that lower marginal costs of technological capability (lower fi) serve as a trade-off 
for higher levels of product substitutability.
Similarly, as the intensity of competition becomes high, the only industries for which it will 
be optimal to have a closed economy are those which have a low marginal cost of technological 
capability and products that are highly substitutable. In this case we find ‘crowding-out’ of 
industries for which autarky is optimal.
We summarize these results in the following proposition.
P roposition  2: O ptim al Trade R egim es for Different T ypes o f  Industry
i) If the intensity of competition is high ( 7  is low, but different from zero), the economy 
will achieve higher wages in autarky only if it is characterized by an industry with sufficiently 
high product substitutability (high a) and a sufficiently low marginal cost of technological 
capability (low /?).
ii) If the intensity of competition is low ( 7  is high), the economy will achieve higher wages 
under free-trade only if it is characterized by an industry with sufficiently low product substi­
tutability (low <t) and sufficiently low marginal cost of technological capability (low fi).
iii) For intermediate values of the intensity of competition, the optimal trade regime is 
obtained by checking whether the values of (3 and a for the economy lie above or below the 
separating curve given by a  =  s(/3,7 0), where 7 0 denotes the economy’s intensity of competi­
tion.
Proof:
Follows from Figure 5.3B.
A  R eplication  A rgum ent R evisited
In chapter 2, section 5, we discussed how the model can be extended to a multiple industry 
setting and the likely consequences of this. This analysis also applies to the models we have 
developed in chapters 3-5. In moving from our simple model to a more realistic setting, we 
can envisage each economy as being composed by multiple industries (suppose there are Ri 
industries in each economy), each with its own characteristic parameter values (/3r ., 7 r ., o>., 
eri, Uon and L* for 77 =  1,..., R* and i = d, /) .  If we introduce multiple industries to the model 
in this chapter, the analysis of the separating surface applies to each industry. Thus, having
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a larger proportion of industries with the appropriate type of trade policy1 would generate 
higher demand for labour and consequently higher wages.
Closely related to these notions is the connection between trade and growth. The empir­
ical evidence is mildly supportive of a positive correlation between free-trade and economic 
growth. However, this is a highly debated claim, with many studies finding a very weak or 
even non-existent link (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 1999). How, then, can this be reconciled with 
our findings?
The view that emerges is that by having a generalized opening of the economy, labour 
demand from some industries will contract, whilst labour demand from others will expand. 
The overall effect on the wage rate (i.e., income) depends on what types of industries generate 
most of the economy’s labour demand. If they are mostly high-cr and low-/? industries and the 
economy exhibits low intensity of competition, we can expect an overall reduction in income 
levels. If on the other hand, most industries have low values of a and high values of /?, together 
with a high intensity of competition, we can expect free-trade will be associated to an increase 
in income levels.
This analysis raises the question: How to go about changing these parameters? From 
section 4 it is clear that there is potential for gains-from-trade. How, then, can we prepare 
the economy to make the most of free-trade? The intensity of competition (the extent of 
profit-sharing: 7 ) is an anti-trust issue. The substitutability of products (<r) seems to be 
an intrinsic characteristic of goods, and this hints towards promotion of industries with low 
product substitutability (which could be associated with goods that exhibit a high degree of 
horizontal product differentiation). The marginal cost of technological capability (associated 
to /?) points towards development of institutions that support the creation of technological 
capability, innovation, product quality, etc. To recapitulate, the focus is now on changing the 
institutions of the economy in order to make it suitable for opening. This reflects a shift of 
emphasis towards modifying the institutional framework of the economy, which in this model 
is captured by structural parameters.
We conjecture that some aspects of Proposition 1 are more general than the current model 
implies. In particular, consider an n-industry (e.g., n-country or n-region) model with limited 
factor supply, and in which factor demand derives from investment in technological capability 
and from the number of firms. In such a setting we expect to find a (welfare) separating surface 
in the space of parameters which affect both the number of firms and technological capability.
1By ‘appropriate’ we mean the type of trade policy (autarky versus free-trade) which generates the highest 
demand for labour for tha t particular industry.
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The existence of this surface is warranted by the trade-off in factor demand between a larger 
number of firms versus higher technological capability. The economic policy consequences of 
this are similar to the ones we have discussed above. This extension lies outside the scope of 
this study and will be the topic of future research.
This completes the analysis of the symmetric equilibrium under identical parameter values. 
As mentioned in the introduction, we found that the inclusion of 7  does not affect our previous 
results regarding asymmetric initial conditions or catching-up (chapter 3, section 5). The 
only difference will be a relocation or shift of the initial symmetric equilibrium, in the manner 
described in section 4 of this chapter. Thus it was not deemed necessary to recreate the analysis 
here.
6  Conclusions
In this chapter we extended the closed economy model presented in chapter 4 to an open 
economy setting, with strategic interaction and endogenous terms of trade. This chapter can 
also be regarded as a generalization of the open economy model developed in chapter 3, to 
allow for varying degrees of intensity of competition.
If we compare the results from chapter 4 (Proposition 1), with the open economy symmetric 
equilibrium, we find that the conclusions for development configurations need to be modified 
slightly for the open economy. From the analysis in section 4 we conclude that a ‘high-tech’ 
configuration2 is still associated with a higher wage rate (and welfare) than other configurations, 
with two exceptions:
1 ) <7 is low, in which case a ‘proliferation’ configuration yields higher wages.
2 ) /? and a are high and 7  is intermediate, in which case an ‘intermediate’ configuration 
yields higher wages.
Notice that for the intermediate economy to yield a higher wage now requires not only high- 
/? and intermediate 7 , but also high-<7 (whereas in chapter 4 it did not depend on cr). This can 
be gleaned from the analysis of Figures 4.2a-b. With one exception, the cases when a particular 
development configuration achieves a higher wage rate are reinforced in the open economy. In 
particular, the wage rates achieved under each configuration will be higher under free-trade. 
The exception is the case of high-/? and low-cr. In this case, the closed economy achieves a
2 Recall the definitions from chapters 2 and 4:
1) H ig h -tech  con figu ration : Industry X  has few firms each with a high level of technological capability.
2) P ro life ra tio n  con figu ra tion : Industry X  has many firms, each with a low level of technological capability.
3) In te rm e d ia te  con figu ra tion : Industry X  has an intermediate number of firms, each with an intermediate 
level of technological capability.
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higher wage rate with an intermediate level of 7  (leading to an intermediate configuration). In 
the open economy with high-/? and low-a, a higher wage rate is achieved with low- 7  (associated 
with a high-tech configuration).
We found that in the symmetric equilibrium, there is a separating surface in (/?, 7 , <j)-space, 
above which autarky is associated with a higher wage rate. Thus the gains from trade theorem 
breaks down. This is not surprising, since industry X  features increasing returns to scale. The 
result allows us to analyze alternative development strategies. In general the opening of the 
economy entails a reduction in the number of firms and an increase in technological capability. 
The optimal trade regime will depend on the characteristics of each industry. This leads to 
the surprising conclusion that different industries need different trade regimes. Moreover, this 
conclusion highlights the need of transforming the economy before opening it to trade, so that it 
is characterized by industries which effectively will ensure that free-trade is welfare-enhancing. 
The transformation takes the form of modifications in the economy’s institutional framework 
(i.e., changes in parameter values). We find that if parameters are changed to maximize 
the wage rate, free-trade will always be optimal (see Figures 4.1-4.6). Thus, free-trade and 
development always go hand in hand.
We also found that the results on asymmetric initial conditions and catching-up from chap­
ter 3 (section 5) follow through for the extended model with adjustable intensity of competition.
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A ppendix 1: Solving th e  Final Stage Subgam e for Industry X
Let us solve the final stage subgame (quantity competition) to obtain ‘solved-out payoff’ for 
domestic and foreign firms. We begin by substituting the inverse demand functions (equation
3.3) and its derivatives (fj^j and for i = d, f )  into the first order conditions (equation
5.3). Erom this, we obtain
0  /  ni+ 1  nj+1
i —2 ( 2 —<?)-£■ — r - + r -
ul  “ h  ( S ' "« I S  Uu
for i, j  =  d, f  and i ^  j
- 5 - f ; 5 = 0  (a i .i)
f^ct uli
We proceed to add and subtract in each of the two equations in (Al.l). After re­
organizing we arrive at
%ki
Uki
(1 -  7iK< -  (i -  7i + *) 2r ESf 5t -  (1 -  7i) 2* E Z !1 g*
2 [ ( 2 - „ ) ( l - 7 i) - ^
for i, j  = d, f  and i j
(A1.2)
The next step is to sum each of the two expressions in (A1.2) over k. This yields
for i, j  = dt f  and i ^  j  (A1.3)
(i -  7i) [SKI1 -  Mm + 1) EZt1
II. IJ
1=1 2  K1 -  7») ( 2  +  <™i) +  7t<T]
The equations in (Al.3) are hnear in ^ z ^ i 1 ^  and Solving for these yields
^  Xli _  (X ~  7i) { [(1  ~  7j) (2 +  gnj) +  7 ^ ]  £ r = i 1 uki -  o' ( l  -  7j) +  1) g ' * 1 ufcj}
^  uH 2A
(Al.3')
for i, j  = d, f  and i ^  j
where A  is defined in the main body of the chapter (see equation 5.5), and is reproduced here 
for convenience
A  =  [(1 “  7 d)  (2 +  +  7 d ° ]  [(1 “  7 /)  (2 +  <mf) +  7 / ° ’] - v *  (1 “  I d )  f r d  +  1) (l -  7 / )  Ov +  1)
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The solution for x ^  is obtained by substituting (Al.3') into (Al.2). This gives the following 
result
Xki — ( 1 - 7  iW khi
1=12 [(2 - < r ) ( l - 7< ) - ^  
where Bi and Q  are defined in equation (5.5) as follows
ni+l Wj+1
1 — B{ —  — Ci Y  I for i, j  = d, f  and i ^  j  
Uki 1^ 1 Uk3 j
(A1.4)
for i } j  =  df f  and i ^  j
( l - 7 i) ( 2 - * ) - % *rii
By imposing symmetry between firms (but not across countries), such that u^i = uu = Ui and 
Ukj = utj =  Uj, we obtain the following simplified expression
Xi = (1  ~  liW i 1 -  Bi (rii +  1) -  Ci (rij +  1) —Ui2 [ ( 2 - ff) ( l - 7, ) - “
for if j  =  df f  and i ^  j
(A1.4')
Upon setting 7d =  7 /  =  0 and imposing symmetry across countries, such that u& =  Uf =  u, 
this expression becomes
u 2x  = u ■ (Al.4")
2 [ 2  + aN]
which is equation (Al.4").
Prices (m*) are obtained by adding and subtracting 2<r^p to the inverse demand functionsuhi
(equation 3.3). This yields
Pk( =  1 - 2 ( 1 - < 7 ) ^ 1  -  for i, j  = d, f  and i ^  j  (A1.5)
Substituting x m from (Al.4) and the expressions in (Al.3') into (Al.5). Thus we obtain the 
following solution for pki'
Phi = ( 2 - < 7 ) ( l - 7i ) - 2 *
/ v Tii+1 rij+1
( l - 7 , - ^V rii J Y i Uki Uki
(Al.6 )
for if j  = d, f  and i ^  j
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where
Di =
(1 -  7i )  [(2 -  i t )  -  27/ I  -  i t ) ]
“ S  { 2 +  °  (1 — o') — <r] — 7 ,(1  -  cr) [2 +  <r(n.f + 1 ) ]}
« ■ =  I  ( ! -% •)  (1
as defined in equation (5.5). Assuming symmetry between firms (such that Uki = uu = Ui and 
Ukj =  uij = U j), we obtain the following simplification
1
for i, j  = d, f  and i ^  j  (A1 .6 ')
Upon setting 7 <* =  7 /  =  0 and imposing symmetry across countries, such that u^ — Uf = u, 
this expression becomes
P = 2 ^ N  (A1-6"}
which is equation (Al.6 ").
The solved-out payoff is the product of (Al.4) and (Al.6 ):
uki Di  ^   ^u n  E{ ^  ^ U i j
Wj-f-1
1 = 1  1 = 1
(A1.7)
for i , j  = d, f  and i j
where
as defined in equation (5.5). The solved-out payoff is equation (5.4) in the main body of the 
chapter.
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A ppendix 2: Second order conditions for th e  Second Stage Subgam e
To obtain the second order conditions, differentiate the first order conditions (5.10) with respect 
to for i  =  d, f .  This yields
/•j ^ k j  71 927rH ( 1  -  '!i)wj£jl3i((3i -  1 ) t t f r 2
 ^ "  d u 2 n d u 2 f r  > r \ Piauki n* l¥zk auki {Ld + L f j u j
for i  — d, f  and k  =  1 ,..., nf 4- 1 (A2.1)
Calculating the derivatives gives
927cki _  2(1 -  7f)
Ki
d 27rH ' 2(1 -
(A2.2)
8u l  ~  K t D‘B< ^
Upon substituting (5.33) and (5.33) into (A2.1), we obtain
(1 -  7j) (1 -  B() ( l  -  7, -  ^  -  a )  +  7 .A A  ^  (A2.1')
V m  J  2(Ld +  L/ )u £
If we further substitute out uki, n» and W{ with their equihbrium values, (A2.1') provides a 
restriction on the parameter space (cr, 7 J . This restriction exhibits similar behaviour to the 
one derived in Appendix 2, chapter 4, in that it implies that a  cannot be too high, cannot, 
be too low (and in particular (3{ cannot be less than or equal to 2  for any value of a and 7 *) 
and 7 1 cannot be too high. If any one of these parameters crosses its bound, the others will 
need to compensate by moving inward from their bounds.
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Part III 
B ig Push Argum ents
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Chapter 6
Endogenous Technological 
Capability, Trade Policy and the Big 
Push
1 Introduction
This chapter introduces a model of the ‘Big Push’. The point of departure is similar to Venables 
(1996), and the main innovation with respect to that paper is that the framework is extended 
by allowing firms to choose technological capability. The argument of this chapter is that not all 
industrialization processes are similar. By analyzing the structural characteristics facing firms 
in different industrial environments, we develop some insights into why the process differs from 
one setting to another. The process of economic development is characterized by a sequence of 
‘take-offs’. There is an industrial take-off and a technological take-off. The industrial take-off 
leads to an initial Big-Push of industrialization. Once this process is underway, the economy 
may (or may not) achieve a second take-off point: Technological take-off. If it does, it will 
reach a higher income level than would have been the case otherwise, under certain conditions.
The modelling of technology in this chapter follows the endogenous sunk costs literature 
(Sutton 1991, 1998). In this literature, fixed outlays raise consumers’ willingness-to-pay for a 
good, in the form of an increase in a shift parameter for the firm’s demand schedule (alterna­
tively, they increase the quality of a product). As before we associate a firm’s technological 
capability to the quality of its products. The framework can easily be extended to deal with 
process innovation, learning-by-doing within the firm and network effects (see Sutton 1998, 
chs. 14 and 15).
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The model, then, consists of a three sector economy. There are demand and cost linkages 
between two sectors, labelled X  and Y. In addition to sectors X  and Y, there is a residual 
(‘rest of the economy’) sector, which is used to close the model. Sector X  is the upstream 
industry. This industry has increasing returns to scale and is imperfectly competitive. Industry 
X  supplies intermediate goods of type X  to the (perfectly competitive) downstream industry 
Y. Industry Y  uses intermediate type X  goods from the upstream sector and labour to 
produce Y  (final output). The demand and cost linkages constitute a pecuniary externality: 
On the one hand, an increase in downstream industry output benefits upstream firms by raising 
intermediate goods demand (demand linkage). On the other hand, an expansion in upstream 
industry leads to lower price/quality ratios through either reduced concentration or enhanced 
technological capability. In turn, this reduces costs for downstream firms (cost linkage). The 
externalities allow the existence of multiple equilibria.
The existence of multiple equilibria is an essential feature of the results that follow. There 
are three equilibria (two stable and one unstable). One of the stable equilibria corresponds 
with high output in both sectors, a low price/quality ratio for type X  goods and high wages. 
The other stable equilibrium features a high price/quality ratio for intermediate type X  goods, 
low output in both sectors and a low wage rate. All equilibria are equally feasible, in the sense 
that the economy’s resources (i.e., its labour endowment) do not change in moving from one 
equilibrium to another. All that may change is the distribution of resources between sectors, 
technological capability or market structure in the upstream industry and the efficiency with 
which resources are used. An essential assumption is that firms cannot commit to the high 
output equilibrium (i.e., there is a coordination failure).
We begin from an initial situation in which the presence of high tariffs results in an equi­
librium featuring low output with a high price/quality ratio for the upstream industry (X), 
and therefore a low output level for the downstream industry (Y) and a low wage rate. We 
analyze the effect of a reduction in tariff levels: When tariffs are reduced sufficiently, the low 
output equilibrium is no longer feasible and the economy takes-off and converges to the high 
output equilibrium. Thus it experiences a ‘Big Push’ of industrialization.
We analyze two variants of this model. In the first variant, the technological capability of 
firms in the upstream industry X  is fixed exogenously, as in Venables (1996, Model I). Firms 
play a two-stage game: In the first stage the entry decision is taken (a zero profit, or free entry, 
condition is introduced). In the second stage, firms compete in quantities, & la Cournot.
In the second variant of the model, firms choose a fixed investment in order to achieve 
a certain technological capability, which is now endogenously determined. The outcome of
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these outlays takes, as noted above, the form of an increase in a shift parameter in the firm’s 
demand schedule (the shift parameter is labelled technological capability). The game is now 
a 3-stage game. In the new (intermediate) stage firms choose how much to invest building up 
their technological capability. The mapping from fixed outlays (F) to technological capability 
is a convex function (i.e., the marginal cost of increasing technological capability is increasing). 
The remaining stages of the game are as in the first variant of the model: In the first stage 
of the game (entry), we determine the number of firms that prevail at equilibrium. In the 
final stage (Cournot competition), firms with higher technological capability (‘quality’) enjoy 
a greater level of demand for a given price.
Both upstream (X ) and downstream (y) sectors produce tradable goods. In principle, 
tariffs can be imposed on either of the sectors (or on both). Since we are modelling a small 
open economy, the rest of the world is exogenous.
To complete the description of the economy’s equilibrium, we introduce a labour market. 
For simplicity, labour supply is assumed to be perfectly inelastic. Labour demand derives both 
from the X  and Y  sectors, and a residual ‘Rest of the Economy’ sector. Labour productivity in 
this residual sector is diminishing: As demand for labour rises from the X  and Y  sectors, less 
labour is used in the ‘Rest of the Economy’, so that its marginal productivity rises, thereby 
increasing wages in the whole economy.
2 M odel A: Exogenous Technological C apabilities
This model is essentially that presented in Venables (1996, Model I), with a number of technical 
extensions. Since Model B builds upon and extends this model, it is convenient to analyze 
the conditions which underlie the results of Model A. We begin by analyzing the downstream 
industry.
2.1 D ow nstream  In d u s try  Y
Downstream firms minimize costs, wLy+pX, subject to the production function Y  =  ALyX 1-a, 
where A  =  oTa ( 1  — a )a_1 is a constant, w is the wage rate, Ly is labour demand by sector 
y , p is the price of intermediate output, X  is aggregate intermediate output demand, Y  is 
downstream industry output and a  is the share of labour in costs (0 ^  a  ^  1 ). Solving for the 
firm’s cost function, we obtain
C (w ,p ,Y ) = wap1~aY
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Since we have constant returns to scale, perfect competition and hence zero profits, at equi­
librium average and marginal costs coincide with price. Setting Y  — 1, the price of output Y  
(denoted by q) can be expressed as
q = wap1~a (6.1)
This is simply the zero profit condition for sector Y . Throughout the analysis q will be 
exogenously given, and q > 1 is assumed. Equation (6.1) can be used to express conditional 
factor demands in terms of industry revenue, obtaining the following
Ly =  (6.2)
X  =  ( l - a ) ^  (6.3)
2.2 U pstream  In d u s try  X
Upstream firms play a two-stage game. The equilibrium concept is Subgame Perfect Nash 
Equilibrium. The first stage involves the entry decision by firms. It is convenient in simplifying 
the expressions that follow, to denote the number of firms as N  +  1 (rather than N ). In 
the second stage, firms compete & la Cournot, viz, firm i chooses the output level X{ which 
maximizes profit: 7t{ =  (p — wc)x{, where c denotes the constant level of marginal cost, p is the
price of upstream goods and w is the wage rate (as defined in section 2.1). The inverse demand
schedule for X  can be obtained from the conditional factor demand for aggregate intermediate 
output, using equation (6.3) above. In a symmetric equilibrium, the first order condition for 
this problem simplifies to
A 1 \ wcpH ) =
Using (6.3), we define upstream industry revenue as follows: S  =  p X  =  (1 — a) qY. Using the
first order condition and the definition of industry revenue, the symmetric solutions for price,
quantity and profits can be expressed as
N  + 1 f c  a \p =  wc——— (0.4)N
_S_ N_
wc (N  + l f* =  ~7T7TTT2 (6-5)
*  =  7— ~ —To (6.6)(N  + 1)2 V '
The entry condition requires that final stage (gross) profits, as defined in (6.6), should just 
cover set-up costs. Setting the expression for gross profits in (6.6) equal to the setup cost e,
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we can solve for the equilibrium number of upstream firms (denoted by N  +  1),
N + l - J I  (6.7)V we
For simplicity, the number of firms is treated throughout as a continuous variable. The case of 
a discrete number of entrants is discussed in Venables (1996). It is convenient to assume e ^  1. 
As e falls, the number of firms increases, and price falls. In the limit, as j  —► oo, (N  4-1) —► oo, 
and price converges to marginal cost (wc). This is the convergence property: Market structure 
converges to the competitive solution as entry costs become small and/or industry revenue 
becomes large. On the other hand as e —»■ S /w ,  we converge to the monopoly solution. In
this limit, we need to impose a ceiling on price (otherwise x  —► 0 and p —► oo). This ceiling
will be the import price of intermediate goods.
The aggregate supply of intermediate output at equilibrium, is given by (recall that the 
number of firms is denoted by N  + 1)
X  =  (lV +  l)ar (6.8)
and labour demand by sector X  equals
Lx =  (N  4-1 )(xc +  e) (6.9)
2.3 The Labour Market
Labour supply is perfectly inelastic at Le. Labour demand comes from industries X  and Y  and 
a ‘rest of the economy’ (residual) sector. This residual sector exhibits diminishing marginal 
productivity of labour: As demand for labour rises in sectors X  and Y , less labour is available 
to the rest of the economy, its marginal productivity rises, thus pushing up the wage rate for 
the whole economy. This behaviour implies the following wage function
qn
-  =  M P L (L e - L y -  Lx) M PL' < 0, M PL"  < 0 (6.10)
where M PL(.) denotes the marginal product of labour in the residual sector, MPL' and MPL" 
denote (respectively) the first and second derivatives, q is the price of the final good, and w 
is the nominal wage rate. Whence, the real wage rate is a decreasing and concave function 
of the amount of labour used in the residual sector. To see why concavity is required, note
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that a rising wage imposes an external diseconomy on sectors X  and Y. In order to achieve 
the ‘Big Push’, this effect needs to be curtailed: It is necessary to assume that the marginal 
productivity of labour (M PL) does not fall too quickly, so that the wage rate does not rise too 
steeply as the upstream and downstream sectors expand output (thereby reducing employment 
in the residual sector).
It is convenient, before turning to a full analysis of the model, however, to remark on a basic 
feature of equilibrium; and to use this to motivate an assumption regarding a functional form 
we wish to impose, as follows: It is easy to see that there is a negative, monotonic relationship 
between employment in the residual sector and the level of output in the downstream industry. 
We can therefore define a function oj (Y ) as follows1,
M P L(Le - L y - L x)=  u  (Y) J  > 0, w" < 0 (6.11)
where <J and u>" denote the first and second derivatives. Rather than choose a specific func­
tional form for M P L(Le — Ly — Lx), it is analytically convenient to instead impose a suitable 
functional form on u> (Y) as follows
u(Y )  =  Y x! \  with e > 1 (6.12)
This reduced form equation appropriately captures the behaviour of the system. Upon sub­
stituting the number of firms (equation 6.7) and firm level intermediate output (equation 6.5) 
into labour demand by sector X  (equation 6.9), labour market clearing can be stated as
Le =  +Lr
Lx+Ly
where Lr denotes the amount of labour employed in the residual sector. This completes the 
description of the model2.
1Note tha t there is no need to  include intermediate output (X ) because this depends positively and monotoni- 
cally on Y. To see this, substitute the number of firms (equation 6.7) and firm level intermediate output (equation 
6.5) into aggregate intermediate output supply (equation 6 .8 ).
2 Note tha t consumers have not been modelled explicitly. An alternative model with consumers is available 
upon request. This model yields similar results, and for simplicity the model is closed using the above reduced 
form wage equation (as in Venables, 1996).
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2.4 Equilibrium
Equilibrium is characterized by means of two conditions, the intersections of which define the 
equilibria.for the economy. The first condition is obtained by solving for p from equation (6.1):
=  ( - ) T
1
—a DD
This schedule is labelled DD. It is convenient to denote the value of p satisfying DD  as py (we 
shall refer to this as ‘demand price’). DD  implies the downstream industry (F) is operating 
with zero profits. Note that DD  is downward sloping in w: For a given price of final output 
(q), a higher wage rate (w) allows a smaller demand price (py) to be paid for intermediate 
output, in order to break even. It is easy to see that DD  is convex with respect to w (see 
appendix 1).
To obtain the second condition, substitute (6.12) and (6.7) into (6.4). This yields
wc
P =  /----------  ss
1 ~  y /i= ^(w )e
This schedule is labelled SS. It is convenient to denote the value of p satisfying SS  by px (we 
shall refer to this as the ‘supply price’). S S  implies zero profits in the upstream industry (X ) 
and labour market clearing. To avoid changes in the concavity/convexity of the S S  schedule, 
we assume:
A l. w > w* — q ( r i a )  ' Note that w* > 1
There are two effects at work in the S S  schedule. The first is that as w increases, the 
marginal cost of intermediate output rises linearly, thereby increasing supply price, this will 
make S S  upward sloping at high values of the wage rate. The effect can be seen in the 
numerator of SS. The second effect works through the number of firms: The wage rate 
increase reflects higher demand for labour by sectors X  and Y , which means higher production 
levels in both sectors. As sales in the upstream industry (X) rise, the number of entrants 
increases, thereby reducing supply price (px). This effect can be observed in the denominator 
of SS, and is prevalent at low values of the wage rate, making S S  downward sloping.
Equating the DD  and S S  schedules yields
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The values of w  which solve (6.13), denoted by w e , are the equilibrium wage rates.
We now provide an account of how the model works. Before doing so, it is useful to begin 
by solving for aggregate intermediate output (X ) in terms of the wage rate. This helps towards 
the construction of a figure with py , px on the vertical axis, and X  on the horizontal axis. This 
figure will provide a useful illustration. Combining (6.7), (6.12), (6.5) and (6 .8 ), it follows that
Y — (1 - o Q 2 2
Q
/_ . I /  w  \  2  1(1 — a ) 2 ( — ) - e 2
6 - 1
(6.14)
where X  represents upstream output. Equations {DD) ,  (S S ) and (6.14) allow us to  write px 
and py as functions of X .  Figure 1 exhibits the functions px { X)  and py (X) ,  which are labelled 
S S  and D D ,  respectively, in the figure. W hen interpreting the figure, it is important to note 
that, under A l, there is a monotonic relationship between w  and X ,  so we may interpret a rise 
in id as a rightward movement along the horizontal axis of the figure (i.e., the horizontal axis 
can be relabelled w  instead of X ).
EXOGENOUS TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES
E2 : Industrial Take-off
Figure 1 : SS shows the function px(X ). DD shows the function py ( X) .  Equilibria E l and E3
are stable, while E2 is unstable.
We can explore the workings of the model by using Figure 1  to examine what happens when the 
exogenously fixed price of imports falls. The vertical axis measures the price of the intermediate 
good, the horizontal axis shows aggregate output of the intermediate good. Three schedules are
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shown in Figure 1: The DD  curve (py), the SS  curve (px), and the price of imports after tariffs 
(pm)- Pm can be controlled by tariff policy. To the left of point A, the import price becomes 
binding and domestic upstream firms cannot set px above pm without losing the domestic 
market to imports. Since the economy is small, supply of imports is assumed infinitely elastic.
DD  is a zero profit schedule. Pairs (p, X )  lying below DD  imply positive profits for 
downstream firms, while pairs lying above imply negative profits. The downstream industry 
will be in equilibrium only along the DD  locus. The opposite holds for SS: For pairs (p,X) 
lying below 55, upstream firms have negative profits (given market structure, i.e., N  + 1) and 
exit ensues, pushing price up. For pairs (p,X) above 55  profits are positive (given N  + 1) and 
entry ensues, driving price down. Hence, with flexible prices, the 5 5  locus is attracting. Note, 
however, that 5 5  is not quite a zero profit schedule. Rather, it is a schedule along which the 
labour market clears and the upstream industry has zero profits, given the number of firms.
All equilibria must lie on the DD  locus, since that is the only way the downstream industry 
will be in equilibrium. If the price level is fixed (as is the case to the left of point A , where import 
price, pm, is below supply price, px), the upstream industry can, however, be in equilibrium out 
of the 5 5  locus, since the number of firms will adjust to make profits zero, but the subsequent 
price adjustment will not take place. Clearly, in this case the number of firms will differ from 
that determined when prices can fluctuate freely (as is the case when the economy lies on the 
5 5  curve).
In equilibrium, supply price will be given by p8 =  min(px,pm), so that if upstream firms 
set a price higher than the price of imports, they will not be able to sell. We begin from the 
case when pm is very high, so that ps =  px. Under Al, there are two equilibria, denoted by Ei 
and Ez in the diagram. E<i is an unstable equilibrium, so we identify Ez with the equilibrium 
outcome (see Appendix 3 for further discussion of stability).
Now let pm fall, so that p3 =  pm (this is the case shown in the diagram). Here there are 
three equilibria, two stable equilibria at E\ and Ez, and an unstable equilibrium at E%. For a 
high protection level (pm is high), let the upstream industry be initially located at E\. This 
equilibrium features a high upstream price, low upstream and downstream output, a large ‘rest 
of the economy’ sector and therefore a low wage rate. The high price is due to the small number 
of firms in the upstream sector, and high concentration is supported by small industry sales. 
Upstream firms sell at a price marginally below pm- The number of upstream firms operating 
at Ei is smaller than the number associated with 5 5  at production level X ei-  As discussed 
above, this is because (p, X )  pairs lying below 55  imply negative profits for upstream firms, 
and exit ensues until profits with price pm are zero.
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Equilibrium E\ is stable. To the left of E\ demand price is above supply price (equal to the 
price of imports), hence it is profitable for upstream firms to enter and aggregate intermediate 
output expands to E\ (note that price is fixed at pm). Meanwhile, other effects are at work: 
As upstream and downstream output rises, less labour is used in the residual sector, and wages 
rise. To the right of Ei, demand price is below supply price (pm), thus firms exit driving price 
back up to Ei, output falls in both sectors, the residual sector expands and wages fall.
The second equilibrium is £ 3 , characterized by a low upstream price, high output in both 
industries, low output in the rest of the economy and a high wage. Low concentration in the 
upstream industry generates a price lower than the price of imports. The low price supports a 
high downstream output level, which in turn supports high upstream output.
This equilibrium is again stable: To the left, demand price is above supply price and up­
stream firms earn positive profits, entry ensues, price falls, downstream and upstream outputs 
increase, shifting the economy back to £ 3 . As before, along the transition the rest of the econ­
omy shrinks and wages rise. To the right of £ 3 , demand price is below supply price, upstream 
firms earn negative profits, exit ensues and the process takes the economy back to E,3.
The third equilibrium is £ 2 , which is unstable. To the left of £ 2  firms exit, and to the right 
they enter, converging to E\ and £ 3 , respectively. £ 2  is the ‘industrial take-off’ point, in the 
sense that if the economy is shifted past it, it will experience a large industrial expansion.
The different configurations of equilibria that may arise in the current framework are set 
out in Proposition 1. To this end, it is convenient to specify some conditions, which allow us 
to formulate the subsequent proposition and impose some restrictions on parameters.
Conditions:
n i  „  f l - a  4 1 ( g - i ) ( i - « )  (1—a )(f l—1)
1  «  [ 2 + ( l - a ) ( 0 - l ) ] 3 J 2 + ( l - q ) ( 0 —l )  •
C2. lim < 1.tW-COO P*
C3. lim £* < 1.
u/+—»tXJ*
C4. px and py have no changes in concavity/convexity 
for w € (it;*,0 0 ).
We also introduce a further assumption, which confines the analysis to values of X  lying 
above X*(w*) in Figure 1.
A 2.
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P roposition  1: E quilibria
I) If C l holds with strict inequality, then under Al, A2, C2, C3 and C4 there are three 
equilibria: Two intersections of DD  and S S  ( £ 2  and £ 3 ) and one intersection of DD  and pm
(El).
II) If Cl holds with equality, then under Al, A2, C2, C3 and C4 there are two equilibria: 
One tangency point between DD  and S S  (E'2) and one intersection of DD  and pm (£ 1 ).
III) If C l does not hold, then there is a unique equilibrium given by the intersection of DD 
and pm (Ei).
Proof: see Appendix 2.
The analysis has concentrated on the more interesting case shown in Figure 1 and stated 
in Proposition 1, part I (Parts II and III are not illustrated). We proceed to analyze the effect 
of tariffs.
2.5 T rade Policy
We will interpret a change in tariff levels in what follows as a shift in the value of pm. The 
effects of tariffs on intermediate goods are discussed in the following proposition.
P roposition  2: Tariffs on In term ed ia te  Goods
If the economy is at £ 1 , a tariff reduction (increase) for intermediate output raises (lowers) 
output in both sectors. If tariffs fall sufficiently, a large output expansion (‘Big Push’) is 
induced. If the fall in the price of imports is sufficiently large, it will eliminate the upstream 
industry and shift the downstream industry to a high production level.
Proof:
The effect of increasing tariffs is to raise pm. Since px and py are downward sloping, £ 1  
shifts to the left, reducing aggregate upstream and downstream output and the wage rate (see 
Figure 1). Protection of the upstream industry generates a contraction of both industries. 
Reducing tariffs lowers pm and moves E\ to the right, increasing output in both sectors.
If the reduction is enough to shift pm below p(we2), by the instability of £ 2  (see Appendix 
3), the economy will start an automatic expansion process and converge to £ 3 . At £ 3 , pm need 
not be binding.
Let wm\n — q 7=1. This specifies the minimum of px for w £ (w*, 0 0 ). If pm falls
below px(wniin), the price of imports after tariffs is too low for the domestic upstream industry 
to operate and the new equilibrium is given by the intersection of py and pmM.
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Proposition 2 has some interesting implications. It says that non-protectionist trade policy 
can help domestic industry to develop. If import price falls sufficiently, the upstream industry 
could be eliminated, leaving the country only with the downstream industry. This will be 
associated with a higher wage rate than if the upstream industry had survived, since the non­
competitive nature of this industry imposes a negative (pecuniary) externality on downstream 
firms.
To analyze protection of the downstream industry consider the following proposition.
Proposition 3: Tariffs on Downstream Goods
Protection in the downstream industry raises output for both sectors. If the economy is 
initially located at E\ and protection is sufficient, an industrial expansion from equilibrium E\ 
to Ez can be triggered.
Proof:
It is useful to relabel the horizontal axis in Figure 1. Note that under Al, X  (equation 
6.14) is a monotonically increasing function of f^. By similar reasoning as before, Figure 1 
can be interpreted as having ^  on the horizontal axis. Then changes in q will shift py, while 
reflecting movements along px (as well as py). To see this, note that q enters px (SS) only
a
through ^  in the denominator. py can be written as py = q ( ^ ) 1-a from which it is clear that 
changes in q not only generate movements along py but shifts as well.
Protection of the downstream industry is equivalent to increasing q. This will shift py 
up. Equilibria E\ and Ez are shifted to the right, whereas E2 moves leftward and upward. 
If the economy is at Ez or Ei, increases in production for both sectors follow. However if py 
shifts past the crossing between pm and px (point A  in Figure 1), then an expansion to Ez is 
triggered®.
Propositions 2 and 3 imply that a combination of protection for downstream firms and tariff 
reduction for upstream firms has the potential to generate a ‘Big Push’ of industrialization.
2.6 Effects of Changing Parameter Values
We consider each parameter in turn.
a  : Under Al, the effect of increasing a  is to shift px up and py down (see equations DD 
and SS). Thus there is a value of a  above which the only equilibrium is E\. This is defined 
by Cl, taking as given other parameters. It is also the case that by reducing a  an expansion
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from Ei to £ 3  can be triggered. This defines a value of a  below which the only equilibrium is 
£ 3  (the reasoning is similar to Proposition 3).
9 : Increasing 9 does not affect py, and shifts px down (see equations DD  and SS). To see 
this, bear in mind that ^  < 1 , thus ( ^ ) 0 1  is decreasing in 9. The value of 9 below which 
only Ei exists, is given by Cl (other parameters being given). There is also a value of 9 above 
which a ‘Big Push’ of industrialization is triggered.
c : Increasing c only affects px by shifting it up (see equations DD  and SS). Thus, there 
exists a value of c (defined by Cl) above which only E\ exists. There is also a value of c below 
which the economy ends up at £ 3 .
e : The effect is similar to c. The value of e above which only E\ exists is also defined by 
C l, taking as given the other parameters. Values of e below a certain threshold generate a 
shift towards £ 3 .
q : see Proposition 3.
The model discussed so far features exogenous technological capabilities. In the next model, 
we go beyond the framework of Venables (1996), in allowing upstream firms to choose their 
level of technological capability. We examine in this setting when an economy can generate 
an industrial expansion (Big Push), and we further explore how this affects the quality of 
its products. Here, an industrial expansion may involve firms acquiring higher technological 
capabilities in order to produce a higher quality product.
3 M odel B: Endogenous Technological C apabilities
In this model upstream firms can invest to achieve higher technological capabilities. In this case 
the intermediate good may no longer be homogeneous. Investment in technological capability is 
also referred to as ‘escalation’ (Sutton, 1998). Escalation leads to higher quality products (i.e., 
higher technological capability). The introduction of quality as an attribute of intermediate 
goods implies that good i will have an associated price (pi) and quality level (ui), which are 
inseparable features. The technological capability of each upstream firm will be embedded in 
the (single) good it produces.
The model will retain the general structure of the previous section: It will have a down­
stream industry, an upstream industry and a residual sector.
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3.1 The D ow nstream  Industry
As in section 2.1, the downstream industry has constant returns to scale and is perfectly 
competitive. Taking the wage rate (w) and the price-quality ratio (j>i/ui) as given, downstream 
firms choose Ly and X{ in order to minimize costs: wLy +  Y h +1 (Pi/Ut ) x i, subject to Y  =
( 7V+1 \1—aJ2i x i) » where pi is the price of intermediate output i (produced exclusively by 
upstream firm i), it* is the quality level of good i (alternatively, technological capability of 
upstream'firm i), 0 ^  <p ^  1 is the extent to which quality reduces costs (below it will be seen 
that it also represents an externality). Other variables are as defined in section 2.1. A good’s 
quality is relevant because it reduces the production cost of downstream firms. This can be 
justified by considering how low quality inputs hinder the production process. To mention 
but two examples, by making the production process more prone to mechanical failures or by 
generating more losses via unsaleable products3.
When downstream firms choose which upstream input to buy, they will choose the one 
with the lowest price/quality ratio and make all their planned purchases from the firm offering 
the chosen variety. Since upstream goods are perfect substitutes, upstream firms must have 
identical price/quality ratios: ^  =  A for all i. In a symmetric equilibrium all upstream
firms have identical prices, quantities and technological capabilities. In this case we write the
solution for the downstream firms’ problem in terms of £ (as opposed to j^), and use X  instead 
of ]CiV+1 x i (where X  is aggregate upstream output). Solving the downstream firms’ problem 
yields the following cost function
c(»,£y) = ^ ( ^ ) ar
As in section 2.1, setting Y  = 1 and C(w, 1) =  q, we obtain the zero profit condition for the 
downstream industry:
q = wi ' “  ( s r  (6i5)
Using (6.15), we express conditional factor demands in terms of downstream industry revenue:
Ly =  ct-^- (6.16)y w '  '
x - ( l —  ) $ ?  (6.17)
3There are other ways of introducing it, into the problem solved by downstream firms. For example, it 
could be introduced as a multiplicative factor in the production function, yielding Y  =  ALy ^]T^+1 mxi j  
However, the chosen alternative gives simpler results.
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3.2 T he U pstream  Industry
To allow endogenous choice of technological capability, the two stage game in section 2.2 is 
modified by introducing an intermediate stage in which firms choose investment in technological 
capability (i.e., product quality). As before, the entry decision is made in the first stage. In the 
intermediate stage firms choose fixed outlays (investment in technological capability). Finally, 
in the third stage firms compete k la Cournot, by choosing quantities. The equilibrium concept 
is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, and the game is solved by backward induction. We seek 
a symmetric Nash Equilibrium in each stage.
In the third stage, upstream firms choose X{ in order to maximize gross profits 7r* =  (pi — 
w c ) x i ,  taking other firms’ quantities, technological capability and market structure as given. 
Marginal cost is a constant, denoted by c. Upstream firms offer a unique price/quality ratio, 
defined by =  A for all i. This means that upstream industry revenue can be written as 
S  = Pjxj =  ^ uj xj- Pro111 which
a=eP ^  (618)
The final stage profit function for upstream firms can be written as 7T< = (An* — w c )  X{. Differ­
entiating with respect to Xi, we obtain the first order condition:
oxXui +  ~—U{X{ =  w c  (6.19)
After calculations shown in Appendix 4, the following solved-out profit function is obtained
=  t6-20)
The profit function no longer depends on Xi, it only depends on Ui and N  + l. If firms choose 
symmetric technological capabilities, setting U{ =  uj yields 7r =  > which is the profit
function obtained in (6.6). Under symmetry, p and x  are also identical to those in equations 
(6.4) and (6.5), respectively.
In the second stage, firms choose Ui to maximize net profit: 7Tj — F(ui), where 7r* is given 
in (6.20) and F(iii) denotes the fixed outlays function, F(ui) =  euf. This function is convex in
ui ({3 > 1), i.e., the marginal cost of increasing technological capability is increasing. A firm’s
technological capability (resp., the quality of a product) is assumed to be bounded below by 
1 (ui ^  1). Zero investment in technological capability gives F  = e and the model collapses to
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the exogenous technological capability model presented in section 2.
Before solving for the optimal technological capability level, let us solve for industry rev­
enue from equation (6.17). This yields S  =  (1 — atyqYvf. In solving for the optimal u*} we have 
assumed that upstream firms take S  as given. Thus the (symmetric) quality level entering S  
constitutes an externality. By increasing their own technological capability and by the sym­
metric response of rivals, firms de facto increase overall industry sales. This market expansion 
effect is not taken into account when firms optimally choose their own investment. The first 
order condition for the intermediate stage is
dni _  dF(ui) 
dui dui
from which we solve for the symmetric (Nash) equilibrium level of technological capability:
u  = 2 (1 - a ) y / i ne3 \w )
N 2
/  \ / ( N  + 1)3.
(6.21)
In the entry stage we set profits (6.20) equal to fixed outlays (F(vn)). Substituting (6.21) into 
the zero profit condition, we solve for the number of entrants,
N + 1  = i ( 1 + f + f ) + 1 <622>
The number of firms is increasing in /?: As the marginal cost of achieving a given technological 
capability rises, quality falls, permitting a greater number of entrants. Also note that the
number of firms depends only on (3, and is independent of industry revenue (cf. equation (6.7)
in section 2.2). This is the non-convergence property discussed in Sutton (1991, 1998) and 
Cabral (2002).
3.3 T he Labour M arket
The labour market is exactly as in section 2.3, except for labour demand from the upstream 
sector. Now labour demand from sector X  is given by
Lx = (N  + l){xc + eu(i) (6.23)
Upon substituting u  from (6.21) and following a similar procedure to section 2.3, the labour 
market clearing condition has labour demand from sectors X  and Y  and (residual) labour used 
in the rest of the economy adding up to the total labour endowment.
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A "Window o f  O pportunity
Since technological capability is bounded from below (u ^  1), there will be a ‘technological 
take-off’ wage rate (denoted by w3), above which firms start investing in technological capabil­
ity. Below the ‘technological take-off’ point, firms do not invest and the workings of the model 
are identical to Model A (exogenous technological capability). The switch point is defined by 
setting u =  1 in (6.21). Substituting Y  out using (6.12), and solving for ws yields
w3 = q 2(1 -  a) N 2
17=T
(6.24)
The ‘technological take-off’ wage (wg) is increasing in q, e, a, j3 and decreasing in 6. The 
key insight is that for an endogenous increase in technological capability to take place, the 
technological take-off wage rate must lie (recall Figure 1) between the unstable equilibrium wage 
and the high output wage (we2 ^  Ws ^  ^ 3 ). The formal condition for this is derived below 
(condition C6  in section 3.5). This condition effectively constitutes a window of opportunity 
for the economy to begin developing its technological capability. We will see below that if the 
economy manages to fit through this ‘window of opportunity’, under certain conditions it will 
achieve a higher wage rate than would have otherwise been the case.
з .4  E quilibrium
As in section 2.4, we characterize equilibrium by two conditions. To obtain the first condition, 
solve for p/u  from equation (6.15). This condition is labelled D'D1, and it holds when w ^  ws 
(recall that ws is the ‘technological take-off’ wage rate, and it defines the wage level at which 
firms start investing). When w < w 3 the model collapses to Model A (exogenous technological 
capabilities). In this case, the condition is simply DD  (which is the same as in section 2.4).
P _  1
u  \u;a /
Similarly to section 2.4, the value of p satisfying DD  or D'D' is denoted by py (‘demand 
price’).
The price quality ratio for sector X  is obtained by using equation (6.4) and dividing by
и. This condition is stated below as S'S ', and it holds for w ^  w3. For w < w3, the relevant
if w < w3 
if w ^  ws
DD
D'D'
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condition is SS, from section 2.4.
P =
wc
1 _  \Zi=5
p wc N  +  1
u u N
if w < ws
if w > ws
SS
S 'S1
The value of p satisfying S S  or S'S' is denoted by px (‘supply price’).
Combining (6.12), (6.21), (D 'D') and (S'S') yields the explicit solution for the equilibrium 
wage rate (for w ^  ws):
w = q < & 2(1 -  a)] * N 0+*eP
___ 1 —a___
/ 3 - i p [ 0 - a ( d - l ) ]
(N  + 1)/3+2<p
(6.25)
We can see that w is increasing in q. Provided > <p[Q — a {6 — 1)], w is increasing in 9 and <p, 
and decreasing in c, e and a. For P <</?[# — a(9 — 1)] the comparative statics properties are 
reversed, w is non-monotonic in f3, at first decreasing and later increasing. A more detailed 
analysis is provided in section 3.6, on the effects of changing parameter values.
The equilibrium value of technological capability is obtained by plugging w from (6.25) and 
Y  from (6.12) into u  (equation 6.21). This yields:
u  =
£P ( l ^ + l ) 2+a+^ 1_a)
-L
(6.26)
A diagram similar to Figure 1 will be helpful in showing how the model with endogenous 
technological capability works. As previously, aggregate intermediate output production (X ) 
is plotted in the horizontal axis. To see that X  is indeed monotonically increasing in w, we 
express X  as a function of w. This is achieved by combining equations (6.12), (6.21), (6.5) and 
(6.8), to obtain
e-1 P-<e
(N  +  l f +2<p
(6.27)
To construct Figure 2, we follow a similar procedure to Figure 1: We use equations {DD), 
{D'D1), {SS), {S'S') and (6.27) to write px, py and ^  as functions of X . Whence we 
plot px{X), £f(X), py{X) and *£{X). px{X) is labelled SS , ^ { X )  is labelled S'S', py{X) is 
labelled DD  and ^ { X )  is labelled D'D1. Thick lines represent the equilibrium outcomes of the 
model, while dotted (continuation) lines represent the outcomes under exogenous technological
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capabilities (Model A).
ENDOGENOUS TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES
p /u
E2 : Industrial Take-off
Technological Take-off
Figure 2: SS shows the function p x{X) .  S'S7 shows the function ^ ( X) .  DD shows the 
function py {X) .  D'D 7 shows the function ^ ( X ) .
The configuration presented in Figure 2 and the effects of changing parameter values (section 
3.6) rely on the following restriction on parameter values:
A 3 . 0 -  ( 1  -  <p) > p  > <p[0 -  a(0 -  1 )]
The analysis of Figure 2 is similar to that of Figure 1. Note the structural change occurring 
at X a. X s is the ‘technological take-off’ point (cf. X e 2 , the ‘industrial take-off’ point). At X s, 
u  =  1 and it will be optimal to start investing in technological capability. This can be noted 
by the change of slope in DD  and SS. As quality rises w ith wages, the price/quality ratios 
fall at a faster rate.
We now discuss the slopes of D'D' and S'S'. By substituting (6.12) and (6.21) into D'D1, 
it can be seen that D'D' is always downward sloping in w.  After similar substitutions it can 
be shown that S' S' can be either downward or upward sloping in w,  depending on whether 
0 — 1 = /? — <p. If 0 — 1 >  (<)/? — <p, S'S ' has a negative (positive) slope. If 0 — 1 =  /3 — (p, the 
price/quality ratio is independent of the wage, hence it is also independent of X ,  thereby leading 
to a horizontal S'S' schedule. For the case depicted in Figure 2, we have that 0 — 1 >  /3 — ip 
(which is encompassed by the left inequality in A3). Below we present some conditions (C5-C7)
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which ensure that 6 — 1 > /? — <p.
The mechanism behind the slope of S'S' is of a fundamentally different nature than that 
behind SS. In SS, as wages rise, firms enter, thereby inducing a lower price. As wages rise 
further, marginal cost keeps increasing. This effect eventually dominates the slope of SS, 
making it positive. In S ’S 1, however, the number of firms is fixed by equation (6.22), and the 
value of the slope depends on two effects. Firstly, the increasing quality level of intermediate 
goods makes S 'S ' downward sloping (ceteris paribus). Secondly, the increasing wage rate (and 
hence increasing marginal cost) makes S 'S ' upward sloping (ceteris paribus).
To summarize, up to wa price has been falling for a while due to entry of firms in the 
upstream industry, and ceteris paribus, it would eventually begin to rise (due to increasing 
marginal costs). However, 6 — 1 > (3 — <p, the endogenous investment in technological capa­
bility gives a ‘second breath’ to the process, and though firms no longer enter, competition in 
technological capability (escalation) leads to a new phase of further reductions in the upstream 
price/quality ratio.
As in section 2, there are three equilibria, and tariff policy can move the economy from E\ 
to E$, as before. This requires that ws G [we2^ez[-  I11 this case, the shift between E\ and 
E$  will be accompanied by an increase in technological capability. Moreover, under certain 
conditions, wez < w (the precise conditions are specified below).
If 0 — 1 > /? — </? (which is implied by A3), the net effect of the increase in product 
quality dominates (otherwise, the increasing marginal cost effect dominates). This parameter 
restriction, namely 6 — 1 > (3 — <p, has an intuitive interpretation, to which we now turn. It says 
that 6 is large relative to (3 — (p. This means that the wage function (equation 6.12) has wages 
rising relatively slowly. On the other hand a small value of (3 — <p implies that the marginal cost 
of building technological capability is relatively low and/or the externality (market expansion) 
effect is relatively strong. Thus in this scenario, the transition from equilibrium E \ towards 
equilibrium E$  (the ‘Big Push’) is accompanied by a relatively slow-rising wage rate, and a 
relatively fast-rising technological capability.
3.5 Trade Policy w ith  Technological Capability
Let us introduce some conditions which will be helpful in presenting an important result:
p ,  2(1—a)
c ^ [  e/3 ( A r + l ) a + ®— ( • “ 1> J
^  ^ N e (JV+1)3/21 r2(l-a) N 2 1 O-«)(«-!)
C 6 * C <  I1 ~  ^ ( 1 - a )  1 V "  J I  > + ! ) * ]
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1 > \ cVK ’ { w ^ )  ( N + D ^ i
_ / Z W - ) ( > - l )  [(' tf \ y f?P+y 1 « ( l - a H l - H » \ ^ - yi . - . l . - » l
V 1-0 \  L \ 2( ) /  { N+ l f +2«\  J
The result is stated in the following proposition (recall Figure 2).
P roposition  4: Tariffs on In te rm ed ia te  Goods w ith  Technological C apability
Let the economy be at E\ and let C1-C6  hold, then:
I) A sufficiently large reduction in intermediate output tariffs generates an industrial ex­
pansion which will shift the economy to Eq , together with an increase in upstream firms’ 
technological capabilities.
If in addition to C1-C6, C7 also holds,
II) The equilibrium with endogenous technological capabilities (E$) will feature a higher 
wage than the equilibrium where technological capability is at a minimum (£3 , with u = 1).
III) If tariffs are lowered sufficiently, the upstream industry may cease to exist.
Additionally,
i) w8 ^  w <^C5
ii) we2 ^  u>3 ^  wez <=>C6
iii) wez ^  w «=>C5 A C6  A C7
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Proposition 4 specifies the consequences of reducing pm/u. In Figure 2 (as in Model A) 
once pm/u  falls below E ^  an industrial expansion follows, converging to either £ 3  (if ws 
$ [we2i ^ 3]) or to E$  (if w3 G [we2, ^ 3]). In the latter case, the transition triggers a rise 
in technological capability as the economy crosses the technological threshold wg. The wage 
rate associated with E$  will be higher than that associated with £ 3  under the conditions set 
out above. If pm/u  falls below Eq  then the upstream industry cannot compete with imports 
and ceases to exist. Equilibrium will now lie at the intersection of pm/u  and D'D1, and (as in 
Model A) the economy will feature a higher wage rate.
Having set out the effects of tariffs for the upstream industry, we now discuss the effect of 
tariffs for the downstream industry.
P roposition  5: Tariffs on D ow nstream  Goods w ith  Technological C apability
Protection of the downstream industry will expand output in both sectors, and if sufficient, 
it can trigger effects similar to those described in Proposition 4.
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Proof:
Note the similarity to Proposition 3. Recall that protection of the downstream industry 
can be modelled as an increase in q. Note also that X  in (6.27) is monotonically increasing in 
and the horizontal axis in Figure 2 can be relabelled —. In this representation, S' S' does 
not shift with changes in q, whilst D'D' does. The rest of the analysis proceeds in accordance 
to Propositions 3 and 4.
Regarding the ‘technological take-off’ point (w3), note that increasing q shifts ws and w 
proportionately. This, together with the upward shift in D 'D ', guarantees that if ws < wez 
held initially, it will continue to hold at the new level of q. Therefore, if the economy featured 
the possibility of ‘technological take-off’ at the initial q, this will still hold at the new qM.
3.6 Effects o f C hanging P a ram e te r Values
For w < w9, all effects of changing parameter values remain as in Model A. The properties 
discussed here are specifically for w ^  w3. The issue of interest is how w, ws, D’D’ and S'S' 
change with parameters.
a  : Increases in a  shift D'D' and S 'S ' up. If P > ip [9 — a(9 — 1)] (A3), w is decreasing in 
a , hence the upward shift in S 'S 1 is greater than the shift in D'D'. If P < <p [9 — a(9 — 1)], w 
can be (but not necessarily is) increasing in a  and the shift in S'S ' would be smaller than the 
shift in D'D1. w3 is increasing in a  (see 6.24). Thus for ft > (p[9 — a(9 — 1)], there exists a 
value of a  above which an increase in technological capabilities does not occur.
9 : Increases in 9 shift down both D'D' and S'S'. For P > p[9 — a(9 — 1)], w is increasing 
in 9 and S 'S ' shifts by more than D'D'. The opposite holds if ft < <p[9 — ot(9 — 1)]. w3 is 
decreasing in 9. If j3 > <p [9 — a{9 — 1)], there is a value of 9 below which w3 > w and it will 
not be optimal to invest in technological capability.
c : Changes in c do not affect D'D'. As in section 2.7, increasing c shifts S'S' up. This is 
reflected in w, which is decreasing in c, as long as (3 > <p [9 — a(9 — 1)]. ws does not depend 
on c. Consequently, there exists a value of c above which no escalation is optimal.
e : If (3 > <p [9 — a(9 — 1)], w is decreasing in e. Rising e is associated with upward shifts 
in D'D' and S 'S ', with the shift in S 'S ' being greater. ws is increasing in e. This means that 
there is a value of e above which investment in technological capability does not take place.
ip : Under A3, w increases with <p, whereas ws is not affected. Rising <p shifts S 'S ' down 
and D'D' up.
(3 : w3 is increasing in (3. However, w is non-monotonic in p. If A3 holds, w is at first
210
decreasing and later increasing in /?. Thus there exists a value of j3 for which ^  =  0.
4 Conclusions
In this chapter we have extended the Venables (1996) model of the ‘Big-Push’ to a richer setting 
in which firms engage in development of their technological capabilities. The main features 
of the analysis have been shown to carry over to this setting. Moreover, this has allowed us 
to examine the effects of the ‘Big-Push’ mechanism on the technological capability of firms 
(product quality).
The main contribution is the following. In the endogenous technological capability setting, a 
tariff reduction for the upstream sector (alternatively, tariff increase for the downstream sector), 
can induce an industrial expansion, together with an increase in upstream firms’ technological 
capabilities. The investment in technological capability will take place if the ‘technological 
take-off’ point (denoted by the wage rate iws>) is associated to a sufficiently low wage (see 
Figure 2 and Proposition 4). The technological take-off can be bypassed if the technological 
take-off wage rate is too high. In this case the economy misses the window of opportunity, and 
ends up with a thwarted process of industrial development in which technological capability 
does not rise. Thus the economy may industrialize, but the industries into which it successfully 
enters will be technologically backward and (under certain conditions) the economy will achieve 
a lower wage rate than if the technological take-off had been achieved. The key notion is that the 
wage rate cannot rise too steeply along the transition path towards the high-wage equilibrium. 
Otherwise, it runs the risk of impeding entry into technologically advanced industries, which 
(under certain conditions) are associated to a higher wage rate at the high-wage equilibrium.
The model also sheds light on some possible reasons why many developing countries man­
aged to (partially) industrialize, whilst very few countries managed to enter successfully into 
high-technology industries: The conditions required for achieving technological take-off are 
indeed stringent.
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A ppendix Is Slope and C onvexity o f DD  and SS
For DD, the relevant derivatives are given by:
®Pv _  a Py q 
dw 1 — a w
d2py
dw2 1 — a \1  — a J wz
For SS, similar calculations yield:
dpx
dw
Px
w
' (5 *) M  (S)*"1
. i  -  y / r h  ( 5 ) 9 ' 1  J
sv. _ S (¥) Vrfs (S)*'1 f(g-1)a/a(S)*"1 .re- 3
dw2 i _ . / «  w ® - 1 \  2 /
A ppendix 2: Proofs
P roof o f  P roposition  1:
The proof proceeds by construction and exclusion of cases not specified in parts I-III of the 
proposition. We examine the basic properties that are required of DD, S S  and pm, and then 
show how these properties are met. Finally, it is shown that the cases of zero or strictly more 
than three equilibria can be excluded.
It will be useful to keep Figure 1 in mind. Also recall that since X  is a monotonically 
increasing function of w (see equation 6.14), the figure with w on the horizontal axis has the 
same properties as Figure 1.
To see why C1-C4 are necessary (and taken together, sufficient), consider C1-C3. To obtain 
two crossings between px and py, there must be three ranges for w. Firstly, for w € (w*, w ^ ) ,  
Px > Py (C3). Secondly for w G [wE2,wE3], px ^  Py (Cl). Finally, for w G (wE3,00), px > py 
(C2). This guarantees at least two crossings (at least one tangency point if Cl holds with 
equality). Including C4 guarantees exactly two crossings (exactly one tangency point if Cl 
holds with equality).
Let us analyze Cl first, while C2-C4 hold. To guarantee that px and py cross or are at least 
tangential, a range where px ^  py is a necessary condition. Indeed this range is defined by two 
equilibria, as follows: w G [we2, 'Wez]- Cl is necessary and sufficient for px ^  py. To see this, 
consider the case when px is tangent to py. In this case ^  has a maximum at px = Py, defined
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by
i
=  0. This yields wp =  q |  l?±(LT°)(gz^)l. 1f Q . Substituting wp, into ^  and
Wp
imposing the condition ^ l w e  obtain Cl.
dw 
>osi
Consider C2: As w —*• oo, ^  —► 0 and C2 holds.
7 Px
To check that C3 holds, let w —* w* from above. Then px —> oo and py —► py{w*), which is 
finite. This yields px > py .
To check C4, calculate and (see Appendix 1). The analysis focuses on positive 
w. =  0 -4=4>- w —► oo (jpy becomes linear), otherwise > 0. To analyse px note that
q 2 -  o 2 „
^  0 for w > w*, and < 0 for 0 < w < w*. Hence to the left of it;*, px is concave, where 
as to the right of w*, px is convex. For w > w* there are no changes of concavity/convexity
in px. Note that —► 0 as w —> qdw2
T=i
, but this does not define a change in_g_i—ct \ 3 - e )
concavity/convexity. Rather, it reflects the fact that px becomes linear as the wage grows.
In order to have at least one firm in the upstream industry, assumption Al implies an upper 
bound on pm, which is defined by pm < py(w*). Performing these calculations yields A2. For 
w > w* there is at least one firm in the upstream industry. For pm higher than the upper 
bound, the domestic upstream industry is non-existent.
It remains to show that zero and more than three equilibria cannot exist.
Consider the zero equilibrium case. If there is no equilibrium, pm and py do not cross {E\ 
does not exist) and Cl does not hold. pm is simply a horizontal line, while py is a hyperbola, 
hence they will always cross - unless pm is exactly zero (an unfeasible price). Therefore, E\ 
always exists. This is true regardless of whether Al and A2 hold.
To exclude strictly more than three equilibria, note that E\ always exists, so what is 
required is that there are more than two crossings of SS  and DD. By C2 and C3, the number 
of equilibria will be even. To see this, note that px > py as w —» w* and as w —► oo, hence an 
odd number of crossings is not possible. To exclude an even number of crossings higher than 
two, note that this would require changes in the concavity/convexity of px and/or py) but this 
cannot be by C4B.
P roof o f P roposition  4:
The configuration shown in Figure 2 is in fine with Proposition 4. C l (strictly)-C4 hold to 
guarantee that DD  and S S  cross exactly twice (see Proposition 1).
Part I follows similar reasoning to Proposition 2: If tariffs for the intermediate goods are 
reduced sufficiently (p mf u  falls below E 2), equilibrium E\ ceases to exist and the economy 
converges to E&-
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To see how i, ii and iii relate to parts I, 11, and III, consider each of the former:
i) For an endogenous increase in technological capabilities to take place, the technological 
take-off wage rate (tus) must lie below the equilibrium wage rate (w). This will hold if and 
only if ^  1 . Substituting w and ws from (6.25) and (6.24), respectively, yields C5. ‘i’ is a 
necessary condition for part I.
ii) Industrialization will be characterized by an increase in technological capabilities if and 
only if wa £ [we2, ^ 3]. Substituting ws into the equilibrium condition (6.13), condition C6  is 
obtained, ‘ii’ is another necessary condition for part I.
iii) In order to have w ^  wez (part II), it is useful to plot the equilibrium condition (6.13). 
This can be seen in Figure 3, where the left hand side (LHS, equal to c) has been plotted 
against the right hand side (RHS, equal to (w)*+T~“ )'
EQUILIBRIUM CONDITION
R H S
LHS
LH S
RH S
w
Figure 3: The equilibrium condition from Model A (equation 6.13)
In Figure 3 it can be seen that for w ^  Wez to hold, we require LHS^RHS. This is also the 
condition required for w ^  wez- But this also holds for w ^  we2- In order to rule out this case, 
both C5 (or ‘i’) and C6  (or ‘ii’) are necessary. Substituting w into the equilibrium condition 
(6.13), setting LHS^RHS and simplifying yields C7. Note that since 0 ^  c < 1 (from Cl) and 
the exponents of c in C7 are positive, C7 yields a restriction of the form c ^  c*, where c* solves 
C7 with equality. C5, C6  and C7 are each necessary for ‘iii’, and together they are sufficient. 
Part II and ‘iii’ are equivalent.
For part III, note that if the tariff is reduced such that pm < px(w), the upstream industry 
will not be able to attain a positive market share, even with high technological capability. As 
in Model A, the economy achieves a higher wage rate in this easel.
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A p pendix  3: Stability
Let we be the wage rate associated with equilibrium ‘£ ’. Recall that upstream firms cannot sell 
at a price higher than the price of imports. Hence, supply price is given by ps =  mm(px,pm). 
Let us introduce the following definition of stability:
Definition: Stability
I) An equilibrium is left-stable if and only if for w < w e , py > pa> Otherwise it is left- 
unstable.
II) An equilibrium is right-stable if and only if for w > w e , py < ps- Otherwise it is 
right-unstable.
An equilibrium is stable if and only if it is left and right stable. An equilibrium is unstable 
if and only if it is left and right unstable®.
To see how this definition works, we now apply it to the equilibria considered in Proposition 
1 . Consider first the case when pm is not binding.
Left-stability: Recall £ 3  in Figure 1. If py > px, the market price is py. Upstream firms 
make positive profits and entry into the upstream industry follows. This increases aggregate 
supply of intermediate output, lowering supply price by moving along px. In turn, higher 
aggregate supply of intermediate output reduces equilibrium price, and this allows a higher 
level of final output. Thus, the gap between px and py is reduced. Higher output in downstream 
and upstream sectors leaves less labour available for the rest of the economy, increasing wages. 
The process continues until py =  px at we (convergence).
Left-instability: Recall £ 2  in Figure 1. If py < px exit follows, thereby decreasing 
aggregate intermediate output, px rises, further increasing the gap between px and py. The 
reduction of aggregate intermediate and downstream output increases labour used in the rest 
of the economy, thereby reducing wages. This process takes the economy to successively lower 
wages and increases the gap between px and py (divergence). Similarly, E2 is left-unstable.
Right-stability: Recall £ 3  in Figure 1. If py < px, arguments similar to the left-instability 
case indicate that the economy converges to a smaller wage rate where py — px. Similar 
reasoning shows that E2 is also right-stable.
R ight-inst ability: Recall £ 2  in Figure 1. If py > px, similar reasoning to the left-stability 
case shows the economy diverging to a larger wage rate where the gap between py and px grows 
(locally).
If pm is binding (as at £ 1), the above reasoning goes through with a slight change. The
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gap between ps and py is not reduced (augmented) by upstream output price changes. Rather, 
the mechanism at work are changes in the aggregate supply of upstream goods, for a fixed 
price. These changes are an optimal reply by upstream firms to unfulfilled demand by down­
stream firms, which occur by either entry or exit (as appropriate). Changes in X  will lead 
to movements along py (while p3 is fixed at pm). These movements along py will either re­
duce or expand the gap between pm and py, depending on whether the stable or unstable case 
(respectively) is being considered.
It follows that Ei and £ 3  are stable equilibria, £ 2  i s  unstable and E2 is right-stable and 
left-unstable.
A p pend ix  4: D eriving th e  solved-out profit function
By perfect substitutability, upstream firms set JJ =  A. Equation (6.18) is reproduced here for 
convenience:
A =  w j —  (A3.1)
L j  U3 X 3
Firms maximize 7ri =  (p* — wc) =  (A 14 — wc) X{. The first order condition is
A =  wc (A3.2)
D
From (A3.2) solve for iMXi and sum this over all firms to get
w + l  /  J V ,• ,  N + l
j  \  i  3
Substitute u3x j  fr°m (A3.'l) into (A3.3) and solve for A to obtain:
N i  I AT . 1 1 1 \
<A3-3)
N +1 -
A = ^  E 1 (A3-4)N  Uj v '3 J
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This can be substituted into (A3.2) to give the following solutions for pi and X{ and, using 
these, 7Tj.
N  I N
* i  =  — - w , i  . . .  1 -wc EiV + 1  Ij U j  \  2^/j Uj
N + l
, WC UiPi =  AUi =  —  > —iv ' Uj
„. ,u. » v
EJ V + l  Uij  U j
7Tj is equation (6 .2 0 ) in the text.
A ppendix 5: A  N o te  on  Second Order C onditions
Since the downstream firms’ problem is strictly convex, it follows that the second order con­
ditions hold. The upstream sector’s second order conditions hold for any N  +  1 > 1, which is 
guaranteed by w > w* (Al).
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Extensions for 
Future Research
This study was motivated by reference to a variety of industrialization experiences, particularly 
those of some East Asian economies (especially South Korea, Japan and Taiwan). We now 
summarize our theoretical findings, and relate them to the historical experience.
After a series of disappointing results from structural reforms based on prescriptions of 
the ‘Washington consensus’ (particularly in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa) and the 
huge literature detailing how East Asian economies diverged from such prescriptions to achieve 
outstanding performance, the economics profession is looking for a better understanding of how 
such heterodox policies could have worked. Rodrik (2004, p.l) puts the problem succinctly:
“Perhaps the disappointments in Africa are due to special circumstances: the 
ravages of civil war and crises in public health. But how can one explain the Latin 
American story, which is one of poor growth and productivity performance in the 
1990s—much worse than in the 1950-1980 period? Fiscal discipline, privatization 
and openness to trade have produced an economic performance that does not even 
begin to match the performance under import substitution. And that is a puzzle 
of major proportions.”
This thesis contributes by providing detailed theoretical insight into the design of indus­
trial and trade policy, using models which capture some essential features of the East Asian 
experience, within a framework which is standard in economic analysis.
A theoretical model is by necessity a simplification of reality, and as such is not expected 
to explain all aspects of the latter. Rather, it is a starting point which uncovers a set of
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mechanisms so that we may begin to shed light into particular processes or systems. The 
models we have developed here address the issue of industrialization. The view that emerges 
from them is essentially that of development as the transformation of a dual economy into an 
industrial economy (Lewis, 1954). While the transition can be caused by different mechanisms, 
the study as a whole points towards an understanding of this transformation process. The 
models in parts I and II provide an understanding of industrialization as a process in which 
an economy changes its underlying institutional structure, and it is these changes that lead to 
its transformation. The model in part III provides an alternative perspective. In that case, 
the transformation is viewed as a process triggered by an initial change (the crossing of a 
threshold). Then, if a series of conditions are fulfilled, the economy may cross a sequence of 
take-offs which will determine at which level of income it ends up.
The models we construct feature some aspects of the East Asian industrialization process 
that have been identified as salient by a number of authors (Amsden, 1989 and Wade, 1990, 
among others). As outlined in chapter 1 (introduction), these features are:
1) Oligopolistic behaviour and the associated strategic interaction.
2) An endogenous treatment of technological capability and market structure.
3) A general equilibrium framework.
4) A dualistic structure (characteristic of many backward economies).
Chapter 2 presents the benchmark closed economy model. Strategic interaction takes the 
form of Cournot competition. The model highlights the trade-off between the market structure 
effect and the technological capability effect. These effects are the fundamental driving force 
for many subsequent results. They constitute the underlying determinants of the demand for 
labour from industry X : Labour demand stems from the sunk investment in technological 
capability that each firm carries out. Accordingly, the number of firms present in the industry 
also affects labour demand. The key notion is that, so long as actual and shadow values of 
outcomes do not diverge1, technological capability and the number of firms always move in
xThis caveat refers to a minor exception discussed in chapter 4 (section 4.1), relating to Figure 4.1b: For 0 
and a high and 7  low, both technological capability and the number of firms rise together. This occurs for the 
following reasons:
On the one hand, for these parameter values the wage rate is unity, hence the shadow value of the wage rate 
lies below the actual outcome. Accordingly, actual technological capability lies below its shadow value (since 
its actual marginal cost is higher than its shadow marginal cost). As 7  increases, the wage rate rises above 
unity and actual outcomes converge to their shadow values. Since actual technological capability was below its 
shadow counterpart, we observe tha t actual technological capability rises to meet its shadow value (meanwhile 
shadow technological capability is decreasing in 7 ).
On the other hand, for low 7 , the number of firms is increasing in 7 . Thus we find that actual outcomes of 
technological capability and the number of firms are moving in the same direction. However, the underlying 
mechanism whereby one variable moves in the opposite direction of the other still applies (the shadow value of 
technological capability is falling). I t has only been concealed by the divergence of shadow and actual values.
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opposite directions: Higher sunk costs increase concentration. Thus, a rise in technological 
capability implies a fall in the number of firms and viceversa. We envisaged two development 
configurations:
H igh-tech: The economy is characterized by few firms, each with high technological ca­
pability.
Proliferation: The economy is characterized by many firms, each with low technological 
capability.
The key question is then, which configuration will deliver the highest the demand for labour 
and hence the highest wage rate? Proposition 1 summarizes the result: Unless a is low, a high- 
tech development configuration is associated with a higher wage rate (and welfare). If cr is low, 
then a proliferation configuration is associated with a higher wage (and welfare). Essentially 
this means that the technological capability effect always dominates the market structure effect, 
except when goods are poor substitutes (i.e., a high degree of horizontal differentiation). This 
proposition is easily extended to encompass an economy composed by multiple industries, 
which are only linked via the labour market. This means that there are neither inter-industry 
demand linkages (goods are not substitutes across industries), nor supply linkages (there are 
no intermediate products). In this simple (but enlightening) case, if a planner chooses policies 
such that all industries except those with low within-industry product substitutability achieve 
maximum technological capability, maximum demand for labour will ensue (thus the wage rate 
and welfare will be maximized). Meanwhile, if a planner chooses policies so that concentration 
is minimized in industries with highly horizontally differentiated products, labour demand from 
these industries will also be maximized.
In chapter 3 we open the autarky model to trade. The international economy features two 
countries, each identical to the autarky model. Firms are Cournot competitors and there is 
strategic interaction between each firm and its rivals (domestic and foreign). We find a sym­
metric general equilibrium, such that each country’s industry X  features subgame perfection. 
With identical parameter values in both nations, we can rule out asymmetric equilibria in 
which firms in one nation have a different technological capability to the other nation’s firms 
(Proposition 2). Moreover, if profits are exactly zero for each firm, the result immediately 
extends to all types of asymmetric equilibria. Thus multiplicity of equilibria is not an issue, 
and we can safely focus on the symmetric equilibrium without need to worry about equilibrium 
switching phenomena.
We find that under Cournot competition free trade always results in a higher wage rate, and 
hence trade is welfare improving (Proposition 3). Moreover the conclusions about development
220
configurations are reinforced for the open economy (high-tech beats proliferation unless a is 
low, in which case the reserve holds).
A fundamental result is that a firm’s marginal benefit of technological capability is de­
creasing in the technological gap, i.e., in the ratio of the firm’s technological capability to its 
overseas rivals’ (Proposition 1). The consequence of this is that if the gap is too wide, firms 
in the backward economy do not find it optimal to invest in technological capability (the net 
marginal benefit is negative).
The opening of the economy to foreign competition forces domestic firms to either match 
their foreign rivals’ technological capability or exit. Thus, in being exposed to a larger market 
size, firms in both nations raise their technological capability, and this leads to the associated 
increase in sunk investments, and a rise in concentration. This mechanism sheds light on how 
the export boom preceded the investment boom in South Korea and Taiwan (Rodrik, 1995a, 
see the comment by Victor Norman).
When we allow for asymmetries in initial conditions, the symmetry of the equilibrium 
is broken in the sense that the initially symmetric equilibrium outcomes will shift to new 
values which are no longer symmetric (although they still correspond to the same equilibrium, 
i.e., multiplicity of equilibria does not arise). The procedure to track equilibrium outcomes 
towards the new outcomes is as follows: We begin from a symmetric equilibrium with identical 
parameter values. Then we introduce a small change in the ratio of initial conditions (J®J) 
and calculate the new equilibrium outcome so that equilibrium conditions hold exactly at the 
new outcome. There are three equilibrium conditions for each country:
1) A condition for the optimal choice of technological capability in industry X.
2) A free-entry condition in industry X .
3) A labour market clearing condition.
The new outcome (which is no longer symmetric) then becomes the starting point for the 
next round of iteration. The procedure was repeated until we encompassed a wide range of 
relative initial conditions. We found that the gains-from-trade-theorem needs to be qualified in 
the following manner: Provided the asymmetries are not too large, both nations gain from free 
trade. However, if initial conditions are too different (the technological gap is too wide), the 
backward nation may find that autarky leads to a higher wage rate. Meanwhile the advanced 
nation still benefits from free trade. This incompatibility of interests gives rise to issues of 
unfair trade negotiations, in which an advanced country pressures a backward nation into a 
trade agreement which is not beneficial to it. The lesson that can be taken from this result 
is that before exposing domestic industry to foreign competition, it is important to compare
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the relative technological capabilities of both industries. If the local industry is lagging too 
far behind, then rather than expose it to trade straight away, it may be more convenient to 
enhance its technological capability first to ensure the technological gap is reduced sufficiently 
and the domestic economy benefits from trade.
Bhagwati (1988) has discussed at length the trend in the USA during the mid-eighties to 
spouse a kind of ‘strategic’ trade policy. The policies spoused by this trend amount to little 
less than coercing small economies into trade diversion towards the USA. The support of such 
policies often calls upon some variant of the infant industry argument, whereby temporary 
interventions may generate a permanent advantage to the small nation. The small nation 
would then presumably overtake the USA in a particular industry. In order to prevent this 
overtaking, interest groups in the USA support removing interventions (industrial policies) 
in foreign economies, which could give rivals an ‘unfair’ advantage. The problem with this 
prescription, as embodied in the 1988 Trade Act, is that the USA would itself decide whether 
foreign rivals enjoy such ‘unfair’ advantages. Given the bargaining power of the USA, it is likely 
that politically weaker rivals can be coerced into trade-distorting measures, such as voluntary 
import expansions, where they divert trade from other nations to the USA. Proposition 4 in 
chapter 3 states the circumstances under which these incentives arise, and pins down parameter 
values that identify the cases under which it will be optimal for the laggard nation to open 
up to free trade with the advanced nation, and when it will not be in its interest. The 
basic thrust of the proposition is that free trade is always welfare enhancing, provided the 
technological capabilities of the two nations are not too dissimilar. It is when technological 
capabilities become very different that the laggard nation could be better off remaining closed 
(although free trade will still be welfare improving to the advanced nation). This proposition 
provides positive and normative criteria for the formation of trading blocks, under conditions 
of dual economies with oligopolistic industries. Basically, nations should only set up free trade 
agreements with nations whose technological capabilities are not too dissimilar to their own. 
When technological capabilities of the laggard economies expand (presumably as a consequence 
of free trade within the ‘backward trading block’) and the technology gap with the advanced 
nation is reduced, it may be optimal to engage in free trade with the advanced nation. The 
last decade has seen the USA embark upon a series of bilateral free trade agreements with 
small nations (particularly within Latin America). The theoretical findings we have developed 
here lead us to predict that these small nations will not benefit from such agreements.
The next questions addressed in chapter 3 relate to catching-up and industrial policy: 
Is a subsidy to investment in technological capability (financed with a lump-sum tax) an
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effective mechanism for catching-up? If so, is it welfare improving? We find affirmatively for 
both questions. Given some level of asymmetry in initial conditions, assume the government 
subsidizes investment in technological capability to ensure that the wage rate of the laggard 
economy matches that of the advanced economy, and this subsidy is financed with a lump-sum 
tax. This subsidy will effectively result in the laggard nation catching-up with the advanced 
nation in terms of their wage rates, even after accounting for any strategic response by foreign 
oligopolists. The social costs of the subsidy do not offset its social benefits, and there is a net 
welfare gain in the laggard economy.
In chapter 4 we introduce adjustable intensity of competition into the benchmark autarky 
model from chapter 2. This is done by means of a generalized profit function for firms in 
industry X .  This device allows us to vary the intensity of competition from individual profit 
maximization to perfect collusion (joint profit maximization), by changing a single parameter 
(7 ). Additionally, the way we have modelled the intensity of competition can be interpreted 
as conjectural variations, with the advantage that 7  is directly measurable (it is the extent of 
cross-ownership within the industry).
The effects of increasing the intensity of competition depend on the values of /? (related 
to the marginal cost of technological capability) and a  (product substitutability or horizontal 
product differentiation). If either or a  are low, then stronger intensity of competition in­
creases technological capability and concentration. If is low (for any a) then it also increases 
the wage rate. If on the other hand ft and a are high, technological capability and concentra­
tion are non-monotonic in 7 . If f3 is high, the wage rate is shaped like an inverted-U in 7 . This 
means that for industries in which the marginal cost of technological capability is high, there 
is an intermediate level of collusion (intensity of competition) which maximizes the wage rate. 
This leads to a revision of the results on development configurations from previous chapters. 
A high-tech configuration leads to higher wages, with two exceptions:
1 ) When a  is low (as before). In this case a proliferation configuration attains higher wages.
2) When (3 is high and 7  takes intermediate values. In this case we find that an in ter­
m ediate configuration yields higher wages. An intermediate economy is characterized by 
intermediate levels of technological capability and concentration.
In chapter 5 we consider the open economy version of the autarky model in chapter 4. The 
opening of the economy is performed essentially in the same manner as in chapter 3. Regarding 
development configurations, the results from autarky require a slight modification. Now the 
high-tech configuration leads to higher wages except when:
1 ) cr is low (as before), in which case proliferation yields higher wages.
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2) When both ft and a are high and 7  takes intermediate values, in which case the inter­
mediate configuration yields higher wages.
In chapter 4 (autarky with adjustable intensity of competition) we found that when tech­
nological capability features a high marginal cost (high /?), there is an optimal level for the 
intensity of competition (alternatively, an optimal level of collusion) which maximizes the wage 
rate. In the open economy with adjustable intensity of competition, we find a similar result, 
but now we not only require high ft, but also a high degree of product substitutability (high 
<7 ). This can help to explain the behaviour of Japan’s MTTI, which sometimes intervened to 
curb competition, by encouraging cartelization and other means of reducing the intensity of 
competition (Amsden and Singh, 1994). We would also expect that as the economy reduces 
its marginal cost of technological capability (/? falls), it would benefit more from subsequent 
reductions in the intensity of competition. That is, as an economy matures from backward to 
advanced, the optimal competition policy changes from medium levels of collusion (intermedi­
ate intensity of competition), to tough competition.
Other results from the open economy with adjustable intensity of competition relate to 
trade policy. We found that there exists a separating surface in the space of (/?, 7 , a) which 
equates the wage of the open economy with adjustable intensity of competition to that of its 
autarky counterpart (Proposition 1, chapter 5). For combinations of (/?, 7 , a) lying above the 
surface, autarky results in a higher wage. Conversely, for combinations below the surface, free- 
trade yields higher wages. The separation arises from the trade-off between the technological 
capability effect and the market structure effect. When the economy is opened, two things 
happen. First, technological capability rises as a result of the increase in market size. Second, 
some firms exit. The two effects exactly offset each other at the separating surface. The impli­
cation is that different industries require different trade regimes, and these are characterized 
in Proposition 2 (chapter 5). A precise prediction as to which types of industry should be 
opened and which left in autarky is provided. In particular, as the intensity of competition 
rises, free-trade becomes optimal for more and more industries. In the limit, as the intensity 
of competition reaches its maximum ( 7  =  0 , i.e., individual profit maximization), the model 
collapses to that of chapter 3 and free-trade is always welfare improving. Proposition 2 and 
Figure 5.3 (chapter 5) provide a typification of the optimal trade regime depending on the 
industry type. Industries which feature low substitutability are quite resilient to free-trade, 
and will generally benefit from it, especially those with low marginal costs of technological ca­
pability (low P). On the other hand, industries with high substitutability tend to be better off 
in autarky, particularly those with low marginal costs of technological capability (low ft). High
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substitutability makes foreign competition potentially very harmful (a strong market structure 
effect), and if this is compounded with strong incentives for escalation (low (3), industries are 
likely to contract their labour demand and thus depress the economy’s wage rate.
We must be careful not to let these results be misinterpreted. The conclusion is not that we 
should dose this or that industry, full stop. That would be throwing the baby out with the bath 
water. Rather, we need to step back and ask the more fundamental question: What can we do 
to increase the wage rate? Most of the parameters are amenable to being controlled by a policy 
maker. /3 (relating to the marginal cost of technological capability) and e (set-up costs) can 
be influenced by industrial policy. 7  relates to competition (antitrust) policy. L  (population) 
can be controlled to some extent by migration and demographic policy. Initial conditions (or 
rather future initial conditions) can be modified by the actions taken in the present, for example 
investment in human capital. Product substitutability (a) seems harder to modify. It may be 
that firms can modify this by investing in horizontal product differentiation (see Motta and 
Polo, 1998). However, in the absence of a formal theoretical treatment, it seems difficult to 
suggest how a policy maker could control it.
Such modification of parameter values points towards changes in the institutional frame­
work of the economy. With these notions in mind we can then focus on what the optimal 
parameter values are in order to achieve the highest demand for labour, wage rate and welfare. 
From Figures 4.1-4.6 we learn that higher wages will follow from lower (3, lower 7  (if either of (3 
or a are low), intermediate 7  (if both j3 and a are high), low cr, low e, high uq and high L. If a 
policy maker can control these parameters, then the economy can be shifted towards a higher 
wage rate. Granges in parameter values leading to higher wages also imply that free-trade is 
optimal. The conclusion is, then, to ask firstly, where in (/?, 7 , <r)-space is the economy located? 
Then, to ask what trade regime is optimal at the current location and whether it is feasible (and 
welfare improving) to modify the institutional framework of the economy (parameter values) 
in order to increase the wage rate and allow the economy to make the most out of free-trade.
This brings us to the question of industrial policy, regarding asymmetries in initial condi­
tions and catching-up. We find the same results as in chapter 3: Catching-up is feasible for 
all parameter values, and industrial policy to this end is welfare improving. Thus industrial 
policy directed at controlling (3 or e in order to shift the economy towards a high-wage state 
(catching-up) is, in principle, feasible.
Expanding this reasoning to a multiple industry scenario leads to similar conclusions. Dif­
ferent industries will be characterized by different parameter values. Thus the policy maker’s 
problem is to modify parameter values so that labour demand from each industry is maximized.
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To recap, it seems there is a strong case for tough competition policy, except in the case 
of industries in which it is hard to raise technological capability (high (3) and goods are easily 
substitutable (high cr). In this case, an intermediate intensity of competition may be desirable. 
Regarding trade policy, if competition is tough ( 7  =  0 ), then free trade is optimal. For lower 
intensities of competition, the optimal trade regime may differ between industries. The general 
picture is that if parameters can be controlled, shifting these to achieve higher wages always 
guarantees that free-trade is optimal. On the other hand, if a cannot be controlled, we find 
grounds for maintaining high a industries in autarky.
In chapter 6  we present a model of the ‘Big Push’ with endogenous technological capabilities 
and multiple equilibria. This chapter presents a vision of the process of development based 
a sequence of take-offs. The transition from a low wage to a high wage equilibrium can be 
triggered by trade policy (industrial take-off). Along the transition path, if the wage rate 
does not rise too steeply, the economy may cross a technological take-off, and this will trigger 
investment in technological capability. There is a window of opportunity through which the 
economy must fit in order to cross the technological take-off, and the conditions for this are 
indeed stringent. Under certain conditions, this will lead to a high-wage equilibrium which 
features a higher wage rate than would have been the case without investment in technological 
capability. If the economy does not manage to fit through the window of opportunity, it will end 
up with a thwarted industrialization process in which it has achieved a higher wage rate, but 
has not increased its technological capability. Thus, the economy industrializes by expanding 
industry along a low-tech path.
The view that emerges from Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) is that the Japanese, South 
Korean and Taiwanese economies successfully used industrial, competition and trade policies 
in order to increase their income levels. If we look at the structure of these economies at the 
beginning of their transformation, and compare that picture with the current status, what we 
see are economies which began being mostly agrarian societies, and are now characterized by 
a series of high-tech industries. Comparing this with less successful industrializes, a crucial 
difference seems to be the extent to which the North East Asian economies managed to develop 
their technological capabilities (their entry into high-tech industries). They first went through 
an import substitution phase, and only later did they open their economies (even then, the 
opening was most generous on the exports side, with import liberalization being less forth­
coming). During the import substitution phase they began the transformation of the economy 
with policies aimed at increasing technological capability. Later on, when their economies were 
opened, their products were sufficiently competitive to successfully enter world markets. How
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did they successfully raise their technological capability during the import substitution phase? 
Appropriate use of competition and industrial policies is supported by our theoretical findings 
as a key ingredient to their performance. It remains to be seen whether the specifics of North 
East Asian industrial and competition policies were in line with our theoretical predictions. 
Studies like that by Lee (1997) for trade policy, preferably at a more disaggregated level, con­
stitute a useful starting point to elucidate the effects of industrial and competition policies on 
industrial output growth.
Wade (2003, p. xlviii) asserts the need for multilateral agencies to become involved in 
the design of development strategies that take into account the lessons from the East Asian 
experience, namely the strategic use of industrial and trade policies. However, the problem 
is that the formal theoretical basis for the design of such policies has been lacking (with 
the exception of the work by Dixit and Grossman, 1986, which only deals with industrial 
policy, i.e., subsidies). Wade (ibid.) proposes the use of input-output tables to guide the 
promotion criteria for such industrial policies. The criteria he supports is that the planners 
should aim to achieve a ‘dense’ input-output matrix, i.e., an economy with lots of internal 
linkages. Amsden (1989) proposes supporting industries which feature high income elasticities. 
Lall (1992) mentions growth potential, linkages and externalities. None of these authors provide 
a positive or normative formal analysis to found such important claims. This thesis provides 
a formal, testable theoretical framework which allows a positive and normative analysis of 
industrial, competition and trade policies. More work is needed to make the theories more 
realistic and general, not to mention thorough testing.
Future Research and Limitations
Possible extensions for future research include using Bertrand competition instead of Cournot 
as the underlying structure of the final stage subgame. This offers the possible advantage 
of encompassing a complete coverage of intensities of competition, all the way from perfect 
collusion (joint profit maximization) to Bertrand (considered to be the most intense of all 
forms of competition).
Other extensions include relaxing the 1:1 structure of industry Y  to allow a more general 
structure, possibly with dim in ish in g  marginal returns. Alternatively, we could drop industry 
Y  altogether. However, this would entail losing the dual structure of the economy, which was 
deemed an attractive feature from the development economics perspective.
A strategic analysis for government policy (in the spirit of the strategic trade policy liter­
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ature, e.g. Brander and Spencer, 1985) lies outside the scope of the thesis, and incorporating 
such decisions into the current framework is a promising extension. Moreover, reference has 
been made to how a policy maker could control several of the parameters of the model. This 
raises the question of how such control would be achieved, the costs associated with it and 
whether such modifications would indeed pay off in terms of welfare. Some progress has been 
made in this direction by considering industrial policy for catching-up in the presence of asym­
metries in initial conditions. Another possibility is to consider the symmetric equilibrium and 
ask whether shifting the economy from some initial parameter configuration towards a new 
configuration (presumably associated with higher wage rates) would be feasible and welfare 
improving. Such extensions will be addressed in the future.
The Big-Push model in chapter 6  lends itself to the incorporation of exports. This is a 
worthwhile extension, and we have already made some progress in this direction. Also of 
interest is the reversal of the upstream and downstream sectors: We can imagine a situation 
in which it is the downstream sector where the imperfectly competitive behaviour lies, while 
the upstream sector is perfectly competitive.
The use of the generalized profit function introduced in chapter 4 invites an analysis of 
how firms choose their intensity of competition (7 ). Future work on this could shed light on 
the optimal distribution of property rights within an industry. This addresses the question of: 
What game (Bertrand, Cournot, perfect collusion, etc.) would firms like to play? Again, this 
framework has the advantage of dealing with directly measurable conjectural variations.
An extension of the models in chapters 2-5 to multiple time periods is a necessary step 
towards a full assessment and reconsideration of the infant industry argument, especially re­
garding the role of expectations and intertemporal strategic interaction (first mover advantages, 
preemption, entry deterrence, etc.). Another seemingly promising avenue is to translate this 
framework into a dynamic general equilibrium setting with dynamic oligopoly. This is an 
extension on which we have begun to work. However, the difficulties of modelling dynamic 
oligopoly are not to be underestimated. In general, the models developed in this thesis would 
benefit from dynamic analysis, and it is in this direction that our efforts are being directed. 
Nonetheless, the framework as it stands can be interpreted as a long run model of general 
equilibrium. The model is long run since (long run) variables such as market structure and 
technological capability are determined endogenously, all production is ultimately consumed 
and any external trade imbalances must be paid for. In this sense the analysis may be in­
terpreted as relating to the final resting point of the system after ‘all is said and done’ and 
any issues of intertemporal allocation of resources have been resolved. Dynamic analysis is
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expected to bring forth issues relating to time (in)consistency of economic policy, descriptions 
of transitional paths, intertemporal resource allocation and intertemporal strategic interaction.
Finally, a word of warning is necessary. In this study we have uncovered various justi­
fications for government interventionism, be it in the form of preferential trade agreements, 
subsidies for catching-up (chapter 3) or targeted trade policy (chapters 5 and 6 ). Although 
the literature on trade under imperfect competition is no longer ‘new’, it is still in its infancy 
with regards to the design of optimal policies for interventions, let alone the testing of such 
policies. Thus, to quote Dixit (1984, p. 4): “Any attempts to justify protection [or more 
generally intervention] on the basis of these results would be, at a minimum, premature” . hi 
particular, policy design exercises need to take into account the literature on mechanism design 
(see Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). This lies outside the scope of this study. Hence the usual 
caveats must be emphasized:
Firstly, the opportunity cost of subsidies has been assumed to be forgone consumption, so 
it remains to be shown whether this is a plausible assumption (i.e., whether the opportunity 
cost of subsidies is unity). In particular, if subsidies to industries are to occur at the expense of 
social investments, such as public health or human capital, we expect the case of interventions 
to be substantially weakened.
Secondly, industrial targeting (whether in the form of subsidies or protectionist trade policy) 
is a rent-seeker’s dream. Such results are more than likely to serve as ammunition for vested 
interests in implementing DUP (directly -unproductive) activities to capture rents (Bhagwati, 
1982). The efficiency losses from such efforts can reach a considerable magnitude and should 
not be understated (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).
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